Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

Kunz & Company, dba Kunz Outdoor Advertising
v. State of Utah, Department of Transportation :
Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ralph L. Finlayson; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General.
D. Williams Ronnow; John J. Walton; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Kunz v. Utah, No. 970216 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/800

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KUNZ & COMPANY, dba KUNZ
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a
California corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

u?* w

&mep

fiALS

so
•A10

vs.

4o. 9702165Bl—JLT
Case No

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Priority No. 15
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
Appeal of Judgment from Bench Trial
on Remand of the Fifth Judicial District Court
Honorable James L. Shumate
D. Williams Ronnow - 4132
John J. Walton - 6678
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Ralph L. Finlayson - 1076
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-0857
Tel: (801) 366-0353

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Tel: (801) 628-1627

FILED
JUL 1 8 1997
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KUNZ & COMPANY, dba KUNZ
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a
California corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 970216-CA

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Priority No. 15
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
Appeal of Judgment from Bench Trial
on Remand of the Fifth Judicial District Court
Honorable James L. Shumate
D. Williams Ronnow - 4132
John J. Walton - 6678
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Ralph L. Finlayson - 1076
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-0857
Tel: (801) 366-0353

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Tel: (801) 628-1627

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

I.

NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION BELOW

2

H.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

7

ARGUMENT
I.

H.

HI.

IV.

13614.1

10
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT BASE ITS JUDGMENT ON THE
EXISTENCE OF ANY CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT, BUT ON
THE FACT THAT OUTDOOR ADVERTISING SIGNAGE WAS
ALLOWED ONLY AS A CONDITIONAL USE, AND NOT A
PERMITTED USE UNDER THE TOQUERVTLLE ZONING
ORDINANCE

10

UDOT HAS FAJXED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE THAT
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT
AND THEN DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FINDINGS ARE SO
LACKING IN SUPPORT AS TO BE AGAINST THE CLEAR
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

17

THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE R933-2-3(4) (1994)
PROMULGATED BY THE UTAH TRANSPORTATION
COMMISSION, CANNOT BE APPLIED IN THIS CASE TO
CmCUMVENT THE LAW OF THE CASE ESTABLISHED BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS

18

THE TRIAL COURT CAREFULLY RECEIVED AND
REVIEWED ALL RELEVANT EVTOENCE AS DEFECTED BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS

21

A.

24

PETITION FOR ANNEXATION

i

ACTUAL LAND USE/LACK OF COMMERCIAL
DEVELOPMENT

25

PROPOSED LAND USES/COMPATIBILITY WITH
CHARACTER OF TOWN

26

PERPETUATING WASHINGTON COUNTY ZONING
DESIGNATION

27

E.

UTILITY SERVICE/INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES

28

F.

SIGNAGE ISSUES

29

G.

EXISTING ZONING ORDINANCE AND PROCEDURES. . . .

30

B.
C.
D.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT CAREFULLY STRUCTURED THE ENITRE
TRIAL, ITS FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENT WITHIN THE CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 27-12-136.3(3) AND THE
PARAMETERS ESTABLISHED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. . . 31

CONCLUSION

33

ADDENDA
No. 1 Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3 (Supp. 1994).
No. 2 Kunz & Company v. State. 913 P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1996).
No. 3 Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law.
No. 4 Trial Court's Order and Judgment.
No. 5 Trial Exhibit "1" (Annexation/Zoning Map).
No. 6 Trial Exhibit "2" (p.29, Signs and p.38, Highway Commercial
Zone).
No. 7 Trial Transcript (condensed copy with Record page number
designated at top right side of each page).

13614 1

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987)

15, 31

Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.. 488 U.S. 204 (1988)
Brewster v. Gage. 280 U.S. 327 (1930)

19
19, 20

Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clavton. 863 P.2d 29 (Utah App. 1993)

18

DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co.. 911 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1990) . . . .

19

Doelle v. Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989)

15

Gravson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989)

17

Kunz & Company v. State. 913 P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1996)

2, 8, 20, 22

Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse. 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994) . 18
Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322 (Utah App. 1993)

17, 18

Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979)

15

Scharfv. BMGCoro.. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985)

17

Smith v. Smith. 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986)

15

Sorenson v. Kenecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141 (Utah App. 1994)

15

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

1, 15, 31

Wade v. Stangl. 869 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1994)

17

West Valley Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991)

17

13614.1

iii

STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1996)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1996)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3
(Supp. 1994)

2, 8, 9, 19, 20, 24, 31, 32, 33

Utah Administrative Code R933-2-3(4) (1994)

13614.1

iv

18, 19, 20, 24, 33

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KUNZ & COMPANY, dba KUNZ
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a
California corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 970216-CA

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
Priority No. 15
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
Appeal of Judgment from Bench Trial
on Remand of the Fifth Judicial District Court
Honorable James L. Shumate
D. Williams Ronnow - 4132
John J. Walton - 6678
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Ralph L. Finlayson - 1076
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-0857
Tel: (801) 366-0353

13614.1

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Tel: (801) 628-1627

JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has original jurisdiction over this Appeal from the
Declaratory Judgment of the Fifth District Court under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j)
(Supp. 1996). This Court has jurisdiction resulting from the Supreme Court's pour over of
the case to the Court of Appeals under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1996).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant's Issue No. 1 is a challenge to the adequacy of the Court's Findings of
Fact, and reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36
(Utah 1994).
Appellant's Issue No. 2, if reached at all by this Court, is a question of law or correct
application of law, and is reviewable without deference to the District Court's determination.
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994).
Appellant's Issue No. 3, is not a question of law as asserted by Appellant, but
actually an issue of fact as to the adequacy of the Court's Findings of Fact, and as such it is
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah
1994).
Appellant's Issue No. 4, is also not a question of law, but an indirect challenge to the
adequacy of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and whether they logically show that the Trial
Court's Judgment is within the context of its review of Utah Code Annotated § 27-12136.3(3) (Supp. 1995) and as such is reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. State
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following authorities are believed by Appellee to be the only statutes relevant and
determinative of the issues presented in this Appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION BELOW.
This is a Declaratory Judgment Action on remand from this Court to the Trial Court

for a trial and further evidence on one narrow and specific issue of fact as set forth by this
Court:
The Trial Court erred in concluding that Section 27-12-136.3(3)
applies only to areas outside incorporated cities and towns.
Outdoor advertising is prohibited in any location zoned for the
"primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising." Because
Kunz and UDOT have presented conflicting evidence regarding
Toquerville's primary purpose behind its zoning of Eveleth's
land, we reverse the grant of Summary Judgment and remand
for trial on that issue.
Kunz & Company v. State. 913 P.2d 765, 771 (Utah App. 1996).
In its Statement of the Case, UDOT goes to extreme lengths to resurrect issues and
facts concerning the original UDOT administrative procedure, and the zoning procedure
before the Washington County Commissioners, all of which have been reviewed and resolved
by this Court in the original Appeal and are not relevant to this Court's remand to the Trial
Court. This Court clearly outlined the scope of review for the Trial Court as follows:
Even so, the Order on Remand is res judicata only "as to those
issues which were either tried and determined, or upon all issues
which the party had a fair opportunity to present and have
determined in the other proceeding." (Citations omitted). Kunz
is therefore bound by the prior adjudication that Washington
13614.1
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County zoning of Eveleth's land was for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising. However, this action involves a
different set of facts, which have not been adjudicated: Whether
ToquerviUe fs zoning, rather than Washington County's zoning,
was for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising.
ToquerviUe's annexation and zoning of Eveleth's land occurred
nearly eight (8) months after the State issued its Order on
Remand. Accordingly, the Trial Court was correct to the extent
that it concluded that the Order on Remand was not binding on
this particular issue.
Id. at 769-70.
. . . Inasmuch as Kunz and the State have presented conflicting
evidence as to Toquerville's primary purpose behind the zoning
of Eveleth's land, we conclude that a genuine issue of material
fact exists. We therefore reverse and remand for trial to allow
the fact finder to determine the primary purpose for the zoning
decision.
Id. at 769.
H.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
The following facts relevant to this Court's review of the trial on remand, were

established at trial on October 1, 1996, and were not rebutted by UDOT, and clearly show a
deliberate, careful planning and zoning process that had nothing to do with accommodating
advertising signage, and everything to do with legitimate municipal needs and long range
planning goals.
The property in question, owned by Thomas Eveleth is located in the northern most
limits of the town of ToquerviUe on the west side of Interstate 15, and was annexed by the
town in 1992. (R. 856; 963-64; Ex. 1) The Petition for annexation was presented by more
than half of the property owners involved. (R. 864; 868.) Originally the Eveleth property
was split, with a portion of it to be annexed into ToquerviUe Town and the northern portion
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of it to remain in the unincorporated area of Washington County. Eveleth, together with a
group of property owners on the east side of 1-15, whose property was also split in the
proposed annexation, contacted Toquerville authorities and requested that the annexation
include all of their properties. Subsequently, Toquerville adjusted the proposed annexation to
include those properties. (R. 855:24-25; 856:1-5; 882-83; 884:23-24; 886.)
The annexation was adopted by ordinance October 14, 1992. (R. 963, 964.)
Beginning in January 1993, and continuing until November 1993, the Toquerville Town
Planning Commission, with the assistance of a Planning Consultant, reviewed Toquerville's
existing zoning and land uses, specifically focusing on all commercial property located within
the Town and prepared a master plan which included the newly annexed property at
Anderson Junction. (R. 893-96; 943.) During the master plan process, monthly meetings
were conducted by the Planning Commission open to the public generally and all affected
property owners specifically were invited to participate, and several public hearings were
held at the Planning Commission and Town Council level. (R. 896; 945.) As part of the
master plan process, the Planning Commission and Planning Consultant identified all existing
uses on the newly annexed property, and solicited input from all property owners as to their
desired uses, and discussed projections for proposed future uses. (R. 897-98.)
Prior to formulating its master plan and recommended zoning, the Planning
Commission considered a broad spectrum of issues and factors including, that the majority of
the town residents did not want to have commercial zoning and development in the "treelined" rural atmosphere of the existing Toquerville main street area. (R. 902:23-903:25;
952:12-19; 977:12-17.) The owners of property located right on the Anderson Junction 1-15
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Interchange wanted the property designated commercial to accommodate their plans for
future commercial development. (R. 870:14-25; 947:13-19.) On the east and north of the
interchange, the property owners wanted residential that would allow subdivisions. (R.
867:24- 868:5; 948:21-22.) A majority of town residents expressed general interest in an
expanded commercial zone in town for the opportunities of increased commercial activities
and revenue because of the limited commercial property existing in town. (R. 947:13-17;
966:5-10.)
Only one other spot had been designated commercial, in the extreme south end of
Toquerville. (R.950-52; Ex. 1.) Most residents favored the creation of a commercial zone
around the Anderson Junction Interchange because it was away from the traditional main
street Toquerville area, because it was near the freeway and could not be seen from town,
and because the freeway interchange offered the best potential for commercial opportunity;
(R. 948:25-949:6-9; 950-953; 966:15-21.) In addition, the existing zoning designation of
Washington County prior to the annexation was considered. (R. 902:3-4; 914:7-11.)
In November 1993, the Planning Commission recommended to the Town Council that
the Anderson Junction area that includes the Eveleth property, be zoned Highway
Commercial (H-C) as provided in the Toquerville Zoning Ordinance (Ex. 2) on the basis that
its location on the 1-15 Interchange would generate substantial commercial traffic, and on the
further basis that the owners of the property on the intersection desired such a designation to
accommodate future commercial development plans, and it provided the best potential tax
base benefits without impacting the traditional existing Toquerville down town area. (R. 90203; 947:13-17; 952:12-953:14.)
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While there was discussion of existence of the three Kunz Outdoor Advertising signs
on the annexed property, there was never any discussion of the outdoor advertising signs as
justification for a Highway Commercial (H-C) zoning designation. (R. 977:18-22.) There
was discussion with the Planning Commission and Planning Consultant about the existing
signs and how to handle them. The Consultant noted in these discussions that the existing
zoning ordinance did not specifically address outdoor advertising and that something needed
to be included in an amended ordinance to specifically address location and regulation. (R.
905-906:8.) Some property owners were very concerned and opposed any proliferation of
outdoor advertising in the 1-15 corridor, while other property owners wanted outdoor signage
as part of their future commercial uses. The discussion of outdoor advertising came down to
the fact that the current Toquerville zoning ordinance did not address outdoor advertising
specifically, and that the ordinance needed to be amended to specifically address location and
regulation of outdoor advertising. (R. 911-912.)
Ultimately, after extensive review and analysis the Toquerville Planning Commission
recommended that the property on the Anderson Junction 1-15 interchange, including the
Eveleth property be zoned Highway Commercial (H-C). Approximately a month later on
December 14, 1993, after detailed discussion by the Toquerville Town Council of the
Planning Commission recommendation, the Town Council adopted the proposed Master Plan
and zoning map and designated the Anderson Junction interchange property including the
Eveleth property as Highway Commercial (H-C) pursuant to the Toquerville zoning
ordinance. (R. 975-976.)
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The Toquerville zoning ordinance adopted in 1982 (R. 956-57; 984-84.) provides that
advertising signs are a conditional use within the Highway Commercial (H-C) zone in
Toquerville Town. (R. 925-26.) In fact, all uses in the Highway Commercial (H-C) zone
were designated conditional uses under the Toquerville zoning ordinance applicable at the
time of the Town's zoning of the subject property in 1993. (R. 926:1-7; Ex. 2 at 38.) The
H-C zone for the Anderson Junction property was adopted pursuant to this ordinance and the
zoning ordinance was not amended in any way to accommodate outdoor advertising.
(R.935.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Trial Court did not base its Judgment on the existence of any conditional use
permit, but on the fact that outdoor advertising signage is allowed only as a conditional use
and not a permitted use under the Toquerville Zoning Ordinance. UDOT mistakenly
concludes that the Trial Court relied on the existence of conditional use permits for the signs
at issue. The record clearly supports the Court's Findings of Fact, that Toquerville's Zoning
Ordinance preexisted the annexation and zoning of the Eveleth property and that the
Toquerville Ordinance did not allow outdoor advertising as a permitted use, but only as a
conditional use subject to a conditional use review procedure and permit. The evidence
shows that the Town intended to substantially limit outdoor advertising signage by use of this
conditional use procedure, in response to concerns expressed by citizens in planning hearings
that outdoor advertising signage in the 1-15 corridor be limited.
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UDOT has failed to marshall the evidence from the record and demonstrate the Trial
Court's Findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. Therefore, this Court should
dismiss UDOT's Appeal.
The Administrative rale R933-2-3(4)(1994), cannot be applied in this case to
circumvent the law of the case established by this Court in Kunz & Company v. State. 913
P.2d 765, 768 (Utah App. 1996). UDOT argues for & post facto retroactive application of
an administrative rale the Utah Department of Transportation adopted that clearly
circumvents the express holding of the Trial Court in its Summary Judgment dated December
22, 1994 (R. 600-602) and affirmed in pertinent part by this Court in its opinion,
"while we agree that an area zoned for commercial or industrial
use in a city or town need not actually have commercial
development on it to satisfy the definition in Section 27-12136.3(2)(a), we conclude that such property may still be
excluded from use for outdoor advertising if the zoning violates
Section 27-12-136.3(3)".
Id. at 768. This is the law of the case. This Court remanded the issue of "primary purpose"
under Section 27-12-136.3(3) for trial, and clearly declined to construe Section 27-12136.3(3) to include zones in which the "primary activity" is outdoor advertising.

UDOT has never made a claim or preserved the issue that Section 27-12-136.3(3) is
ambiguous in any way or that R933-2-3(4) (1994) applies in this case. Nor did this Court
treat Section 27-12-136.3(3) as ambiguous in its express directive to the Trial Court to take
evidence as to primary purpose of the Toquerville Town zoning action. Therefore, a UDOT
Administrative rale cannot be applied in an attempt to circumvent the clear law of the case as
established by the Court of Appeals.
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The Trial Court carefully received and considered all relevant evidence as expressly
directed by this Court. IcL at 769. The Trial Court received evidence and testimony with
regard to the following factors considered by Toquerville Town:
A.

Petition for Annexation.

B.

Land Use/Lack of Commercial Development.

C.

Proposed Land Uses/Compatibility with character of Town.

D.

Washington County Zoning.

E.

Utility Service/Infrastructure.

F.

Signage Issues.

G.

Existing Town Zoning Ordinances and Procedures.

Finally, the Trial Court carefully structured the entire trial, and the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment within the context and framework of Utah Code
Annotated § 27-12-136.3(3) and according to the parameters established by this Court on
remand. The record clearly shows sufficient evidence supporting each of the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact, which in turn show the logic followed by the Court in its Findings of Fact
and Conclusion of Law which form the basis for the Trial Court's Judgment which should be
affirmed by this Court.

13614.1
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT BASE ITS JUDGMENT ON
THE EXISTENCE OF ANY CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT,
BUT ON THE FACT THAT OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
SIGNAGE WAS ALLOWED ONLY AS A CONDITIONAL
USE, AND NOT A PERMITTED USE UNDER THE
TOQUERVILLE ZONING ORDINANCE.

UDOT has mischaracterized the Trial Court's Finding of Fact Number 10 and sets up
a "strawman" in an attempt to avoid its burden of marshalling the evidence which supports
the Trial Court's Finding. UDOT argues that the Trial Court's ultimate Judgment was based
on the existence of Toquerville conditional use permits for the signs in question, and then
argues Kunz "tendered no evidence to show that Toquerville had issued conditional use
permits for the signs", thereby avoiding its burden to marshall the evidence. UDOT quotes
the following Finding in support of its argument:
10. Due to the fact that the placement of outdoor advertising
signs within the Eveleth property after Toquerville annexed and
zoned the subject property could only be done by conditional
use permit, the Court cannot find that the primary purpose of
zoning was to allow outdoor advertising signage.
(Findings of Fact, R. 769)

Nowhere in the Finding quoted or in any other Finding of Fact articulated by the
Court, or in dicta in the trial transcript, does the Court comment on, make a finding, or
otherwise conclude that there is any conditional use permit for the signs. The existence of
conditional use permits was never raised and was not the focus of the Court because it is not
relevant. A careful reading of the Court's Findings of Fact in sequence clearly puts Finding
Number 10 in the correct context:
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6. The Court finds from Exhibit "1" and testimony, the Town
of Toquerville, is separated into two distinct areas, one south of
a high ridge that blocks the view of Anderson Junction from the
traditional "main street" area, and one north and west of the
high ridge which constitutes the annexed area and includes the
Anderson Junction and the 1-15 Interchange.
7. Unrebutted testimony was presented without objection that it
was the purpose of the Town in establishing its master plan,
zoning ordinance, zoning districts, and a zoning map, that
commercial zoning be limited to two distinct areas. One, a tiny
parcel located at the south end of the Town on State Highway
U-17 which leads toward La Verkin, Utah and the other parcel
immediately surrounding the Anderson Junction 1-15 Interchange
in the north end of Toquerville.
8. The Court finds from Exhibit "2", it was the intent of
Toquerville Town, because it incorporated its planning and
zoning to match up with the existing zoning ordinance, that any
signage of the type involved in this litigation be permissible only
by conditional use permit. The Town Ordinance so provides,
and it was the clear intention of the Town in this annexation to
substantially limit outdoor advertising signs by that process.
9. The Court heard evidence and testimony of the intent of the
Town from the former Mayor, the former Chairman of the
Planning Commission at the time these actions were undertaken,
and from the former Town Engineer, while such testimony
provides some assistance in the Court's determination of these
facts, the most telling evidence of Toquerville's intent with
respect to outdoor advertising signs is the Toquerville Zoning
Ordinance itself.
10. Due to the fact that the placement of outdoor advertising
signs within the Eveleth property after Toquerville annexed and
zoned the subject property could only be done by conditional
use permit, the Court cannot find that the primary purpose of
zoning was to allow outdoor advertising signage.
(Findings of Fact, 1 6-10; R. 768-769.)
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A review of the record clearly establishes the logic of the Trial Court's findings and
thinking. The Court received as Exhibit "1" an engineering map of Toquerville Town which
shows the annexed property, and the other zoning districts within the Town. The Court
heard testimony of Kim Wallace the Town's Engineer, Kenneth Sizemore the Town's
Planning Consultant, Glade Peterson the Planning Commission Chairman at the time of the
master planing, and zoning of the subject property, and Charles Wahlquist the Mayor at the
time of the annexation and zoning.
The Mayor established that the zoning map, Exhibit "1", was the only zoning map
adopted by the Town and even though the Town had the intent to continue to work on zoning
generally throughout the Town, Exhibit "1" was the map that existed in December 1993 at
the time of the zoning action, and to his knowledge existed as is shown in Exhibit "1" as of
the date of Trial. (R. 982-983.)
The Planning Consultant, testified that the black oval drawn in on Exhibit "1"
represents a high ridge that separates the traditional rural "down town main street area" from
Anderson Junction and the 1-15 corridor. (R. 903:3-905:4.) During the course of the zoning
and master plan planning public meetings from January 3, 1993 through November of 1993,
a strong majority of town residents expressed their desire that they did not want to have
commercial development or zoning in the "tree lined rural atmosphere" of the existing
Toquerville Town site in the main street area. (R. 902:23-903:25; 952:12-19.) The
Planning Commission and residents looked along the corridor of UDOT Highway that travels
through Toquerville, and determined that there were not many locations along the corridor
that would be appropriate for intensive commercial development. For that reason they
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determined that the Anderson Junction area on Exit 27 of 1-15 was the most appropriate
location for commercial services and zoning. (R. 903:18-25; 905:5-11.) The only other area
designated for commercial zoning was a very small parcel located at the extreme south end
of Toquerville Town on UDOT Highway which had been approved for commercial zoning
years earlier by the Town Council and was affirmed as a commercial zone during the 1993
master plan process. (R. 951:21-952:4; 976:24-977:6.)
The Town Council formally adopted the Toquerville Zoning Ordinance in 1982. (R.
956-957; 983-984.) The Trial Court received the Town Zoning Ordinance in its entirety as
Exhibit "2". As part of the master plan process and hearings, the Planning Commission and
zoning consultant reviewed the existing Toquerville Zoning Ordinance. (R. 906:9-15.)
Specifically, they reviewed page 38 of Exhibit "2" which sets forth the characteristics of
Highway Commercial Zone as adopted in 1982. This became the basis for the Planning
Commission's designation of the Highway Commercial Zone for the Anderson Junction
annexation property. (R. 910:5-911:11.)
Based on the Toquerville Ordinance, outdoor advertising signs are not a permitted use
within the Highway Commercial zone, but only a conditional use. (R. 925:23-926:7.) The
Planning Consultant testified that there was discussion in the master planning meetings about
the outdoor advertising signs existing in the annexed area and how to handle them. Some
property owners expressed concern and opposition to any continued proliferation of outdoor
advertising in the 1-15 corridor. Other owners expressed a desire to have outdoor advertising
as part of their commercial uses in the future. The Planner noted in these discussions that
the existing Toquerville Zoning Ordinance did not specifically address outdoor advertising
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and that the ordinance needed to be amended to specifically address location and regulation
of outdoor advertising. (R. 905-906; 911-912.) It was the intent of the Planning
Commission to continue revisions of the Zoning Ordinance to address outdoor advertising,
but that was never done. (R. 912:12-15; 933:10-14; 935:6-9.)
The Planning Consultant summarized the discussion of the signage issues in the
Planning Commissions master plan process as follows:
My recollection of the issue, at the time we went through this
process, was that we have a fairly long discussion about the pros
and cons of outdoor advertising and the fact that there is a State
statute that directs some of the location of signs along the
freeways.
I did indicate to the Planning Commission that we needed to
look at the State Highway Beautification Act and determine what
they could, as a municipality, impose that might be more
restrictive than what the State Code allows.
We talked about that fact that outdoor advertising along the 1-15
corridor might impede some of the other economic development
efforts that were going on at the time in terms of tourism
development and that we wanted to retain a more natural
looking corridor entering into the St. George basin.
We talked about the fact that the three (3) signs were already
erected and that we might have to live with the decisions that
allowed those signs to be erected in the first place as prior nonconforming uses prior to the annexation of the property. Those
all were talked about in general terms, but again, that was not
followed up on and no proposed ordinance amendments were
developed or recommended.
(R. 934:8-935:9.)

Viewing the evidence marshalled above in a light most favorable to the Trial Court's
determination, the Court's Findings of Fact and Judgment are supported by the clear weight
of the evidence. The clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential to the Trial Court's
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decisions because the witnesses and parties appear before the Trial Court and the evidence is
presented there. Pena, 869 P.2d 936. Thus, the Trial Judge is "considered to be in the best
position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to drive a sense of the proceedings as a
whole, something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record." Id. (citing
In Re: J. Children. 664 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1983)).
In applying the clearly erroneous standard, first, the evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the Trial Court's determination. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36
(Utah 1994). Next, the Findings of Fact must show the Court's Judgment or Decree
"follows logically from and is supported by, the evidence." Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996,
999 (Utah 1987); Smith v. Smith. 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). Finally the Findings
"should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Acton. 737 P.2d at 999;
Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). Conversely, UDOT has the burden to
first marshal all evidence that supports the Court's Findings, and then demonstrate that the
Findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence. Doelle v.
Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Sorenson v. Kenecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873
P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994). UDOT.has utterly failed in its burden to marshall the
evidence herein.
The evidence marshalled above clearly shows that the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of
Law, and ultimate Judgment, entered by the Trial Court, follow logically from and are all
supported carefully by the evidence set forth in the Record. The Findings are detailed and
make reference to subsidiary facts which clearly disclose the steps of the Court's reasoning
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and logic to reach its ultimate conclusion, that the Toquerville zoning authorities did not zone
the Eveleth property as Highway Commercial for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising. Indeed, there is clear and convincing evidence that the Toquerville Planning
Commission, Planning Consultant, and ultimately the Toquerville Town Council, carefully
reviewed over an 11 month period, all issues and factors that are appropriate to a
comprehensive master plan and zoning consideration, including the public's desire to protect
the character of the tree lined Toquerville main street by removing commercial zoning to the
Anderson Junction area, before they adopted the Highway Commercial zone.
The evidence clearly supports the conclusion that outdoor advertising of the type at
issue in this case was not a permitted use in the Highway Commercial zoning classification
under the Toquerville Zoning Ordinance. Not only was it not a permitted use, but even as a
conditional use, the Toquerville Zoning Ordinance could not by its terms permit outdoor
advertising of the size and scope of the Kunz advertising billboards at issue in this case
except as a non-conforming use. That evidence is clearly set forth in Exhibit "2" received
and discussed by the Court. Testimony of the Planning Consultant also clearly established
that the Planning Commission recognized that the signs were preexisting and probably nonconforming. (R. 934.) Taken in total, the evidence marshalled above is more than sufficient
to sustain the Court's Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment as entered by
the Court.

13614.1

16

II.

UDOT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE THAT
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND
JUDGMENT AND THEN DEMONSTRATE THAT THE
FINDINGS ARE SO LACKING IN SUPPORT AS TO BE
AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

As stated above, UDOT's issues Number 1,3, and 4, are indirect attacks on the
adequacy of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and should be reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. The Appellate Court should not address UDOT's challenge of the Trial
Court's Findings unless UDOT has properly marshalled the evidence. Robb v. Anderton,
863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993). In order to successfully challenge the Trial Court's
Findings of Fact, the Appellant must marshall evidence in support of Findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so lacking in support as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. Wade v.
Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994); West Valley Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d
1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). When appellants fail to marshal the evidence in support of a
challenged Finding, the Utah Supreme Court has declined to consider the attack and the Trial
Court's Findings are upheld. Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467,
470 (Utah 1989); Scharfv. BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
In the present case, UDOT has characterized their statement of the issues presented
for review Numbers 1,3, and 4 in such as way as to appear to avoid the requirement of
marshalling. Careful review of those issues, however, show that they are issues of fact,
challenging the adequacy of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, reviewable under the clearly
erroneous standard, and therefore require marshalling as a prerequisite to review.
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However, UDOT fails to marshall the evidence in the record that shows the Trial Court did
in fact review those elements as directed by this Court. UDOT merely presents carefully
selected facts favorable to its argument rather than properly marshalling any evidence which
is insufficient to sustain its burden. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, 872
P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App. 1994); Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App.
1993). Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993). Since
UDOT has failed to marshall the evidence in support of the Court's Findings applicable to
those three issues, this Court should decline review of UDOT's arguments.
HI.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE R933-2-3(4) (1994)
PROMULGATED BY THE UTAH TRANSPORTATION
COMMISSION, CANNOT BE APPLIED IN THIS CASE
TO CIRCUMVENT THE LAW OF THE CASE
ESTABLISHED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

UDOT in its second argument sets forth a two-fold argument in support of its
contention that this Court should apply R933-2-3(4.) (1994). First, UDOT contends that the
Trial Court based its Judgment on a conditional use permit that does not exist; and then that
this Court held in its earlier opinion the Kunz Company signs were unlawful on the basis that
Kunz failed to exhaust administrative remedies and therefore this Court now has a "clear
slate" to apply R933-2-3(4) (1994). Both contentions are strawman arguments.
Kunz has demonstrated under Argument I above, that the Trial Court did not rely in
any way on the existence of the conditional use permit as the basis for either its Findings of
Fact or Judgment which are all clearly supported by sufficient evidence in the Record. In
addition, to allow this Court's holding regarding Kunz's failure to exhaust remedies as a
basis to apply the Administrative Rule as urged by UDOT, would allow UDOT to completely
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circumvent the law of the case established by this Court in its remand and in effect allow a
post facto retroactive application of an administrative rule.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court have held that
retroactivity is not favored in the law and that administrative rules will not be construed to
have retroactive effect unless their language requires the result. DeVargas v. Mason &
Hanger-Silas Mason Co.. 911 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1990); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp.. 488 U.S. 204 (1988). There is no such language or need to require retroactive
application of this administrative rule in this case.
UDOT suggests that since the Court of Appeals declared the Kunz signs "illegal"
Kunz had no vested rights to the signs at the disputed location as of the date of the Trial on
Remand, October 1, 1996; and therefore this Court is free to apply R933-2-3(4) (1994).
This on the basis that it is "the settled rule that the practical interpretation of an ambiguous
or doubtful statute that has been acted upon by officials charged with its administration will
not be disturbed except for weighty reasons". Brewster v. Gage. 280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930).
UDOT conveniently ignores three fundamental facts that defeat their argument. First,
UDOT has never raised or preserved the issue that Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-136.3(3) is
in any way ambiguous. The statute is clear and unambiguous in its language; it states,
"commercial or industrial zone does not mean areas zoned for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising." Utah Code Annotated § 27-12-136.3(3) (Supp. 1988). This
statute clearly sets forth a narrow issue of fact for consideration by any official charged with
this administration, i.e., was the zone created for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising signage.
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The second fatal fact is that UDOT has never applied that rule to Kunz in this case as
part of the administrative procedure and review, as the Brewster case seems to require.
UDOT's administrative holdings have all been based on a conclusion that the zones were
created primarily to allow signage.
The third fact fatal to UDOT's argument, is that this Court has already construed
U.C.A. § 27-12-136.3(2)(a) and § 27-12-136.3(3) in such a way as to make the language of
R933-2-3(4) (1994) contrary to this Court's statement of the law of the case.
In Kunz & Co.. v. State. 913 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah App. 1996) this Court held:
While we agree that an area zoned for commercial or industrial
use in a city or town need not actually have commercial
development on it to satisfy the definition in Section 27-12136.3(2)(a)...

The Court's holding here allows signs as the only use in a zone under 27-12-136.3(2)(a) so
long as zone was not created for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising. This
is in direct contradiction to R933-2-3(4) (1994) which states:
(4) "Areas zoned for the primary purpose of outdoor
advertising" as used in sub-section 27-12-136.3(3) of the Act is
defined to include areas in which the primary activity is outdoor
advertising.
(Emphasis added.)

This language would purport to render any area in which the "primary activity" is outdoor
advertising unlawful even though this Court has held as a matter of law that an area zoned
for commercial or industrial use in a citv or town need not actually have commercial
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development on it to satisfy the provisions of the Act. In the face of that clear conflict,
certainly an administrative rule must give way to the legal holding of the Court of Appeals.
With regard to the factual issue under Section 27-12-136.3(3) as to whether a zoning
authority has zoned an area for the "primary purpose allowing outdoor advertising", this
Court has construed the scope of the factual inquiry under that statute and specifically set
forth factors to consider in its holding:
Furthermore, in determining the primary purpose behind a
particular zoning decision, the fact finder can and should
consider all relevant evidence, not just the stated purpose of the
zoning body or local government. This would include evidence
of the actual land use or any evidence that the zoning body
merely perpetrated a prior zoning designation.
Kunz, 913 P.2d at 769. (Emphasis added.)
This Court clearly declined to take a narrow position that Section 27-12-136.3(3) is
defined to include those areas in which the primary activity is outdoor advertising, rather it
correctly construed the statute to require a broader factual inquiry. On the basis that the
parameters set forth by this Court as quoted above, conflict with the language of R933-2-3(4)
(1994), this Court's holding is the law of this case and supersedes any administrative rule.
Therefore this Court should not apply R933-2-3(4.) (1994) to this case.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CAREFULLY RECEIVED AND
REVIEWED ALL RELEVANT EVIDENCE AS DIRECTED
BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

This Court specifically directed the Trial Court on remand that:
The fact finder can and should consider all relevant evidence,
not just the stated purpose of the zoning body or local
government... includ[ing] evidence of actual land use or any
evidence that the zoning body merely perpetrated a prior zoning
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designation. ...We therefore reverse and remand for trial to
allow the fact finder to determine the primary purpose.
Kunz, 913 P.2d at 769.

This Court's remand is in effect a mandate to review the Toquerville planning process
that began in 1992 with the annexation of the Eveleth property and culminated in December
1993 with adoption by the Town Council of the zoning designation "Highway Commercial"
for the Eveleth property. At the outset, it is important to understand the scope of the Trial
Court's review as the context in which to view UDOT's claims of error. Before receiving
any evidence on October 1, 1996, the Trial Court stated the following:
Alright. Counsel, just so you will get a general understanding
of the way that I view the remand from the Court of Appeals, it
seems to me as though the Court of Appeals wants the Court to
determine the primary purpose.
Now, the way of determining the primary purpose is really
interesting to me because if I find that the actions of the zoning
authority were based on number of considerations, it may be
extremely difficult to discern a primary purpose. . . .
In this matter, we have extremely broad horizons to look at the
information that can be brought to the Court that might bear
upon a factual finding of whether or not the primary purpose of
the zoning authority was to create an area for outdoor
advertising in the form of the billboards which have been the
subject of this litigation.
Now, because we have such a broad horizon, I think I must
broadly use the definitions of Rule 401 et. seq. in the Rules of
Evidence to determine what was probative of this issue of
purpose and primary purpose in the zoning authorities'
activities.
That means I will have to look at what they did, I will have to
look at what happened, I will probably have to look at what was
proposed, and I will probably have to look at what the body of
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zoning authority thought about it, and the only way I may be
able to do that is to look at what the individual persons thought
about and discussed in reaching this decision.
(R. 841:25-843:13.)

It should be noted that the Trial Court's Statement quoted above, was in response to
UDOT's attempt to limit the scope of inquiry and evidence to only the Toquerville Town
official written records. It is ironic that UDOT at various times through the trial objected to
the introduction of relevant evidence probative of the Town's purpose in its zoning action
and now comes before this Court arguing that the Trial Court did not consider those same
factors as expressly directed by the Court of Appeals.
UDOT characterizes its Issue Number 3 that "the Trial Court failed to consider the
specific factors directed by the Court of Appeals as a question of law in part, to be reviewed
without deference to the District Court to again avoid marshalling the evidence. Kunz
disagrees with UDOT's characterization. UDOT is challenging the adequacy of the Trial
Court's review and Findings. Such a challenge should be reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard.
At the trial on October 1, 1996, the Trial Court received and considered testimony
and evidence relevant to and probative of all factors including each of the specific factors
directed by this Court, which were considered by the Toquerville Planning Commission,
Planning Consultant, and Town Council during the annexation, master plan, and zoning
process which formed the basis for the Planning Commission's recommendation to the Town
Council, and the Town Council's zoning action in December 1993.
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A,

PETITION FOR ANNEXATION. The Town Engineer, Kim Wallace,

testified that the original discussion to annex the subject property was initially proposed by
the owners of property right on the Anderson Junction Interchange and southwest of the
interchange. Those property owners were interested in municipal services, primarily
culinary water services, and desired to be annexed to develop commercial opportunities that
might arise from a reservoir that was on the Washington County Water Conservation District
drawing board at that time. (The reservoir is designated in blue on Exhibit "1".) (R. 847-49;
866-67.) Additionally, property owners north and east of the Anderson Junction Interchange,
were anxious to have their property zoned residential to accommodate current residential
development and planned subdivision development that they wanted regulated under
Toquerville zoning ordinances. (R. 867-68.) Together, over fifty percent (50%) of the
affected property owners in the annexed area petitioned Toquerville to annex their property
into the town. (R. 868:14-25.) Mayor Wahlquist testified the Town was interested in
annexation to get a handle on expected growth. (R. 967:5-16.)
With regard to the Petition for Annexation, UDOT argues that Toquerville's
annexation and zoning of the land was at the request of Eveleth. The record simply does not
support that argument. In fact, Exhibit "1" received by the Court and testimony of the Town
Engineer, Kim Wallace, conclusively establishes that the original proposed annexation did
not include any property north of the Section 27 boundary line which would include the
northern portion of the Eveleth property, and certain residential properties north and east of
the Anderson Junction Interchange. (R. 856.) Eveleth, and other property owners north and
east of the Anderson Junction Interchange, originally had their properties split by the
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proposed annexation so that a portion of their properties were to be annexed while a portion
of the properties were to remain in the unincorporated Washington County area. All of the
property owners, not just Eveleth, contacted ToquerviUe Town authorities and requested that
all of their properties be included in the annexation to prevent the division of their property
between the Town and County. (R. 876; 884:13-24; 901.) Before Eveleth ever contacted
ToquerviUe Town authorities, the proposed annexation was under way and to suggest that the
annexation was requested by Eveleth, misconstrues the Record and misrepresents the
evidence.
B.

ACTUAL LAND USE/LACK OF COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT. The

Trial Court took judicial notice of the general layout of the subject property based on the
Judge's experience driving through the property on the interstate and stated:
THE COURT: Counsel, why don't we look at it in this
fashion, and I do this, counsel, with some hesitation, but there
is no way we can get around this Court's familiarity and
personal famUiarity with the area, and, gentlemen, I would
propose that I take judicial notice that the area in which these
signs are located, which is north of Exit 27, west of the 1-15
freeway, if one were to stand on the 1-15 freeway near the area
of the signs and look west and northwest, you would see
basically sage and pinion foliage extending for some miles
uninterrupted by the presence of human activity at all.
As a backdrop to that sage and pinion foliage you have the
western face - no take that back - eastern face of the Pine Valley
Mountains, which constitute the horizon west and northwest of
the area of the signs, and that it is with the exception of the
freeway, itself, in that location without any other indication of
human activity. That's my recollection.
I believe at this junction, Anderson Junction, even the utility
corridors are on the east side of the freeway so you don't even
have the power lines or the Mountain Fuel lines to the west as
the observer standing on the freeway would face toward the Pine
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Valley Mountains. Now, does that describe the property and
the location of the signs in the area in which the signs and the
area in which the signs are located to your satisfaction, Mr.
Finlayson?
MR. FINLAYSON: Your honor, I believe that is accurate, and
with this witness, I won't pursue that.
(R. 879-880.)
The Planning Consultant, the Planning Commission Chairman, and the Toquerville
Mayor, all testified that there was no commercial activity other than signs on the Eveleth
property. (R. 924:1-3; 959:22-23; 979:13-16.) The Court also received as evidence
Exhibits 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 16, which are photographs of the Eveleth property,
showing the outdoor advertising signs, the natural state of the property and the lack of any
other commercial development. In addition, in the midst of UDOT's opening statement
following the close of Plaintiffs case, the Trial Court interrupted, to point out to counsel, "it
doesn't seem to be necessary on the state of this record to establish any point of proof at this
point that the signs are the sole evidence of humanity on the subject property." (R. 995:812.) At that point, Plaintiff agreed that the signs are the only "development" that is apparent
on the Eveleth property. (R. 996:5-12.)
C.

PROPOSED LAND USES/COMPATIBILITY WITH CHARACTER OF

TOWN. As part of the master plan process, the Planning Commission and Planning
Consultant identified all existing uses on the newly annexed property, and solicited input
from all property owners as to their desired uses, and discussed projections for proposed
future uses. (R. 897-98.) The Planning Commission considered input from property owners
in the immediate vicinity of the Anderson Junction 1-15 Interchange who wanted the property
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designated commercial to accommodate their desires and plans for future commercial
development. (R. 870, 947-48.) The Planning Commission also considered input from
residents favoring the creation of commercial zone around the Anderson Junction Interchange
because it was away from the traditional down town Toquerville area, and because it was
near the freeway and could not be seen from the Town, and because the freeway interchange
offered the best potential for commercial opportunity. (R. 902-03, 948-53, 966.)
D.

PERPETUATING WASHINGTON COUNTY ZONING DESIGNATION.

It should be noted here that UDOT objected to the inquiry and introduction of any evidence
with regard to Washington County zoning designation which was overruled by the Court (R.
81.) and now alleges that the Court did not consider evidence of the prior Washington
County zoning. The Planning Consultant, testified that during the Planning Commission
meetings from January 1993 through November 1993, one of the factors the Planning
Commission looked at was the existing Washington County zoning of the annexed property
prior to annexation. (R. 902:3-4; 914:7-11.) Mr. Sizemore pointed out that the Planning
Commission did not merely rubber stamp the Washington County zoning designated. (R.
918:21-24.) In addition, the Planning Commission Chairman Glade Peterson testified that
while he couldn't recall what the Washington County zoning designation was, he recalled that
it did not have any bearing on the Planning Commission's actions as far as zoning. (R.
954:15-21.) In response to cross-examination, Mr. Peterson had this exchange with State's
counsel:
Q. So when you adopted the Highway Commercial category for
Toquerville and Washington County was the same Highway
Commercial, you didn't change the zoning category did you?
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A. No, I said we really weren't aware of what Washington
County had. We zoned what I had as Exhibit "2" [Toquerville
Zoning Ordinance outlining Highway Commercial] and zoned it
Highway Commercial.
(R. 960:17-23.)

UDOT offered no evidence at trial and none has been marshalled that shows the Town
"merely perpetrated" any zoning designation.
E.

UTILITY SERVICE/INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES. The Trial Court

received and considered ample evidence regarding the status of utility infrastructure in the
annexed area. The Town Engineer testified that the primary issue initially driving the
Petition for Annexation was the property owners' desire to have Toquerville extend
municipal services into the annexed area. (R. 866-67.) The Engineer also testified that there
were no sewer or water services at the Eveleth property. (R. 874-75.) The Planning
Commission Chairman testified that the Planning Commission was aware that there were no
sewer or water utilities at the Anderson Junction area, but also testified that the Planning
Commission discussed the need to extend municipal utilities including water and sewer into
the annexed area. (R. 949:14-20.) The Mayor testified that the Town had investigated and
pursued the development of several water sources in the annexed area without success until
working out an arrangement with the Washington County Water Conservancy District
resulting in the installation of a 21" well and a water tank that was under construction at the
time of trial that would provide water in the annexed area. (R. 967-72.) The Engineer
further testified that in the annexation process, there were detailed discussions at the Town
level and preliminary planning, including cost estimates, for the extension of culinary service
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and utilities into the annexed area. Utilization of a special improvement district as a means
of financing extension of utilities was also discussed. (R. 887.) The clear evidence shows
the Town engaged in planning as the first step to actual development of infrastructure.
F.

SIGNAGE ISSUES. The Planning Consultant testified that there was a

general discussion about existing signs in the annexed area and how to handle them. He
noted in the discussions that the existing ordinance did not specifically address outdoor
advertising and something needed to be included in the ordinance to specifically address
location and regulation. (R. 905-906.) The Planner stated that some property owners
expressed concern and opposition to any proliferation of outdoor advertising in the 1-15
corridor while other owners wanted outdoor signage as part of their commercial use in the
future. The discussion came down to a realization that the current ordinance did not
adequately address signage and needed to be amended in order to more fully address the
issue. (R. 911-912.) The Planning Commission Chairman, testified that based on his
memory, and in his opinion signs were not a primary issue in the planning process. (R.
954.)
Mayor Wahlquist testified that while he was aware of the three advertising signs on
the Eveleth property, he does not recall that it was brought up in the Town Council
discussions. (R. 974:24-975:8.) The Mayor testified that outdoor advertising was not the
basis of adopting the Highway Commercial zoning designation. (R. 975; 976:15-22.)
Finally, the Mayor testified that he did not recall any discussion of outdoor advertising signs
as justification for the Highway Commercial zoning. (R. 977: 18-22.) (See also Planning
Consultant's summary of signage discussion. (R. 934: 8-935: 9.)
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G.

EXISTING ZONING ORDINANCE AND PROCEDURES. The Court

received Exhibit "2" which is the Toquerville Ordinance Number 1978-1 Ex. 2), the Town
zoning ordinance prepared in 1978 but actually adopted in 1982. (R. 956-957; 983-84.) The
Mayor testified that the zoning ordinance as it appears as Exhibit "2" was the official zoning
ordinance in effect at the time of the master plan and adoption of the zoning map, Exhibit
"1". (R. 984.) The Planning Consultant testified that the Highway Commercial zone
designation (H-C) which is outlined at page 38 of Exhibit "2", was the basis of the Planning
Commission's H-C designation with regard to the Anderson Junction property incorporated
into the Master Plan recommended to the Town Council. (R. 910:5-24.) Under the (H-C)
Zone Classification, all uses are designated as "conditional uses" subject to conditional use
permit. (Exhibit "2" at 38.) The Planning Consultant testified that under the sign
regulations contained at page 29 of Exhibit "2", outdoor advertising is a conditional use
within the H-C zone designation. (R. 925-26.) Finally, the Planning Consultant testified
that the zoning ordinance was not revised or amended in any way to accommodate or allow
outdoor advertising during the master plan or zoning procedure. (R. 935.)
It is obvious from the marshalling of the record above, that the Trial Court reviewed
the factors specifically outlined by this Court, and all evidence offered that was relative and
probative of any and all factors actually considered by the Town authorities in adopting the
Highway Commercial zoning designation. The Trial Court simply didn't find UDOT's spin
on the evidence credible. It is also obvious from the marshalled record, that the rural
community of Toquerville, Utah, with limited resources, engaged in a comprehensive and
carefully considered review of a full spectrum of planning and zoning considerations in
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master planning the annexed property at Anderson Junction and in adopting a Highway
Commercial zoning designation for the Anderson Junction area and did not "merely
perpetuate the prior county zoning designation".
The record supports the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and show that the Trial
Court's Judgment follows logically from and is supported by the evidence and that subsidiary
facts are clearly established in the record and incorporated into the Trial Court's Findings of
Fact that demonstrate the Trial Court's Findings and Judgment are based on sufficient
evidence and not clearly erroneous. Actin. 737 P.2d at 999; Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36.
What is conspicuously absent in the record and UDOT's argument is any affirmative
evidence whatsoever offered by UDOT which contradicts in any way the evidence marshalled
above, or otherwise affirmatively demonstrates that the Court's Findings and Judgment are so
lacking as to be against the clear weight of evidence. Nowhere is there any evidence that
signage issues were primary considerations driving the zoning decisions, nor was there any
evidence shown that demonstrates the zoning ordinance was developed, crafted, or adopted to
accommodate signage at all.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT CAREFULLY STRUCTURED THE
ENTIRE TRIAL, ITS FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT WITHIN
THE CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED § 27-12-136.3(3) AND THE PARAMETERS
ESTABLISHED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

Contrary to UDOT's argument in Point IV of its Brief, the Trial Court did not
disregard at all Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (Supp. 1994). Indeed even a superficial
reading of the Court's Findings of Fact clearly demonstrate a careful and logical analysis and
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presentation of the Court's Findings framed in the context of the language of Section 27-12136.3(3).
UDOT's reference to the Trial Court's parenthetical musing as proof that the Trial
Court disregarded Section 27-12-136.3(3) in either the conduct of the trial, or in reaching its
Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment ignores entirely the whole structure of the Trial, and
the Court's repeated insistence on receiving all relevant and probative evidence bearing on
the issue of the Town's purpose in designating the Highway Commercial zone. The Court's
parenthetical statement cited by UDOT came at the conclusion of its recitation of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law. The Court's statement in full was:
I observe parenthetically that the legislative use within § 27-12136.3(3) of the phrase "primary purpose" of allowing outdoor
advertising probably does not accomplish the intent - the
announced intent of the act or give any kind of reasonable
framework within which Courts may determine issues of these
kinds.
I would suspect that it would be a rare case if the Court could
find evidence that the primary purpose was to build billboards.
The evidence here is the primary purpose is to get development
away from the old traditional town of Toquerville out against
the freeway, isolate the old traditional town from that
commercial purpose, and increase the tax base of the town by
having a commercial base, but not in their backyard.
(R. 1068:5-20.)

That statement must be put in proper context by comparing it to the statement the
Trial Judge made earlier in the trial:
Alright. Counsel just so you will get a general understanding of
the way that I view the remand from the Court of Appeals, it
seems to me as though the Court of Appeals wants the Court to
determine the primary purpose.
13614 1

32

Now, the way of determining the primary purpose is really
interesting to me because if I find that the actions of the zoning
authority were based upon a number of considerations, it may
be extremely difficult for the Court to discern a primary
purpose.
(R. 844:25-842:10.) (Emphasis added)

The Court's parenthetical statement at the conclusion of his Findings of Fact is
nothing more than a follow-up to the statement made at the outset, that ultimately identifying
the primary purpose of any legislative action may be difficult to do. Indeed, as the Record
marshalled above amply demonstrates, the Toquerville Town officials and Town residents
considered multiple issues and factors and were no doubt attempting to achieve multiple*
purposes. What is most clear from review of the record is that there is no demonstrated
evidence whatsoever that accommodating outdoor advertising was ever a motivation or even
a subsidiary purpose of the annexation, master plan, or ultimate zoning designation.
CONCLUSION
The record clearly supports the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and shows that the
Trial Court's Judgment follows logically from and is supported by the evidence, and that
subsidiary facts are clearly established in the record and incorporated into the Trial Court's
Findings that demonstrate the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Judgment are based on
sufficient evidence and are not clearly erroneous. This Court should hold that the Utah
Administrative Code § R933-2-3(4) (1994) is not applicable to this case on the basis that it is
in clear conflict with this Court's earlier holding and construction of Utah Code Ann. § 2712-136.3(2) and (3) (Supp. 1994). Finally, UDOT has failed completely in its burden to
marshal the evidence and show that the Trial Court's Findings and Judgment are against the
13614.1
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clear weight of the evidence. For these reasons, this Court should uphold and affirm the
Trial Court's Judgment in its entirety.
DATED this 18th day of July, 1997.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
MCDONOUGH

ILLIAMS RONNOW
Attorneys for Appellee
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ADDENDUM NO. 1

ADD.l

27-12.136.1

HIGHWAYS

27-12-136.1. "Utah Outdoor Advertising Act99— Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Outdoor Advertising
Act."
History: L. 1967, ch. 51, $ 1.
Meaning of "this act" — Laws 1967, ch. 51
enacted {§ 27-12-136.1 to 27-12-136.13.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Nonconforming use.
Clted
*
Nonconforming use.
State could not compel removal of outdoor
advertising sign on ground that sign violated
this act because advertising had established
prior nonconforming use and sign in question
substantially complied with negotiations be-

tween parties and was constructed without
objection by commission, and no procedure for
p a y i n g j u s t compensation for removal of sign
had been pursued by the state. National Adv.
Co. v. Utah State Rd. Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 132,
486 P-2d 383 (1971).
_.. , . TT. , _ ,. r _
_ Ctted in Utah Dep t of Ttansp v. Reagan
J " * " " A d v - ***- 7 5 1 R 2 d 2 7 ° ( U u h C t - APP1988
^-

27-12-136.2. Purpose of act.
The purpose of this act is to provide the statutory basis for the regulation of
outdoor advertising consistent with zoning principles and standards and the
public policy of this state in providing public safety, health, welfare, convenience and enjoyment of public travel, to protect the public investment in such
highways, to preserve the natural scenic beauty of lands bordering on such
highways, and to ensure that information in the specific interest of the
traveling public is presented safely and effectively.
The agreement entered into between the governor of the state of Utah and
the secretary of transportation of the United States dated January 18, 1968,
regarding the size, lighting and spacing of outdoor advertising which may be
erected and maintained within areas adjacent to the interstate and primary
highway systems which are zoned commercial or industrial or in such other
unzoned commercial or industrial areas as defined pursuant to the terms of
such agreement is hereby ratified and approved.
History: L. 1967, ch. 51, § 2; 1971, ch. 61,
5 1.

27-12-136.3.

Meaning of 'this act." — See note under
§ 27-12-136.1.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Commercial or industrial activities* means those activities generally recognized as commercial or industrial by zoning authorities in this
state, except that none of the following are commercial or industrial
activities:
(a) agricultural, forestry, grazing, farming, and related activities,
including wayside fresh produce stands;
(b) transient or temporary activities;
(c) activities not visible from the main-traveled way;
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(d) activities conducted in a building principally used as a residence; and
(e) railroad tracks and minor sidings.
(2) "Commercial or industrial zone" means only:
(a) those areas within the boundaries of cities or towns that are
used or reserved for business, commerce, or trade, or zoned as a
highway service zone, under enabling state legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations;
(b) those areas within the boundaries of urbanized counties that
are used or reserved for business, commerce, or trade, or zoned as a
highway service zone, under enabling state legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations;
(c) those areas outside the boundaries of urbanized counties and
outside the boundaries of cities and towns that:
(i) are used or reserved for business, commerce, or trade, or
zoned as a highway service zone, under comprehensive local
zoning ordinances or regulations or enabling state legislation;
and
(ii) are within 8420 feet of an interstate highway exit, offramp, or turnoff as measured from the nearest point of the
beginning or ending of the pavement widening at the exit from or
entrance to the main-traveled way; or
(d) those areas outside the boundaries of urbanized counties and
outside the boundaries of cities and towns and not within 8420 feet of
an interstate highway exit, off-ramp, or turnoff as measured from the
nearest point of the beginning or ending of the pavement widening at
the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way that are reserved
for business, commerce, or trade under enabling state legislation or
comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations, and are actually used for commercial or industrial purposes.
(3) "Commercial or industrial zone" does not mean areas zoned for the
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising.
(4) "Comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations" means a
municipality's comprehensive plan required by Section 10-9-301, the
municipal zoning plan authorized by Section 10-9-401, and the county
master plan authorized by Sections 17-27-301 and 17-27-401.
(5) "Department" means the Department of Transportation.
(6) "Directional signs" means signs containing information about public
places owned or operated by federal, state, or local governments or their
agencies, publicly or privately owned natural phenomena, historic, cultural, scientific, educational, or religious sites, and areas of natural scenic
beauty or naturally suited for outdoor recreation, that the department
considers to be in the interest of the traveling public.
(7) (a) "Erect" means to construct, build, raise, assemble, place, affix,
attach, create, paint, draw, or in any other way bring into being.
(b) "Erect" does not include any activities defined in Subsection (a)
if they are performed incident to the change of an advertising message
or customary maintenance of a sign.
(8) "Highway service zone" means a highway service area where the
primary use of the land is used or reserved for commercial and roadside
services other than outdoor advertising to serve the traveling public.
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awarding the natural father his costs and
attorney fees incurred after September 8,
1993. See Schoney v. Memorial Estates,
Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah App.1993) (holding no abuse of discretion awarding costs and
attorney fees when sanctions were warranted).
CONCLUSION
We therefore affirm the sanctions imposed
by the trial court and award the natural
father his costs and attorney fees incurred on
appeal. We remand the case to the trial
court for a determination of the amount of
the award on appeal.
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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5 KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

KUNZ & COMPANY dba Kunz Outdoor
Advertising, a California corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
STATE of Utah, Utah Department
of Transportation, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 950186-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 14, 1996.
Outdoor advertising corporation sought
order declaring signs on property adjacent to
interstate highway to be in compliance with
state law and providing injunctive relief.
The Fifth District Court, Washington County, James L. Shumate, J., entered summary
judgment for corporation. Department of
Transportation appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkins, J., held that: (1) property
reserved for commercial or industrial use in
city or town could be excluded from use for
outdoor advertising near highway if zoning

violated statute providing that "commercial
or industrial zone" does not mean areas
zoned for primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising; (2) fact issues existed as to
whether primary purpose behind rezoning of
land was to allow outdoor advertising; (3)
corporation was bound by order of Department concerning signs; and (4) corporation
was required to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to obtaining renewal permits before seeking order in district court
providing declaratory and injunctive relief.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Appeal and Error <3=>863
In considering appeal from summary
judgment, Court of Appeals reviews trial
court's legal conclusions, including its conclusion that material facts are not disputed, for
correctness. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
2. Appeal and Error <£=>863
Standard of review of summary judgment allows Court of Appeals to make its
own conclusions and does not obligate it to
defer to trial court. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
56(c).
3. Highways <3=>153.5
Area zoned for commercial or industrial
use in city or town need not actually have
commercial development on it to satisfy highway code's definition of "commercial or industrial zone" as including areas used or
reserved for business. U.C.A.1953, 27-12136.3(2)(a).
4. Highways <3=>153.5
Area zoned for commercial or industrial
use in city or town which does not actually
have commercial development on it may be
excluded from use for outdoor advertising
near highway if the zoning violates statute
providing that "commercial or industrial
zone" does not mean areas zoned for primary
purpose of allowing outdoor advertising.
U.C.A.1953,
27-12-136.3(3),
27-12136.4(l)(d).
5. Zoning and Planning <2>624
In determining primary purpose behind
particular zoning decision, fact finder can and
should consider all relevant evidence, not just
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stated purpose of zoning body or local government; this would include evidence of actual land use or any evidence that zoning
body merely perpetuated prior zoning designation.
6. Judgment <s»181(15.1)
Issues of material fact existed as to
whether primary purpose behind rezoning of
land to commercial use was to allow outdoor
advertising, such that land would be required
by statute to be excluded from use for outdoor advertising, precluding summary judgment. U.C.A.1953, 27-12-136.3(3); Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
7. Highways (&=3157
Outdoor advertising corporation was
bound under doctrine of res judicata by order of Department of Transportation concerning removal of billboards, even though
corporation had not been party to proceedings in which order was issued, where corporation was privy to, and subsequent assignee
of, corporation which had been party to such
proceedings.
8. Judgment <°>681
Court would not adopt test set forth in
Restatement of Judgments (Second), providing various exceptions to applicability of res
judicata to successor of property interest
when that party is subject of pending litigation to which transferor of interest, rather
than successor, is party. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44.
9. Judgment <3=>713(2), 720
Res judicata applies only as to those
issues which were either tried and determined, or upon all issues which party had
fair opportunity to present and have determined in other proceeding.
10. Highways <2> 153.5
Although outdoor advertising corporation was bound under doctrine of res judicata
by prior adjudication of Department of
Transportation that county's zoning of land
was for primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising, it was not bound by any adjudication as to whether town's zoning was for
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising, since town's annexation and rezoning

of land occurred nearly eight months after
order was issued.
U.C.A.1953, 27-12136.3(3).
11. Highways <3>153.5, 157
Regardless of whether outdoor advertising signs adjacent to highway were located in
valid commercial or industrial zone, they
were illegal and subject to removal where
sign owner had not obtained valid permits for
signs. U.C.A.1953, 27-12-136.4(l)(d), 27-12136.7(l)(a).
12. Administrative
3>662

Law

and

Procedure

Highways <s=>153.5, 159(2)
Outdoor advertising corporation was required to exhaust administrative remedies
with regard to obtaining renewal permits for
signs before seeking order in district court
declaring signs to be in compliance with state
law and providing injunctive relief; statute
providing district courts with jurisdiction to
review final orders of Department of Transportation resulting from formal and informal
adjudicative proceedings did not relieve corporation from exhausting its administrative
remedies, order denying permits was not final order under such statute, and order did
not result from formal and informal adjudicative
proceedings.
U.C.A.1953, 27-12136.9(4)(a).
13. Administrative
e=>662

Law

and

Procedure

Highways <3=> 153.5
Where outdoor advertising corporation
did not exhaust its administrative remedies
with regard to sign permits, neither trial
court nor Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
to reverse, alter, or otherwise circumvent
that particular agency action. U.C.A.1953,
63-46b-l(8).

Appeal from Fifth District, Washington
County; The Honorable James L. Shumate,
Judge.
Jan Graham and Ralph L. Finlayson, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.
D. Williams Ronnow and John J. Walton,
St. George, for Appellee.
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door advertising. UDOT revoked the permits and ordered the signs' immediate removal.
Lundgren appealed the UDOT order to
WILKINS, Judge:
this court. However, in December 1989, durThe Utah Department of Transportation ing pendency of the appeal, Washington
(UDOT) appeals the district court's grant of County rezoned Eveleth's property as "highsummary judgment in favor of Kunz & Com- way commercial." After UDOT informed
this court of the changed circumstances, we
pany. We reverse and remand.
remanded the case to UDOT in April 1990.
OPINION
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON, and
WILKINS, JJ.

BACKGROUND
Thomas Eveleth owns real property adjacent to Interstate 15 in Washington County,
near the Anderson Junction. In March 1986,
Eveleth applied to the county for a zoning
change, seeking to change the zoning of his
property from "agricultural" to "highway
commercial."
Prior to obtaining the zoning change,
Eveleth entered into an agreement with
Lundgren Outdoor Advertising (Lundgren)
whereby Eveleth would lease his property to
Lundgren for the purpose of placing and
maintaining billboards on the property. In
July 1987, Eveleth and Lundgren applied to
UDOT for permits to construct three billboards on the property along 1-15. Each
application certified that "the sign is in full
compliance with the [Outdoor Advertising]
Act," and that Eveleth's property is zoned
"commercial." In fact, the property was still
zoned "agricultural" at the time. Nevertheless, UDOT granted the permits, and Lundgren proceeded to erect the three signs later
that year.
In March 1988, UDOT notified Lundgren
that the property was not zoned "commercial," as was claimed in the permit applications. Lundgren then notified Eveleth of
this problem, and Eveleth took further steps
to obtain the zoning change.
In August 1989, UDOT held a hearing on
the matter to determine the legality of the
signs pursuant to the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act (codified at that time at Utah Code
Ann. §§ 27-12-136.1 to -136.13 (1989)).
UDOT ruled that the three billboards violated sections 27-12-136.4, -136.9, and -136.3(3)
because the billboards were located on property that was not zoned "commercial" nor
could be deemed such for purposes of out-

UDOT conducted further proceedings,
which involved only the parties to the appeal,
UDOT and Lundgren. Subsequently, in
February 1993, UDOT issued a new order
ruling that although Eveleth's property was
now zoned "commercial," the rezoning was
for the "primary purpose" of allowing outdoor advertising, thereby disqualifying the
property for that use, pursuant to section 2712-136.3(3) of the Utah Code.
UDOT sent the Order on Remand, which
revoked the permits for the three signs and
ordered their removal, to Lundgren and
Eveleth. However, ownership of the signs
had changed prior to the issuance of UDOT's
final order. Two years earlier, in February
1991, Kunz & Company (Kunz) had purchased the billboards from Leonard & Company, a successor to Lundgren.
In September 1993, UDOT sent a letter to
Kunz explaining the illegality of the signs
and providing a copy of the UDOT Order on
Remand. Nevertheless, Kunz did not take
any steps to intervene or appeal that order.
Subsequently, in November of that year,
the town of Toquerville annexed Eveleth's
property and chose to retain the "highway
commercial" zoning for the area. However,
there is not now, nor has there ever been,
any commercial development on the property
other than the three billboards.
On January 18, 1994, Kunz applied for
renewal permits for the signs. UDOT denied the application, and on February 16,
Kunz filed an action for declaratory judgment in district court. Kunz sought a declaration from the trial court that "due to the
annexation and rezoning of the subject property, the billboards are now in compliance
with applicable state law, specifically . . . the
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, and that re-
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moval of the billboards is not warranted
thereunder." The parties also agreed to
have the trial court determine "the effect [on
Kunz| (if any) of the UDOT District Five
'Order on Remand.'" Finally, Kunz sought
permanent injunctive relief, enjoining UDOT
and the State "from any removal of, or hindrance of Kunz's access to, the billboards."
During the course of the proceedings,
UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment,
and Kunz filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment. In December 1994, the tiial court
denied UDOT's motion and granted Kunz's
cross-motion. Specifically, the trial court
held that Kunz is not bound by UDOT's
Order on Remand and that the three signs
comply with the provisions of the Outdoor
Advertising Act. UDOT appeals.
ANALYSIS
[1, 2] As is the case whenever we consider an appeal from a summaiy judgment, we
review the trial court's legal conclusions, including its conclusion that the material facts
are not disputed, for correctness. See Utah
R.Civ.P. 56(c) (stating that summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . .. the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law''). This standard allows us to
make our own conclusions and does not obligate us to defer to the trial court. See State
y. PencL 869 P.2d 932. 936 (Utah 1994).
I.

Application of Outdoor Advertising Act

Kunz specifically asked the trial court to
declare that "the billboards, as presently situated on [Eveleth's] property, lie within a
bona tide commercial zone not created or
existing for the primary purpose of outdoor
advertising/' which would qualify the area for
billboards under the Outdoor Advertising
Act.
See Utah Code Arm. § 27-12136.4(l)(d) (1995). Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, "[a]ny person . .. affected by a statute .. . may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising
under the . . . statute . .. and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." Id. § 78-33-2 (1992).
Thus, the trial court in this case could properly decide the issue. See Id. § 78-33-1.

The trial court concluded that the current
zoning of Eveleth's land met the requirements of the Outdoor Advertising Act and
thereby permitted the use of billboards on
the property. In reaching this conclusion,
the court specifically relied on the fact that
Toquerville has zoned the area as "highway
commercial." See id. § 27-12-136.4(lXd)
(1995) (permitting the use of outdoor advertising in a "commercial or industrial zone").
The court found this designation sufficient to
fall within the statutory definition for such a
zone as provided in the Outdoor Advertising
Act.
Section 27-12-136.3(2)(a) defines "[commercial or industrial zone," in the relevant
part, as "those areas within the boundaries of
cities or towns that are used or reserved for
business, commerce, or trade, or zoned as a
highway service zone, under enabling state
legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations."
Id. § 27-12136.3(2)(a). In addition, a subsequent provision in the Act limits the definitions found in
subsection (2) by establishing that " l.c |ommercial or industrial zone' does not mean
areas zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising." Id. § 27-12136.3(3).
The trial court construed the use of the
term "reserved" in subsection (2)(a) to mean
that the property does not actually need to
have commercial development on it, but chat
it merely be zoned for that purpose. Thus,
the couit determined that the current zoning
of Eveleth's land satisfied the statute, despite
the fact that the three signs represent the
only commercial development on the property. The trial court further concluded that
the "exclusionary definition" in section 2712-136.3(3) referred only "to the areas outside incorporated cities and towns."
[3, 4] While we agree that an area zoned
for commercial or industrial use in a city or
town need not actually have commercial development on it to satisfy the definition in
section 27-12-136.3(2)(a), we conclude that
such property may still be excluded from use
for outdoor advertising if the zoning violates
section 27-12-136.3(3). The trial court erred
in deciding that this latter provision applied
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only to areas outside of incorporated cities
and towns.
In enacting section 27-12-136.3(3), the legislature must have contemplated that local
zoning bodies might attempt to generate immediate revenue from lands adjacent to highways by rezoning such lands to allow outdoor
advertising. However, allowing outdoor advertising in areas without other businesses or
highway services in the vicinity would violate
essential purposes of the Outdoor Advertising Act—enacted in pan to promote the
"convenience and enjoyment of public travel
to protect the public investment in such highways, to preserve the natural scenic beauty
of lands bordering on such highways, and to
ensure that information in the specific interest of the traveling public is presented safely
and effectively." Id. § 27-12-136.2. Accordingly, if a zoning body designates specific
land as "commercial" for the primanj purpose of allowing outdoor advertising on that
land, then section 27-12-136.3(3) prohibits
the use of billboards on the land regardless
of whether or not the zoning body also intends to "reserve" the land for other commercial use.
[5,6] Furthermore, in determining the
primary purpose behind a particular zoningdecision, the fact tinder can and should consider all relevant evidence, not just the stated purpose of the zoning body or local government. This would include evidence oi
actual land use or any evidence that the
zoning body merely perpetuated a prior zoning designation. Inasmuch as Kunz and
UDOT have presented contlicting evidence as
to Toquerville's primary purpose behind the
zoning of Eveleth's land, we conclude that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. We
therefore reverse and remand for trial to
allow the fact Under to determine the primary purpose for the zoning decision.
II.

Effect of Order on Remand

UDOT argued before the trial court that
UDOT's Final Order on Remand, issued in
February 1993, constitutes an enforceable order against Kunz and has res judicata effect
on the issues of this case. In light oi these
arguments, Kunz and UDOT agreed to have
the trial court decide what effect, if anv, the

Order on Remand has on Kunz and this case.
The trial court ruled that because Kunz was
not a party to the previous UDOT proceedings and did not receive adequate legal notice
of those proceedings, Kunz was nor bound by
the Order on Remand.
[7] Nevertheless, the trial court failed to
recognize the significance oi the fact that one
of Kunz's predecessors in interest, Lundgren.
was a party to those proceedings. Res judicata applies to the same parties and to their
privies or assignees. D'Aston i\ Aston, 844
P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App.1992). As a privy
to, and subsequent assignee of, Lundgren's
interests in the billboards, Kunz is bound by
the UDOT Order on Remand to the same
extent as Lunclgren. The trial court erred in
ruling otherwise.
[8] Kunz proposes that we adopt the test
set forth in the Second Restatement of Judgments, which provides various exceptions to
the applicability of res judicata to a successor
of a property interest when that property is
the subject of a pending litigation to which
the transferor of the interest, rather than the
successor, is a party. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments >J 44 (1982). Utah has
not adopted the Restatement test, and we
decline to do so now.
[9, 10| Even so, the Order on Remand is
res judicata only *' 'as to those issues which
were either tried and determined, or upon ail
issues which the party had a fair opportunity
to present and have determined in the other
proceeding.'" DAston. 844 P.2d at 350
(quoting Thvockmmio)) >\ Throckmorton. 767
P.2d 121, 123 (Utah App.1988)). Kunz is
therefore bound by the prior adjudication
that Washington County's zoning of Eveleth's land was for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising. However, this
action involves a different set of facts, which
have not been adjudicated: Whether Toquerville's zoning, rather than Washington County's zoning, was for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising. Toquerville's
annexation and zoning of Eveleth's land occurred nearly eight months after UDOT issued its Order on Remand. Accordingly, the
trial court was correct to the extent it con-
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eluded that the Order on Remand was not
binding on this particular issue.
III.

Further Relief Sought by Kunz

As part of its declaratory action. Kunz also
sought an order declaring the billboards to
be in compliance with state law. declaring
them exempt from any removal requirements, and granting permanent injunctive
relief to prevent UDOT and the State from
removing the signs. Under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, a party may seek any further
relief that is necessary or proper in light of
the declaratory judgment issued by the trial
court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-8 (1992).
Nevertheless, the trial court cannot grant the
relief asked for in this case.
[11] Regardless of whether the signs are
found to be located in a valid commercial or
industrial zone, the signs are still illegal and
subject to removal, because Kunz has not
obtained valid permits for the signs. See id.
§ 27-12-136.7(l)(a) (1995) ("Outdoor advertising may not be maintained without a current
permit.");
id. § 27-12-136.9(l)(b)
("Outdoor advertising is unlawful when . . . a
permit is not obtained as required by this
chapter.").
[12] In January 1994, Kunz applied to
UDOT for renewal permits for the three
billboards. When UDOT denied the applications, Kunz did not exhaust its administrative
remedies, but instead tiled this declaratory
action in district court. Kunz claims that
exhaustion of remedies is not required in this
case because the state legislature has provided that "[t]he district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final
orders of the Department of Transportation
under this section resulting from formal and
informal adjudicative proceedings."
Id.
§ 27-12-136.9(4)(a).
However, Kunz's argument that section
27-12-136.9 allows Kunz to proceed directly
to district court for the relief sought is disingenuous. First, this section does not relieve
Kunz from exhausting its administrative
remedies. See id. § 63-46b-14(2) (1993) ("A
party may seek judicial review only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except" under circumstances not appli-

cable to this case.). Furthermore, the
UDOT order denying the permits is not a
final order under this section, nor is Kunz
seeking review of that order in this action.
See id. § 27-12-136.9(4)(a) (1995). Most importantly, the UDOT order denying the permits is not a final order resulting from formal and informal adjudicative proceedings
as required under this section. See id.
Once UDOT denied Kunz's applications for
new permits, Kunz should have requested
further agency action, seeking adjudicative
proceedings to determine whether the permits should have been granted in light of
Toquerville's annexation and rezoning of
Eveleth's property. See Utah Code Admin.P. R907-1-3(B)(3) (indicating how adjudicative processes may be petitioned for by
persons outside UDOT). UDOT's administrative rules specifically provide for adjudicative proceedings pursuant to the Outdoor
Advertising Act. Id. R907-1-1(A)(2). Such
proceedings would commence informally and
convert to formal proceedings if necessary.
See id. R907-1-KA), -5(F), & -15(B). Indeed, Administrative Rule 907-l-15(B) specifically establishes:
No final order is issued in the informal
phase if there is a timely objection and
request for hearing made. If such a timely objection and request for hearing is
made, the matter is treated as a contested
case which is processed as a formal proceeding before the Director. Such right to
have the matter be contested and processed "formally" is an available and adequate administrative remedy and should be
exercised prior to seeking judicial review.
Nevertheless, Kunz chose not to exhaust its
administrative remedies following UDOT's
denial of the new permits. Before Kunz
could claim on appeal that UDOT erred in
denying the permits, UDOT should have had
the opportunity to correct the alleged error.
See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 861 P.2d 414, 423-24 (Utah
1993) (recognizing that the correction principle underpins the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies); see also Maverik
Country Stores v. Industrial Common, 860
P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App.1993) ("The basic
purpose underlying the doctrine . . . Is to
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Cite as 913 P.2d 771 (Utah App. 1996)

allow an administrative agency to perform
functions within its special competence—to
make a factual record, to apply its expertise,
and to correct its own errors so as to moot
judicial controversies.'" (quoting Parisi v.
Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 818,
31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972))).
[13] Because Kunz did not exhaust its
administrative remedies with regard to the
sign permits, neither the trial court nor this
court has jurisdiction to reverse, alter, or
otherwise circumvent that particular agency
action. See Maverik Country Stores, 860
P.2d at 947-48; see also Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l(8) (Supp.1995) ("Nothing in this
chapter may be interpreted to provide an
independent basis for jurisdiction to review
final agency action.") Accordingly, the trial
court cannot order UDOT to grant the permits. Without the permits, the billboards
are illegal, and the trial court is without
jurisdiction to change the signs' legal status
and grant the further relief requested by
Kunz in its declaratory action. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-33-8 (1992) ("Further relief
based on a declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted when necessary or proper.
The application therefor shall be by petition
to a court having jurisdiction to grant the
relief." (emphasis added)).
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in concluding that
section 27-12-136.3(3) applies only to areas
outside incorporated cities and towns. Outdoor advertising is prohibited in any location
zoned for the "primary purpose of allowing
outdoor advertising." Because Kunz and
UDOT have presented conflicting evidence
regarding Toquerville's primary purpose behind its zoning of Eveleth's land, we reverse
the grant of summary judgment and remand
for a trial on that issue.
The trial court also erred in concluding
that the UDOT Order on Remand has no
binding effect on Kunz. Nevertheless, res
judicata does not bar adjudication of the new
issue presented in this action.
Finally, the trial court is without jurisdiction to declare the billboards to be in complete compliance with the Outdoor Advertis-

ing Act because Kunz did not exhaust its
administrative remedies following UDOT's
denial of the new sign permits. The trial
court cannot exempt the billboards from removal requirements or grant the injunctive
relief requested in this action.
Reversed and remanded.
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
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STATE of Utah, In the Interest of E.K., a
person under eighteen years of age.
K.K., Appellant,
STATE of Utah, Appellee.
No. 950292-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 14, 1996.
Infant was determined to be neglected
child by the Third District Juvenile Court,
Salt Lake County, Olof A. Johansson, J.
Mother appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Billings, J., held that: (1) after-born child
may be "neglected" based on abuse of siblings; (2) state established prima facie case
of neglect based on abuse of siblings; and (3)
challenge to state's use to judicial notice was
not preserved for appeal.
Affirmed.
Orme, P.J., concurred in part and concurred only in result in part.
1. Infants <s=>156
For purposes of statute defining "neglected or abused child" as child who is at
risk of being neglected or abused because
another child in the same home was neglected or abused, children "in the same home" is
not limited to children actually present in
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KUNZ & COMPANY dba KUNZ
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a California
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:
:

THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH :
STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
:

Civil No. 94050322

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on before the Court on October 1, 1996, for a bench trial
pursuant to remand from the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiff was represented by counsel D.
Williams Ronnow. Defendants were represented by counsel Ralph L. Finlayson. The Court
received testimony and evidence regarding the issue on remand, and now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The property in question, owned by Thomas Eveleth, located west of Interstate 15 in

the northernmost limits of the town of Toquerville, Washington County, was annexed by the Town
in 1992.

2.

Beginning in January 1993, Toquerville town undertook the process of master-

planning its entire community and enlisted the assistance of the Five County Association of Government's planner, the town engineer, and solicited the input of all property owners.
3.

The three signs in question in this lawsuit had been on the Eveleth property since

4.

The only use of the Eveleth property since 1987 has been for outdoor advertising

1987.

signage.
5.

There is no evidence of any utility ever servicing the property - water, power, gas,

sanitary sewer or other utilities.
6.

The Court finds from Exhibit 1 and testimony, the Town of Toquerville, is separated

into two distinct areas, one south of a high ridge that blocks the view of Anderson Junction from the
traditional "Main Street" area, and one north and west of the high ridge which constitutes the
annexed area and includes Anderson Junction and the 1-15 interchange.
7.

Unrebutted testimony was presented without objection that it was the purpose of the

Town in establishing its master plan, zoning ordinance, zoning districts and its zoning map, that
commercial zoning be limited to two distinct areas. One, a tiny parcel located at the south end of
the Town on state highway U-17 that leads toward LaVerkin, Utah, and the other parcel immediately
surrounding the Anderson Junction 1-15 interchange in the north end of Toquerville.
8.

The Court finds from Exhibit 2, it was the intent of Toquerville Town, because it

incorporated its planning and zoning to match up with the existing zoning ordinance, that any
signage of the type involved in this litigation be permissible only by conditional use permit. The

Findings and Conclusions
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Town ordinance so provides, and it was the clear intention of the Town in this annexation to
substantially limit outdoor advertising signs by that process.
9.

The Court heard evidence and testimony of the intent of the Town from the former

mayor, the former chairman of the planning commission at the time these actions were undertaken,
and from the former town engineer, and while such testimony provides some assistance in the
Court's determination of these facts, the most telling evidence of Toquerville's intent with respect to
outdoor advertising signs is the Toquerville Zoning Ordinance itself.
10.

Due to the fact that the placement of outdoor advertising signs within the Eveleth

property after Toquerville annexed and zoned the subject property could only be done by conditional
use permit, the Court cannot find that the primary purpose of the zoning was to allow outdoor
advertising signage.
11.

The primary purpose of Toquerville's zoning action, designating the subject property

as Highway Commercial, was to keep the commercial development away from the traditional
downtown Main Street area of Toquerville and isolate the traditional downtown area from the
property zoned commercial near the 1-15 Anderson Junction interchange and increase the tax revenue
of the town from an expanded commercial base.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The designation of the Highway Commercial zone at the Anderson Junction 1-15 interchange
by the Toquerville Town Council on December 14, 1993, was not for the primary purpose of
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allowing outdoor advertising, and therefore does not violate UCA § 17-12-136.3(3) (Supp. 1988).

DATED this _3L day of •NovffmTjcrf'l•1996.
BY THE

JAMES L
Fifth Distric
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on the *T

day of November, 1996 to be hand-delivered and delivered via

facsimile to the following:
RALPH L. FINLAYSON
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Fax No.: 1-801-366-0352

Findings and Conclusions
Page 5
9109.1

t

f '

ADDENDUM NO. 4

ADD. 4

FILED
(•IFTH ji^TP.IOT COUR1

'87 JflH 23 PF1 1 23
D. Williams Ronnow (USB #4132)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
249 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (801) 628-1627
Fax: (801)628-5225
JWH&Mc File No.: 3668.0004

V / A ^ I : ' . ' ^ - - COUNTY
BY'.Or^l...

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KUNZ & COMPANY dba KUNZ
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a California
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
:
Civil No. 94050322

vs.

:

THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH :
STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
:

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on before the Court on October 1, 1996, for a bench
trial pursuant to remand from the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiff was represented by
counsel D. Williams Ronnow. Defendants were represented by counsel Ralph L. Finlayson.

77P-

The Court having received testimony and evidence regarding the issue on remand, and having
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on December 4, 1996.
NOW, WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the designation of the Highway Commercial Zone at Anderson Junction 1-15
Interchange by the Toquerville Town Council on December 14, 1993, was not for the
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising, and therefore does not violate Utah Code
Ann. § 17-12-136.3(3) (Supp. 1988)
DATED this J L i r d a y of January, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

Tiros:
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)
:ss.
)

Sharon M. Allhands, being first duly sworn, states that she is an employee of the law
firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, and that she caused to be served on this
c2-^2_

day of January, 1997, the foregoing proposed ORDER AND JUDGMENT upon the

following by facsimile transmission and by depositing a true and correct copy thereof in the
U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
RALPH L. FINLAYSON
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Fax No.: 1-801-366-0352

M^^i

yrf(WU*-4j

Sharon M. Allhands
Subscribed and sworn to before me this X} clay of
1997.

(UiMJ^Nqfary Public
Residing at £^
~"

NOTARY KDBLIC

TAMMIE L. TAUCER
624 North 1100 West
St George, Utah 84770
Mv Commission Expires
February 15, 1UM
QTATF O F UTAH^
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Chapter 12.
12-1

SIGNS

Signs Allowed

The following described signs shall be allowed as indicated in the accompanying table:
Zone
Permitted Conditional

Maximum
Size in
Feet

Maximum
Height in
Feet

Advertising

8 x 12

18

Business

8x20

50

Name Plate

1x2

8

All Zones

Indirect

Property —
Sale, Lease
Rent or Trespass

2x3

6

All Zones

None

Public
Information

3x6

8

All Zones

Indirect

Temporary

8 x 12

16

All Zones

None

Type of Sign
See definitions

Use

Use

CN

Illumination
Type of

HC

Indirect

Aba/e 50'

Indirect

*The d i s t a n c e from the top of the sign to t i e ground supporting it.
12-2

Construction

All signs in commercial zones shall have a surface of noncombustible material;
provided, however, that combustible structural trim may be used thereon.
12-3

Illumination

All s i g n s , except business signs, shall be illuminated by indirect lighting,
the source of which shall not be visible from the s t r e e t . In no case shall
direct rays of light be permitted to penetrate a property in a residential zone
or used for residential purposes.
12-4

Location of Signs

All signs shall maintain a clear view of intersecting streets as provided in this
ordinance, and no sign shall be less than nine (9) feet high over public rightof-way. In any zone requiring a front yard, all ground signs in that zone
shall adhere to the front yard requirements.

-29-

13-9

Highway Commercial Zone H-C
1.

Purpose
To provide commercial areas on major highways for the location of
travel service and highway oriented commercial u s e s .

2.

Permitted Uses
All permitted u s e s subject to conditional use permit.

3.

Conditional Uses
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

4.

Restaurant or drive-in cafe
Motels
Mobile home sales
Overnight camping facilities
Automobile service station, auto a c c e s s o r i e s
Nursery, sale of plant materials
Roadside stand, sale of agricultural produce and related items
Accessor/ buildings and uses

Height Regulations
No building or structure shall be erected to a height greater tnan two
and one-half (2 1/2) stories or thirty-five (35) feet.

5.

District
H-C

Area, Width and Yard Regulations

Area
20, 000 sq.

ft,

Width

Front

20'

20

-38-

Yards in Feet
Side
None, except
10* where
side yard
abuts a
residential
zone; 20
feet when
abutting a
street

Rear

None, except
10' wnere
rear yard
abuts a
residential
zone
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KUNZ & COMPANY,
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)
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5
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vs.
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7

gentlemen,

))

8

record will r e f l e c t

9

October,

Defendant.

)

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

Plaintiff,

Case No.
) 940500322
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, )

1

THE COURT:

Good m o r n i n g , l a d i e s and

and welcome t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .

1996.

1
The

t h a t t o d a y i s t h e 1 s t day of

1
1

The h o u r i s 9 : 0 1 a . m .

1

10

112
113

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEOTAPE

114

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE

115
16
1
117
118
1
119
1
20

The m a t t e r b e f o r e t h e C o u r t i s t h e t r i a l

10

111

T u e s d a y , August 1, 1996
APPEARANCES:

11

on remand from t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s .

12

and Company v e r s u s Utah S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t of

13

Transportation,

14

D. W i l l i a m s Ronnow and Mr. R u s s e l l M i t c h e l l ,

15

the defendant,

For t h e P l a i n t i f f :

D. W i l l i a m s Ronnow, E s q .
R u s s e l l S. M i t c h e l l

F o r UDOT:

Ralph L. F i n l a y s o n , E s q .

18

t o h e a r t h e i s s u e of what was t h e p r i m a r y p u r p o s e of

1

19

T o q u e r v i l l e Town i n z o n i n g t h e s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y

1

where t h e s i g n s i n t h i s l a w s u i t a r e s i t u a t e d when

1

t h a t p r o p e r t y was zoned a s c o m m e r c i a l .

23

22

Mr. Ronnow?

1 1
1
2
1
1 3
1
1 4
1
1 5
1
1 6
1
1 7
1
1 8
1
1 9
I
I10
I
111
1
112
1
113
1
114
1
115
1
116
1
17
1
18
1
119
20
21
22
23
24
25

Am I r i g h t ,

I
1

MR. RONNOW:

23

That's correct,

24

As I u n d e r s t a n d ,

25

there's just that single issue.

Your Honor.

t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s on remand,

1
1
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57
D i r e c t E x a m i n a t i o n by Mr. Ronnow
C r o s s - E x a m i n a t i o n by Mr. F i n l a y s o n
87
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100
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109
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100
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SCOTT J . SNOW
174
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184
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24
1 - Map
16
24
2 - Zoning Ordinance
73
124
124
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129
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1
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Reported by:

1

together with t h e i r

122

125

Mr.

1

20

124

1

and f o r

Mr. Ralph F i n l a y s o n .

appropriate client representatives,

1

1

For t h e p l a i n t i f f ,

Counsel a r e p r e s e n t ,
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Case i s Kunz
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THE COURT: All right. I will hear an
opening statement, then, from the plaintiff, if you
wish to make one, counsel; however, we have plowed
this ground so many times, and I have read both your
memorandum, don't feel the need to be overly
eloquent or lengthy.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor MR. FINLAYSON: I have one preliminary
matter. (Inaudible) ~
THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson.
MR. FINLAYSON: - evidence that may be
introduced, and I would just like to ~
THE COURT: Counsel, my bailiff will run
things around for you —
MR. FINLAYSON: Oh, I f m sorry.
THE COURT: - in order to help you stay
in camera, meaning not in chambers, but in the view
of the electronic eye. What is this memorandum,
counsel?
MR. FINLAYSON: I'm not sure what evidence
the plaintiff will present, but it may possibly be
oral testimony or other documentary evidence that's
not part of the official Toquerville record, and
since the zoning was a legislative matter, the law
is clear that only official records of that
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legislative record are admissible. For example,
oral testimony in some member about what the intent
was is not admissible.
THE COURT: All right. Which rule of
evidence are you referring to, counsel?
MR. FINLAYSON: It's not a rule Of

evidence strictly. It's a rule of statutory
construction that is settled in that arena.
THE COURT: I see that you have cited
Arizona, New Jersey, Fed. ~ (inaudible) —
apparently the northern district of Illinois. Any
Utah statutes or rules or cases on this issue,
counsel?
MR. FINLAYSON: I searched quite fully,
and I found no specific Utah authority. I also cite
Sutherland. He refers to 14 states' cases, all of
which support the proposition stated, none of which
go the other way, and I found no reference to any
Utah authority. I have cited this in another —
it's not precedent. I cited it in another case that
went to the Utah Supreme Court, and it THE COURT: They saw fit not to give us a
ruling on the issue?
MR. FINLAYSON: Well, at this - this

25 issue didn't even go up because the other side did
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not press this issue, but the lower court kept out
an affidavit of —
THE COURT: All right. Well, counsel,
what I'm going to do in view of your motion and your
authority and the lack of authority on this matter
is allow you on specific instances for proffered
testimony from Mr. Ronnow to raise that objection,
and you can raise it on one occasion and have a
continuing objection, but because there is no
authority in the State of Utah under the rules of
evidence, I will receive all of the evidence unless
I clearly think it is somehow violative of the rules
of evidence, as I understand them, in order to
preserve a record.
We will probably not lose a lot of time in
doing that, and I think it's the best way to
preserve a record. Mr. Ronnow, again, I am not
ruling one way or another on this issue. Is there
anything else you want to say in response to the
concept?
MR. RONNOW: I just want to establish a
brief preliminary statement with response, and then
we'll go ahead and deal with it issue by issue, but
since this is the first I have seen this memorandum
and I - is there a motion that goes with this?
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THE COURT: Apparently it's an oral Motion
in Limine, as I understand it.
MR. RONNOW: All right. Your Honor, I
would - I would just say this, as a foundation for
later evidentiary argument, the State continues to
present to the Court circular arguments in an
attempt to limit evidence that — to just those
categories of evidence that they feel are outlined
by the Court of Appeals or whatever.
I would draw the Court's attention to the
Court of Appeal's opinion at 769 in which the Court
states, Furthermore, in determining the primary
purpose behind the particular zoning decision, the
fact finder can and should consider all relevant
evidence, not just the stated purpose of the zoning
body or local government.
And the State has made that argument that
the — as a matter of fact, they go so far as to say
the State — what they're now claiming is the only
record that should bereviewed,the stated position
of the zoning body are not probative because they're
inherently unreliable, and so we have this circular
argument.
Since we are talking about an un - a
clear — the statute is narrowly focused by the

Pa e8

s

Court of Appeals regarding a determination of
primary purpose, primary implying that there may
have been other purposes to be considered, in that
language that I just read, I think it's clear that
in this particular situation, without any
clarification as to limiting that definition and in
light of the Court of Appeals' specific instruction
that the intent is to get to all the intent and
understanding of how the zoning authority reached
its decision and what motivated it, not merely it's
official legislative declaration.
THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson, it is your
motion, so I'll give you last say.
MR. FINLAYSON: It will be a very short
response. In our trial memorandum, we stated right
at the end that any documentary evidence that is in
the legislative file would not be inadmissible and
that would go to weight.
Certainly, the Court of Appeals did not
intend that inadmissible evidence on that issue be
received, and where the law is settled, that certain
kinds of evidence on that issue are not admissible.
They should be limited to the official record, which
is reliable and which we do not object to.
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, just so

I
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you' 11 get a general understanding of the way tnat I
view the remand from the Court of Appeals, it seems
to me as though the Court of Appeals wants the Court
to determine the primary purpose.
Now, the way of determining the primary
purpose is really interesting to me because if I
find that the actions of the zoning authority were
based upon a number of considerations, it may be
extremely difficult for the Court to discern a
primary purpose.
I liken the entire issue to a
determination of — (inaudible) - in a criminal
case. There we have very definite levels of purpose
behind criminal conduct, no longer intentional
reckless or criminally negligent under our present
statute.
In this matter, we have extremely broad
horizons to look at the information that can be
brought to the Court that might bear upon a factual
finding of whether or not the primary purpose of the
zoning authority was to create an area for outdoor
advertising in the form of the billboards, which
have been the subject of this litigation.
Now, because we have such a broad horizon,
I think I must broadly use the definitions of Rul^
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MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, reserv/
THE COURT: okay. Then you may call your
first witness, counsel.
MR. RONNOW: Plaintiffs call Kim Wallace.
THE COURT: Mr. Wallace, if you would come
forward in front of counsel table here and well
before the bench, face the clerk, raise your right
hand and be sworn, sir. That's fine right there,
Mr. Wallace.
Whereupon,
KIMBALL WALLACE,
having been first duly sworn to testify to the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
was examined and testified as follows:
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Please have a
seat here on the witness stand.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, if I may, we're
going to need the easel
THE COURT: All right. The bailiff or you
may struggle with it. It does have its
eccentricities so watch your fingers as it unfolds.
It's been known to bite.
MR. RONNOW: Where's the microphone for
theTHE COURT: The microphone you'll probably
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end up using is either the one on witness stand,
counsel, or the one on the jury bar behind you.
MR. RONNOW: All right.
THE COURT: And if you understand the
limitations of our record, counsel, just presume
that you have got a live reporter here. The cameras
will not pick that up, nor under the proposed rules
of appellate procedure would that be part of the
record. So just act like we've got a live reporter
working here and all will be well.
MR. RONNOW: I understand, Your Honor.
-OOODIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RONNOW:
Q. Would you state your full name, please?
A. Kimball Nielsen Wallace.
Q. Where do you reside, Mr. Wallace?
A. Farmington, Utah.
Q. How are you currently employed?
A. I'm a civil engineer working for the State
of Utah in the Department of Environmental Quality.
Q. Would you briefly describe your post high
school education degrees and licensing, please?
A. I attended Weber State College, and then
transferred to the University of Utah, graduated
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401 et sequitur in the rules of evidence to
determine what is probative of this issue of purpose
and primary purpose in the zoning authorities
activities.
That means I'll have to look at what they
did, I'll have to look at what happened, I'D
probably have to look at what was proposed, and I'll
probably have to look at what the body of the zoning
authority thought about it, and the only way that I
may be able to do that is to look at what the
individual persons thought about and discussed in
reaching this decision.
Now, perhaps the Court of Appeals did not
exactly look at the problem they were creating on
remand with this broad approach, but I can see no
other way to look at it, but, again, I will apply
the rules of evidence to any matters objected to,
and wef 11 just work at it one issue at a time. Mr.
Ronnow, an opening statement if you wish.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, I don't think, in
light of our argument discussion, an opening
statement is necessary. We're prepared to proceed.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Finlayson, do
you want to make an opening statement or do you want
to reserve opening statement to a later point?
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1 with a bachelor of science degree from the *
2 University of Utah.
3
Q. And are yc licensed as a civil engineer
4 in the State of Lin?
5
A. That's right. Four years after college
6 taking a professional engineering examination, I
7 have been a licensed civil engineer since 1976.
8
Q. And in the time frame of approximately
9 1992 and '93, where did you reside?
10
A. I resided in St. George Utah at that time.
II
Q. And how were you employed at that time?
12
A. I was the owner of an engineering firm by
13 the name? of Meridian Engineering.
14
Q. And did you — in that capacity, were you
15 retained by Toquerville Town to assist them in an
16 annexation project?
17
A. Yes, I was. I was acting as the city
18 engineer for the Town of Toquerville.
19
Q. And could you — roughly, what was the
20 time frame of that annexation project you're
21 referring to?
22
A. Well, discussions began in 1990 or
23 thereabouts with comments from various property
24 owners, and then the annexation concluded in the
|25 latter part of 1992. So for about a two-year peripd
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1
it progressed.
2
Q. Would you explain in a little greater
3
detail essentially the general chronology of what
4
you did as an engineer in assisting and consulting
5
with the town relative to the adoption of the master
6
plan?
7
A. Well, there were a lot of minor things I
8
can just comment briefly on at that time. We had a
9
number of issues, a lot to do with the water
10
system. Property owners up near Anderson Junction
11
was desirous of having services provided to them,
12
primarily water, and so they looked to the City of
13
Toquerville, through an annexation process, whereby
14
Toquerville could either extend their water system
15
up or create an individual, a separate water system
16
up at Anderson Junction with existing wells and
17
storage reservoirs. So there were a number of
18
issues relative to the water, the culinary water.
19
In addition t xne culinary water, I was
20
also employed during this period of time as a board
member of the Washington County Water Conservancy 21
22
District, and as such, I was doing a study on the
23
three streams that come down into the canyons. And
24
we looked at a feasibility at this time of building
25
a new dam between the Town of Toquerville and the
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Town of Leeds. It would be just south of Anderson
Junction.
So in the process of looking if a new dam
were to be built in that area, I got very heavily
involved in the master planning of the roads and the
utility lines that would subsequently go in if that
dam were to be installed, and so that was an
irrigation project that had to do with hydro power
as well as irrigation. And that came into play at
this time.
J
There were a couple of other minor
issues. One, La Verkin was very anxious to annex
that portion of the — of Toquerville, which is on
the intersection of the highway that goes up to Zion
National Park. That area, which I think Gilbert
Construction is now developing, was at that time in
Toquerville, and so there was an interest in La
Verkin having that land de-annexed from Toquerville
and annexed into La Verkin.
Well, if that was to take place, the Town
of Toquerville was very interested in having some
commercial property, and so it led the people of
Toquerville to look at Anderson Junction more
heavily. If La Verkin were to obtain the land on
the south end of Toquerville, then Toquerville would

J2-
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look to the north intersection. So that issue was
in the back of our minds. Nothing had happened
during that time.
And then another minor issue was a good
friend of ours, County Commissioner Scott Hirschi,
had some problems with some people who were
littering some property up near Toquerville
Junction. They, I think, just had a bunch of old
debris that was on the property, and the county had
a very difficult time enforcing them to clean that
up.
And there was some discussion between
Scott Hirschi and myself relative to if Toquerville
annexed that area maybe Toquerville would be more
successful inrequiringthose people to clean up
that eyesore, and so there was some encouragement
off therecordon a minor issuerelativeto cleaning
up some property.
Q. All right. I am going to show you — I'm
going to approach the clerk and have this —
THE COURT: Plaintiffs 1, counsel?
MR. RONNOW: -marked. Yes, Plaintiff s
1.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. RONNOW: I'm ph ;ing on the easel here

1
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an engineered map. I'm going to ask you, if you
will, to approach the easel. I'm going to ask you
some questions about this map.
MR. FINLAYSON: if I may inquire, is this
part of the official Toquerville record?
MR. RONNOW: This is a copy of what
ultimately became the zoning map which is the
current Toquerville zoning map. A black and white
copy of what is a colored map that is sitting here,
it's on the wall of Toquerville.
MR. FINLAYSON: I'll make a general
objection at this time about anything offered that
may go to annexation, which is a step apart from
zoning, but it might be linked.
To the extent that annexation can be
linked to zoning, if it's evidence outside the
official legislative record on zoning, I object on
the basis of my initial document, and I won't
continually make objections of this type.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you,
counsel. You have a continuing objection. The
Court notes your objection. It is overruled. Mr.
Ronnow, you may go forward.
MR. RONNOW: All right.
Q. Mr. Wallace, if you would approach that
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map on the easel, are you generally familiar with
that map?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Could you identify specifically what that
is for the Court?
A. Well, prior to 1990 or '92, this
rectangular area here less this little nook here was
Toquerville Town limits.
Q. All right. For purposes of the record,
let me first ask you if you just identify it
generally. Is that — is that an engineering
drawing of what ultimately included the new
annexation in Toquerville Town?
A. That's correct.
Q. All right. Now, then, if you would,
please, take the red marker, and would you just
generally outline on the town boundaries, the
portion of that map that was existing prior to the
annexation as the official Toquerville Town?
A. This was Toquerville.
THE COURT: Mr. Wallace, the sides of the
map, according to — or the sides of the drawing
there, according to your red line, north, south —
I'm sorry — the east and west boundaries are
outlined clearly. Is that a — and I'm too distant
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or my eyes are too old to determine the line. Is
that a section line that denotes the northern
boundary of the town?
THE WITNESS: This is right through the
center of a section. This is the section -THE COURT: All right. So it's a line THE WITNESS: (Inaudible.)
THE COURT: So it's a quarter section
line?
THE WITNESS: That's correct.
THE COURT: All right. And quarter
section line of which sections, township, and range
if you have it on there?
THE WITNESS: This is township 40 south,
range 13 west is this area right here.
THE COURT: And it's a quarter section
line running through which sections?
THE WITNESS: Section 34, and even this
close, I can't tell which section this is.
THE COURT: Well, it would have to be 35.
THE WITNESS: It's 35.
THE COURT: 34 and 35. All right. That
gives us a real solid description. Go ahead, Mr.
Ronnow.
///
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MR. RONNOW:
Q. Mr. Wallace, if you would take that red
marker, and at the top of the Exhibit 1, would you
simply write preannexation boundaries, write those
words, and you can abbreviate.
All right. Now, then, in your work as
consul ~ a town engineering consultant on this
master plan, would you now describe, in reference to
Exhibit 1, that portion of the property around
Toquerville that was originally prepared and
proposed as an annexation in 1992, and would you do
that in green, please.
And you have labeled that, on the upper
right-hand corner of Exhibit 1, annexation, 1992,
indicating the proposed annexation property; is that
correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Let me ask you to make one more
identification mark. Taking the blue marker, since
our map is primarily in black and white —
THE COURT: So is your judge, counsel.
MR. RONNOW: Excuse me?
THE COURT: since I'm color blind, I f m
about in black and white, too. Go ahead.
MR. RONNOW: We're going to do it this
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way: I would like you, in the annexed portion,
roughly parallel to the 1-15 corridor but alongside
of the 1-15 corridor, to make a bold dotted line in
blue so that the judge can clearly see that that
generally indicates the 1-15 corridor.
THE COURT: All right. And the record
should reflect that this Court is well familiar with
the property having commuted up and down 1-15 ever
since about 1968 when that portion of the freeway
was open, and I recognize the area described by Mr.
Wallace on Exhibit 1. Go ahead.
MR. RONNOW: Thank you.
Q. One last matter with regard to Exhibit 1,
Mr. Wallace. In the course of preparing the
annexation materials, let me first ask you this: As
engineer, did you prepare your own engineered
drawing of the proposed annexation?
A. It was a sketch from a U.S.G.S. sheet, so,
yes, it was just a sketch, though not a detailed
drawing like this.
Q. And is — have you reviewed that sketch
that you prepared in preparation for your testimony?
A. Yes.
Q. Is the green section on Exhibit 1, which
you have identified as the annexed property, 1992,
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does that accurately correspond and reflect your '
sketch of the proposed annexation property prepared
in 1992?
A. It is. This is the ultimate
configuration. The original sketch, which I have in
my file with me today, shows the original proposed
annexation was arectanglein this fashion. It did
not include this small parcel of land up on the
northern end of the ultimate annexation, but I have
a copy of the sketch after it had been changed and I
— you could see where this had been added on to my
sketch indicating the final configuration.
Q. In preparation of that final proposed
annexation map, did you become familiar with the
property owned by Mr. Thomas Eveleth in the Anderson
Junction area?
A. It was explained to me, and this is just
recently, my memory fails me on my ownrecall,but
as I met with Charles Adams, the town clerk, two
weeks ago, he indicated to me that when we made the
original proposal that some property owned by Tom
Eveleth was included in the original proposed
annexation.
By a phone call Mr. Eveleth talked with
the town clerk, Chester Adams, andrequestedthat
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his additional property to the north of the proposed
annexation be included in the annexation process,
and that information must have been conveyed to me
because I adjusted the boundary of the proposed
annexation to include all of Mr. Eveleth's property
as well as some additional property on the east side
of 1-15. And so that was the reason it was changed
was because there was a formal - an informal
request made.
Q. Let me - lei me see if I understand you.
The original proposal that just had the straight
clean rectangular shaped annexation, in fact, would
have divided at least two property owners1
properties so that part would have been within
Toquerville Town and part would have been without
Toquerville Town; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And that is the map we now see that has
that rectangular knob on the upper — on the north
end of the town at the Anderson Junction area, that
knob is to accommodate those property owners and
bring the total of their property within the
boundaries of Toquerville Town; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. All right. You may be seated, Mr.
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Wallace. Thank you.
*
THE COURT: Counsel, do you offer Exhibit
No. 1?
MR. RONNOW: Yes, Your Honor. We would
offer Exhibit No. 1 at this time.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. RONNOW: We would offer it for two
reasons, both as a official —
THE COURT: Demonstrative?
MR. RONNOW: Demonstrative of Mr.
Wallace's testimony but also as a copy of the
current zoning map or the zoning map that was
adopted pursuant to the annexation and subsequent
master plan.
THE COURT: All right. Subject to your
continuing objection, Mr. Finlayson, any other
objections that you want to make as to Exhibit 1?
MR. FINLAYSON: NO.
THE COURT: All right. 1 is received.
It's in evidence. Go ahead, Mr. Ronnow.
(Whereupon, Plaintiffs Exhibit
1 was received into evidence.)
MR. RONNOW: Bailiff, if we could just
leave that there, we're going to be referring to
that throughout testimony. Thank you.
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Q. Now, Mr. Wallace, for the record, would
you just briefly summarize how an annexation is
initiated?
A. Well, annexations can be initiated by
private property owners requesting annexation of a
city or it can be initiated by a city itself. In
this case the mayor had received a number of phone
calls and conversations from people that were
interested in annexation, and that was probably what
was taking place in the 1990 period.
And then we reviewed the process of
annexation, and we were counseled by our attorney,
John Palmer, that there needed to be a petition
signed by a majority of the property owners
representing one-third of the value of that
property.
So we went through a series of meetings
requesting input from property owners. We sent out
letters to the individual property owners explaining
the advantages and disadvantages of being within the
city and generally just got their input.
Q. Now, Mr. Wallace, in the annexed portion
that you show on Exhibit 1, there are various
geometric designations, triangles and rectangles
that are shaded different colors. Are you familiar
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develop that area.
'
They talked specifically about motels,
rest stops, and they were the prime group that was
really pushing this annexation, and their company is
known as — was at that time as The Property Shoppe,
and they were the ones who were the primary people
really pushing this annexation.
Q. And as a result of those discussions and
the feedback that you solicited and received as
engineer, can you tell us why these property owners
wanted to petition for annexation?
A. The vast majority of the reasons was to
.
accommodate a culinary water system, which here for
they did not have. They have private wells on those
homes that are up there, but they have no municipal
water resources. So they looked to Toquerville to
provide them with culinary water.
Q. Was there — in the annexed property, you
made reference just in passing, were there some
residential property owners that were up there
living at the time?
A. Yes. Yes, there's a ranch and a number of
homes. I'm guessing now two or three homes at the
time. There might be three or four.
THE COURT: Mr. Wallace, again, I'm goin^
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with what those designations represent?
A. Not on all of them. I am aware that they
do generally follow property lines of individual
properties, and a lot of that land is government
property. And it looks like when —
THE COURT: when you say "government," do
you mean federal government or state lands or is it
a mixture of both?
THE WITNESS: I think everything on the
east side is federal. I think that's U.S.
property. And I think it is U.S. property Forest
Service on the west side, too.
THE COURT: All right.
THE WITNESS: I think it f s federal. I
think it's U.S. property.
MR.RONNOW: All right.
Q. In your — if I understand your testimony,
then, as part of the annexation process, you
solicited input from the property owners involved in
the annexation; is that correct?
A. That's correct. There was some property
right at the junction that was purchased through
some — I don't know — went into default or
something, but it was purchased by some real estate
property owners in St. George, and they wanted to

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

to show my general familiarity with the property,
but also because some of it has been litigated as
well. My recollection, from other litigation as
well as driving around and looking around up in
there, is that the ranch properties, the dwellings
consist in the - within the annexed area shown on
Exhibit No. 1 within those properties outlined on
the northern end of the exhibit and to the east of
the freeway whereas the property on the west of the
freeway does not contain dwellings. Am I accurate?
THE WITNESS: That is correct. All
dwellings are on the east side of 1-15, and on the
west side, other than those signs, there was nothing
there except some — a dirt road, access to the
mountains.
THE COURT: All right.
MR.RONNOW:
Q. Mr. Wallace, you made reference in passing
to your work with water conservancy district with
regard to a reservoir in that general area. Let me
see if I understand this. Was there a plan for a
reservoir on the drawing board, if you will, at the
same time the Toquerville annexation was being
discussed?
A. Yes, there was.
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Q. Did this reservoir — can you explain to /
rect?
/
1 goes through Toquerville; is that correct?
us, was it large enough that it would have, had it
2
A. That's correct.
gone in - and I need to lay a little foundation.
3
Q. Now, again, to clarify the record, did the
Did it ever go in?
4 town ultimately adopt the annexation pursuant to the
A. No, it did not.
5 petition of the property owners?
Q. All right. Again, those of us who drive
6
A. Yes.
the road know that it never went in, but we do have
7
Q. And one last time, Exhibit 1, the green
to make the record.
8 box represents that an — that property that was
Had it gone in, and at the time it was
9 actually and formally annexed by the Town of
being discussed in the planning stages, was it large
10 Toquerville; is that correct?
enough to provide recreation — water recreation
11
A. That is correct.
opportunities?
12
Q. Now, during the annexation process when
A. Yes, it would have been large enough to
13 you solicited feedback and were discussing issues
provide recreation.
14 with property owners, did you ever discuss with
Q. And did that reservoir and the potential
15 specific property owners that you can recall outdoor
recreation opportunities factor into some of the
16 advertising issues in the annexed property?
feedback from property owners with regard to their
17
A. I cannot recall any conversation relative
desire to be annexed?
18 to that, to signs.
A. Yes. Yes, Ifm sure if that was a
19
Q. Do you have — as part of your work in
reservoir, the commercial property would have been
20 preparing this annexation, did you consult with and
more -- a little more valuable.
21 discuss these issues with the planning commission as
THE COURT: Mr. Wallace, with reference to
22 part of your duties?
Exhibit No. 1, at the time that this proposal for a
23
A. I did meet on a couple of occasions with
reservoir in this area was considered, where would
24 the planning commission, and I was in those meetings
the reservoir had covered, if you can just tell me
25 with them.
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by section, township, and range so we'll have a —
1
Q. Do you recall any discussion at the
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, if we may clarify
2 planning commission meetings, either discussion
the record, I'm going to ask Mr. Wallace if he would
3 raised by members of the public or raised by the
take that blue pen again and if he can on Exhibit 1
4 planning commissioner, himself, with regard to any
just draw a rough oval where the reservoir was being
5 outdoor advertising signs located in the proposed
planned.
6 annexation?
THE COURT: All right And you have
7
A. Counsel, there may well have been
8 placed a circular mark east of the freeway in
8 discussion relative to those signs, but my memory is
9 section what, sir?
9 not such that I can recall any of this ~ any of
THE WITNESS: This would be in section 27,
10 those discussions concerning an outdoor sign in
in the southwest quarter of section 27.
11 those meetings.
THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
12
THE COURT: Pardon me.
MR. RONNOW:
13
MR. RONNOW:
Q. And the southwest quarter of section 27 is
14
Q. Now, based on your work as the town
15 pretty close to the center of the proposed
15 engineer and consultant in this master plan and your
16 annexation; is that correct?
16 participation in those planning meetings, could you
17
A. Yes, it is.
17 articulate for the Court what you feel were the
18
Q. And that is, just to orient us on the
18 primary purposes that motivated this annexation of
19 ground as well as the map, that is west of the state
19 property in Toquerville?
20 highway that goes from 1-15 into Toquerville. Do
20
MR. FINLAYSON. Although I made a
21 you know what state highway that is by chance?
21 continuing objection, this is so I clearly directed
22 That's all right if you don't know.
22 to the ultimate issue and ~
23
A. I don't know. I'm guessing.
23
THE COURT: rm going to sustain your
24
Q. But essentially it is in between the
24 objection, Mr. Finlayson, on the form of the
25 question. Frankly, counsel, it would be more useful
25 interstate, 1-15 highway, and the state highway that
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to the Court to have this witness' memory probed as
to the items that were discussed either by specifics
or by category of considerations that he can recall
rather than his feelings on the matter, which,
unfortunately, don't help the Court much. Go ahead.
MR. RONNOW:
Q. Based, Mr. Wallace, on your recollection,
those meetings and discussions, both with property
owners and with the planning commission members
and/or other official Toquerville — Toquerville
Town officials, do you recall the specific issues or
concerns that were raised with regard to objectives
for this annexation?
A. Counsel, the reason we proceeded with the
annexation was to provide services to that area. I
do not have any recollection specifically relating
to those signs. I do not recall any conversations
with property owners, which I did mail out letters
to each of the property owners.
I spoke by phone ~ I would — I would,
again, guess that every property owner that lived
outside this area I contacted them by phone to make
certain that they got our mailing, and so I'm
suspecting I did speak to every property owner on
the phone, but I do not recall, in any of those y
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conversations, any discussion relative to those
billboard signs.
THE COURT: Mr. Wallace, what were the
issues discussed either in the zoning meetings, the
planning commission meetings, the town council
meetings pertaining to the annexation and/or the
zoning of this property just in broad categories if
you could delineate those?
THE WITNESS: Three key issues were
usually discussed. One is always to do with money,
who pays what taxes in the county versus the city.
Secondly, what services would be available, and who
would pay for those services. And then a third
issue was the key issue was the zoning, the
subsequent zoning which would be enacted by the Town
of Toquerville, and that was probably more
controversial than any of the other three.
And the zoning in the county had - and I
don't remember the details - but they had a zoning
such that if a person owned a certain piece of land
they couldn't subdivide it into real small parcels,
nor did their master plan look like there would be
much chance of doing that in the future.
So there was some interest in a number of
property owners that were interested in subdividing
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their property into smaller parcels, and so tney
were hopeful in the annexation process they would
receive a zoning that would be conducive to allowing
them to better use their property through
subdividing it.
MR. RONNOW: All right.
Q. Now, Mr. Wallace, you have now just
described a residential zoning issue that was
discussed. Earlier you described a commercial
zoning issue. I'm going to ask you was it 51
percent of the property owners was there a consensus
that, A, the property should be annexed by
Toquerville Town?
A. The final - the final documents, which I
received this morning, I visited with Elwin Prince
at the Washington County Title, it's now called
Terra Title, but Elwin Prince did the research and
he has given me a tabulation that shows 34 property
owners and 18 of them voted in favor of the
annexation, 16 of them voted negative.
And in his certification that he gave to
John Palmer, the city attorney, it showed that 39.6
percent of the assessed value of those who voted for
- 39.6 percent of the total value, and so it looks
like our 50 percent and our one-third value was just
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barely met on this annexation question.
Q. You have talked about discussions during
annexation with property owners about those two
zoning issues. Did you participate in subsequent
discussions during the master plan process that
followed the annexation?
A. To some extent. Ken Sizemore took the
lead during the zoning process, but I was in
attendance at several meetings.
Q. And were those same issues of commercial
and residential zoning designation discussed in
those meetings?
A. Yes. I specifically remember individuals
in our meeting indicating that they had a windmill
apparatus that they had either installed or wanted
to install or wanted to manufacture, that they
requested having zoning conducive to that windmill
structure. I don't remember a lot of the other
details, but I do remember quite a number of people
in those meetings.
THE COURT: I'm intrigued, Mr. Wallace,
when you talk about windmills. There is the
traditional windmill that's used to pump water.
Were we talking about electrical generation
windmills or traditional windmills or do you

t2^^7/^Page34
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recall?
*~X?^J
THE WITNESS: Ken Sizemore will probably
help you more, but, no, this was not a traditional
windmill. This was a cylindrical windmill that
produced electricity - produced electricity for
their needs anyway, and he wanted to build these to
sell them throughout the country, and this was his
prototype. This is where he wanted to manufacture
them, and he wanted one to be built and used there.
And I suspect it's there right now.
THE COURT: All right, sir. Go ahead,
counsel.
MR. RONNOW:
Q. In your participation in master plan in
process, do you recall the property owners located
right on the 1-15 intersection, the cloverleaf
intersection or interchange, rather, do you recall
discussions with those property owners relative to
how they wanted their property zoned?
A. Yes. They specifically had some — even
some sketches, they had some plans, and they did
show their property limits, they showed a proposed
motel, it was a small motel with a convenient
store. And we, in our master planning, looked at
details. There was an existing well up there that
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Just so we're clear, the topography is not shown on
Exhibit 1, but I'm well familiar with it. The
western side of the freeway, more specifically the
northern portion of the annexation on the side west
of the freeway is probably the highest point in that
area and would give you the greatest pressure head
for a water tank storing water at that location. Is
that accurate, sir?
THE WITNESS: That's correct.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr.
Ronnow.
MR. RONNOW: Just a moment, Your Honor.
Let me make a note here.
Q. With regard - Mr. Wallace, with regard to
the common boundary issue with Leeds, and Leeds is
the community immediately west of Toquerville, along
the 1-15 corridor; isn't that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, then, if — let me understand, the —
in the county boundary commission, the boundary was
adjusted in connection with the annexation and
master plan in process; is that correct?
A. It was concurred at that time. I think
this is what we had always proposed, and the Leeds
people concurred in that matter at that time.

| 2 - € 7 / /Page38
:ity iiin obtaining
1
Q. And did that reflect the logistical
we were very interested in as a city
2 reality of providing water services to those
water rights that existed at that well site.
3 properties that would be part of the adjusted
We anticipated that if that were to be
4 Toquerville boundary?
annexed that a special improvement district would be
5
A. That is correct.
created whereby the property owners would be
6
Q. So to simplify it, the boundary was
assessed sufficient fees to build a storage tank on
7 adjusted so that those property owners of
the west side of 1-15 up on a knoll, and then that
8 Toquerville could deliver water to, as a logistical
would be fed from a well down near the easterly side
9 matter, became Toquerville properties and those that
of 1-15 and would provide adequate water for this
10 made more sense for water and service delivery from
commercial development.
11 Leeds became Leeds properties; is that right?
And then we had another issue with the
Town of Leeds. There was some controversy about the 12
A. That's a correct statement.
ultimate boundary between the Town of Leeds and the 13
Q. Thank you.
Town of Toquerville. So we had representatives of
14
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, we have no
15
further
questions at this time.
the town, either the planning council or the city
16
THE
COURT: Mr. Finlayson, you may
town - town council of Leeds were in a number of
17 cross-examine.
our meetings, and we had agreed - it turned out
18
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you.
that through the boundary commission - the county
19
-oOoboundary commission we did agree to a common
20
CROSS-EXAMINATION
boundary line that you see now and Leeds had some
21 BY MR. FINLAYSON:
interest in their water system in coming down. And
22
Q. Is it correct that Toquerville, itself,
we set this water zone to accommodate a common
23
did
not plan any commercial development up in the
boundary between Leeds and Toquerville.
24 area where the signs are?
Q. Mr. Wallace 25
A. When you say "Toquerville, itself," they
THE COURT: Hold on a second, counsel.
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have — Toquerville has no property, and they had no
involvement m any commercial development. We were
— we were interested m obtaining water rights m
thatTHE COURT Mr. Fmlayson, I ordinarily
ask counsel to stand while they're questioning.
That way when objecting counsel stands up my
attention is drawn to it, and I can see what the
problem is. Go ahead, counsel.
MR FTNLAYSON Thank you, Your Honor, and
I apologize.
THE COURT That's fine.
MR FINLAYSON
Q At the time of the annexation, there was
no culinary water or sewer to the area where the
signs are; is that correct?
A That is correct. There were private wells
for individual homes on the opposite side of the
highway, but I don't think there were any utilities
on the west side of 1-15.
Q All right. When did you leave the
Toquerville employment or contract relationship?
A The last - the end of December in 1993.
Q At that time, was there any culinary water
or sewer up to that area?
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A No, sir.
Q Without water and sewer up there,
commercial development is not feasible; is that
correct?
A That's correct. There would have to be
utilities available for a commercial development.
Q So far as you know, there is not presently
any culinary water or sewer up to that area?
A No, not that I'm aware of.
Q Would you show us where on the map these
signs were?
A Well, I - I can't tell you exactly
where. I am aware that this triangular piece of
property contains - contained the signs, but I
couldn't show you specifically on the property where
they're ~ where they're located.
THE COURT So the record is clear, Mr.
Wallace, what you're referring to is the triangular
portion of the property west of I-15 in that small
rectangle on the northern extent of the annexation
of 1992. That's correct, sir?
THE WITNESS That's correct.
THE COURT All right.
MR FINLAYSON. if you'll stay there, I'll
ask another question or two.
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Q Which is the property that was included at
Eveleth's suggestion that would have not been
included without that suggestion?
A Everything north of this section 27 and
west of 1-15 was requested by Tom Eveleth and his
wife to be included in the annexation process.
Q Was there a portion of that that was not
included in the original plan?
A Yes.
Q What part of that?
A Everything north of section 27 was
originally not included m the annexation proposal.
It was subsequent to his phone call, and I have a
letter from him in my file now that verifies that he
requested that additional property north of section
27 west of 1-15 be included in the annexation.
Q Can you tell where on the map the old 91
road crosses 1-15?
A Well, I'm aware the old 91 comes up
through here where the residential homes now front
the old 91, and it looks like it crosses it on the
southerly side probably right near ~ it would have
crossed it right near the southern portion of the
interchange, Anderson Junction.
Q Does that map show where Anderson Junction
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is?
A It does. I didn't delineate it well here,
but you can see the expanded right-of-way of 1-15,
and that's the junction right there.
THE COURT. Counsel, might we stipulate
that Anderson Junction is Exit 27 on Interstate 15?
MR RONNOW. Yes, Your Honor, we would we would gladly stipulate to that.
THE COURT All right. Just so we all
make sure that no one looking at this record in the
future is confused. I think that's Exit 27, as I
recall.
MR RONNOW- if we may also, to clarify,
Your Honor, if I may propose a stipulation that the
only interchange on 1-15 that is shown on Exhibit 1
within the green annexation property is the Anderson
Junction.
THE COURT- Exit 27?
MR RONNOW Exit 27.
THE COURT Would you so stipulate, Mr.-MR FINLAYSON- Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT - Finlayson? All right. The
record is clear. Go ahead, Mr. Finlayson.

24

MR FINLAYSON. You may be seated if you

P^77

25 wish.
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1 That's my recollection.
Q. You referred to a business, The Property/
2
I believe at this junction, Anderson
Shoppe?
3 Junction, even the utility corridors are on the east
A. Yes, sir.
4 side of the freeway so that you don't even have the
Q. Did they want to retain signs up where
5 power lines or the Mountain Fuel lines to the west
Zions —
6 as the observer standing on the freeway would face
A. I have no ~ I have no knowledge of that.
7 towards the Pine Valley Mountains. Now, does that
Q. Do you recall telling me previously that
8 describe the property and the location of the signs
they didn't want signs up there?
9 and the area in which the signs are located to your
A. No. In our conversation earlier, there
10 satisfaction, Mr. Finlayson?
was a gentleman who's interested in developing the
11
MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, I believe that
land, which would be in the Leeds portion, it would
12 is accurate, and with this witness, I won't pursue
be south of the interchange and south of the
13 that.
annexation, and that gentleman was very adamant
14
THE COURT: Well, let me give about not having those signs there. And he was a —
15
MR. FINLAYSON: (Inaudible.)
he had an option on the property within the Leeds
16
THE COURT: Let me give Mr. Ronnow an
proposed declaration of annexation, and he made a
17 opportunity to describe the property and the, if you
specific request that those signs not be there.
18 will, the vista at that location. Mr. Ronnow,
Q. Do you know why he did not want the signs
19 anything you want to add to that or objections you
there?
20
would like to make to the Court taking judicial
A. He indicated that as an entrance to his
21 notice of those observations?
project, which was a very large proposal, including
22
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, the only
golf courses, a destination resort, he thought that
that would be an eyesore and that it should be left
23 objection I would make is that I have no specific
in its natural, pristine condition.
24 evidence, and I don't think any has been presented,
Q. All right. Are you aware of the nature ofy
25 as to the location and availability of power
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the topography in that area?
A. Yes, I am. I've walked that several
times.
Q. How would you describe it?
MR. RONNOW. I'm going to object as to
ambiguous, the phrase, "that area."
THE COURT: Counsel, why don't we look at
it in this fashion, and I do this, counsel, with
some hesitation, but there's no way we can get
around this Court's familiarity and personal
familiarity with the area, and, gentlemen, I would
propose that I take judicial notice that the area in
which these signs are located, which is north of
Exit 27, west of the 1-15 freeway, if one were to
stand on the 1-15 freeway near the area of the signs
and look west and northwest, you would see basically
sage and pinion foliage extending for some miles
uninterrupted by presence of human activity at all.
As a backdrop to that sage and pinion
foliage, you have the western face — no, take that
back — eastern face of the Pine Valley Mountains,
which constitute the horizon west and northwest of
the area of the signs, and that it is with the
exception of the freeway, itself, in that location
without any other indication of human activity.

Page 45 - Page 48
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services on the west end of the freeway.
freeway, So I think
the Court's judicial notice should be qualified that
there is no evidence, and we believe that there are
no utilities over there.
I have no evidence that they exist, nor do
I have any evidence that they are not available, and
the reason I add that caution is that it is not very
far south on the west side of the interstate now
that there are multiple residences with power
utilities available, and I just don't know how far
north they go.
THE COURT: And I understand that,
counsel, and I do not intend to, by my taking
judicial notice of the items that I placed on the
record, imply whether there is or is not electrical
service there. What my judicial notice goes to is
the visual appearance, and the visual appearance is
as I have stated without any reference to electrical
service or availability on the west side of the
freeway, and that's well clarified. Anything else,
Mr. Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson?
MR. RONNOW: One other - excuse me, there
is one other thing in way of judicial notice. At
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summary judgment there was an affidavit submitted
received by the Court by an engineer that
specifically located those signs in a number of
feet. I was just looking for it, but an engineer
that went out there and located those signs on the
west side of the freeway, and that is part of the
Court's original record at summary judgment.
THE COURT: Is it, Mr. Finlayson? I
recall MR. FINLAYSON: it is part of the Court's
original - i t ' s an affidavit - actually it's not
admissible in this forum. It's hearsay in a trial.
We will elicit testimony on that issue, and that
will be through Mr. Snow. So I think it premature
to address those distances.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, in order ~
following the Court's lead here to perhaps expedite
this a little bit, plaintiffs are perfectly willing
to stipulate that the three outdoor sign structures
are located in the northwest triangular portion of
Mr. Eveleth's property that appears on Exhibit 1 as
the northwest side of Interstate 15 in the bump on
the annexation at the very top of that annexation
and their exact location, I don't think, is
necessarily too material. They are there. We don't
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MR. RONNOW: if I may approach the /
exhibit, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yes, counsel.
MR. RONNOW:
Q. Drawing your attention to Exhibit 1, what
we have described as a small rectangular bump, which
is on the top of this drawing, that is the north end
of the Toquerville annexation, there is property
located within that area that is both on the west
side of the interstate and on the east side of the
interstate; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And is it your understanding that both
property owners, that is Mr. Eveleth and whoever
owns the property on the east side of the freeway,
requested that there property be included in the
annexation?
A. That is correct.
Q. And do you recall specifically what their
concern was with the original proposal that lopped a
portion of their property off? Why were they
concerned with that original proposal?
A. Mr. Eveleth was to be consistent with his
property already inside the annexation. The people
on the east side I have no recollection. I do, in a
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file in front of me, have their names.
i
MR. FINLAYSON: I object as hearsay.
THE COURT: Is it hearsay, Mr. Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: Well, Your Honor, he has
already testified as to — in relationship to why
this was — why he, as the city engineer, modified
this. I think it's material to what the proposal
and purpose was.
THE COURT: Counsel, as far as the
justification for Mr. Wallace's going above the
section line for township 20 — or section 27, as
shown on Exhibit No. 1, the information is not
hearsay. It is simply foundational to the reason
why Mr. Wallace added the additional rectangle on
top of the annexation proposal.
To that extent, the desire expressed by
the property owners, Mr. Eveleth on the west and the
other owner or owners on the east, is not hearsay.
It is not received for the proof of the matter
asserted, specifically, the specific intentions or
desires of those property owners, Mr. Eveleth and
the others, but is received only to indicate the
reason why Mr. Wallace made the change, and with
that modification, you may proceed, Mr. Ronnow.
///
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dispute that.
THE COURT: And the only other thing that
we should understand for the purpose of the record
and part of the evidentiary milieu that the Court
will work with, is that on today's date, the 1st of
October, 1996, all that remains of the signs are the
vertical posts. The faces of the signs are removed,
and that today all there are now is the vertical
steel posts that previously supported the face of
those signs, and you can stipulate to that, Mr.
Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: That is correct.
THE COURT: And Mr. Finlayson, that is the
fact as you understand it as well?
MR. FINLAYSON: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Finlayson, any
further cross-examination for Mr. Wallace?
MR. FINLAYSON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Anything more of
this witness, Mr. Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: Yes, Your Honor.
-oOoREDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RONNOW:
Q. Mr. Wallace, first of all -

£6^

10-J)l-96
jPageTT

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (801) 652-9971

Page 49 - Page 52

10-01-96
I

>CondenseIt™
tZ43#£>

/ P a g e 53

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
|25

MR. RONNOW- *~*is%S^
f
Q Do you know, Mr. Wallace, whether there
are any — at the time you prepared the proposed
annexation whether there were any commercial uses in
that northwest portion of the — this bump we're
talking about, the north bump on the — excuse me —
on the east side of the road, those property owners
that requested they be included, were there any
commercial uses in there that you were aware of?
A. Not that I was aware of.
Q. And are you aware of how it was ultimately
zoned in that area?
A I would — I am — right now from my
recollection, no. No, I'm not acquainted with how
that was ultimately zoned.
Q. All right. Now, Mr. Wallace, drawing your
attention to the discussion regarding services, in
your earlier testimony you said that one of the
primary issues for the annexation was to facilitate
the extension of municipal services into the annexed
area around Anderson Junction; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. When you say services or utilities, which
services and utilities exactly are you referring to?
A. Culinary water.
y
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Q. And at the time of the annexation, I think
you testified there was no culinary service up
there; is that correct?
A. That's correct. No municipal culinary,
just private.
Q. Would you describe to the Court, then —
first, were there discussions specifically as part
of the annexation master plan with regard to how and
when those utilities might be extended into the
annexed area?
A. Yes. There was detailed discussions.
From our master plan, we had a cost estimate of
several approaches to bringing culinary water into
that area, and in our declaration of annexation, it
specifically states that this area would be provided
services from the city and that those services would
be paid for by those people who lived within that
area, such that there would not be an unfair tax
burden on the existing citizens of Toquerville.
Q. When you say that those citizens would pay
for those services, how exactly was that discussed?
What — by what procedural vehicle would they pay
for those?
A. There would be a special improvement
district, the creation of a special improvement
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district whereby the city could assess — make
assessments to those property owners for the cost of
the utility.
Q. Now, then, at the time of the annexation
in these discussions, do you recall whether there
was a discussion of how quickly that those services
might be provided?
A. I don't think --1 don't think we had any
specific dates. It was anticipated in the near
future that it could be proposed, the special
improvement district be proposed.
Q. And now in relationship to your career and
training as a civil engineer, have you worked on
other annexations for other municipalities?
I
A. Yes. Yes, I have.
Q. And is it fair to characterize this
annexation process is perhaps the first step of a
long-range planning process for a general?
A. Yes, we have a master declaration of
annexation, which includes clear up to Pintura, and
each city has those master declaration of annexation
within their boundaries. That's the first step.
And then the second step is the implementation of
annexing portions of that anticipated area.
Q. So at the time the annexation was
J
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discussed and approved, based on all of your
feedback from property owners and planning
commission members, et cetera, was it the objective
to facilitate the water and other utility service to
that area from —
MR. FINLAYSON: object, leading.
THE COURT: It is leading. Rephrase your
question, Mr. Ronnow. Sustained.
MR. RONNOW:
Q. With regard to the utility issue, at the
time the annexation was finally approved —
MR. RONNOW: Well, I'll withdraw that
question. I think he's answered it sufficiently.
No further questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson, anything else
of Mr. Ronnow - or not of Mr. Ronnow — Mr.
Wallace?
MR. FINLAYSON: No, thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr.
Wallace. You may step down. Counsel, may Mr.
Wallace be excused or do you want him to hang
around?
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, he may be
excused.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Wallace, you

1
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may go back to work up north if you want, sir.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
THE COURT: Your next witness, counsel.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, plaintiffs call
Mr. Ken Sizemore.
THE COURT: Mr. Sizemore, if you'll come
forward, in front of those tables, raise your hand
and be sworn.
Whereupon,
KENNETH SIZEMORE,
having been first duly sworn to testify to the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
was examined and testified as follows:
THE COURT. Thank you, sir. Please have a
seat on the witness stand.
-oOoDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RONNOW:

8
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Q. Would you — would it be fair, as a without sliding your position, but as a shorthand
reference to your work, to refer to you as a
planner —
A. Certainly.
Q. ~ in connection with the work you did for
Toquerville?
A. Definitely.
Q. All right. Now, then, would you describe
to the Court briefly, as an overview, your
involvement in either the annexation or the master
plan and zoning that took place in Toquerville in
1992 and f93?
A. In late 1992 Mr. Kim Wallace contacted me
by telephone and indicated to me that Toquerville
was undertaking an annexation process that would
include Anderson Junction, that was including a
substantial amount of property, approximately three

19
Q. Would^you-state~your fullname, please.
20
ArTinKenneth Lee S i z e m o r e ^ ^
21
QTTtfrrSiaaaeft, wftere"3oyoureside?
22
A. I reside in Santa Clara, Utah.
23
Q. And how are you currently employed?
24
A. I'm employed as the deputy director of the
25 Five County Association of Governments.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

sections of land, that the community needed some
assistance in determining the appropriate general
planning for the land uses in those three sections,
and, subsequently, the appropriate zoning
designations for those pieces of property.
I was then asked by Mr. Wallace if I could
provide that technical assistance to the community.

l
Q. And would you briefly oescribe^our post
2 high school degrees, certificates, and licenses, if
3 any?
4
A. Certainly. I hold a bachelor of arts
5 degree in political science with a certificate in
6 public administration from Utah State University. I
7 have substantial postgraduate work but did not
8 complete that program because I moved here to
9 southern Utah.
10
That program included economics, public
11 administration, and community planning. I've worked
12 %in community planning since 1977, a number of
13 functions, including county planning for Cache
14 County, Utah, and in my current function as
15 community and economic development director for the
16 Five County Association of Governments.
17
Q. In your capacity as community economic
18 development director of the Five County Association
19 of Governments, are you called on to consult with
20 rural communities with regard to annexation, master
21 plan, and land use zoning issues?
22
A. Constantly, yes, sir.
23
Q. And were you involved in that capacity
24 with the Town of Toquerville in 1992 and '93?
25
A. Yes, sir.
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I indicated that thatrequestshould be made to our
governing board and the approval be given, which is
the normal process for assigning that kind of work
in our organization. Thatrequestwas made in
December of 1992 subsequent to the annexation having
taken place. Therequestfor my assistance was made
subsequent to the annexation.
Q. All right. So you came on board
officially after the final annexation ordinance was
adopted?
A. That's correct.
Q. And inrelationto your duties, what were
your marching orders when you came on board with
Toquerville?
A. My standard process is to schedule a
meeting with the planning commission of the
community. I did so, met with the planning
commission of Toquerville. I believe our first
meeting was January of 1993.
That particular planning commission meets
monthly, and during the year of 1993,1 visited with
the planning commission on a monthly basis
determining the procedure that should be followed in
allocating land uses for the annexed area.
We quickly determined that the entire
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community should be looked at and expanded the scope
of my assistance to the community to incl
the
entire Town of Toquerville, not just the m
annexed area. And we reviewed the existing general
plan designations already on record, and I prepared
draft, general plan, and zoning maps for the
community.
Q. Now, then, did you participate with the
planning commission in public hearings with regard
to the proposed master plan?
A. I recalled that public hearings were
eld. I do not recall that I was personally in
attendance at the actual public hearings.
Q. Did you attend open planning commission
meetings at which the public attended and provided
any input into the —
A. Yes. Over the year we had a number of
meetings where specifically the property owners of
the newly annexed area were invited to come and
discuss with the planning commission their desires
for uses of land in the newly annexed area.
Q. Prior to meeting with the planning
commission and beginning this preliminary process of
developing information, were you given any
instructions or directions as to how any specific
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property in the annexed area was to be zoned?
A. No, sir.
Q. And so would you describe in detail, if
you will, the scope of your meetings and how you
solicit information as you developed - as you
developed the master plan and specifically with
regard to the annexed property?
A. We first asked Bush and Gudgell
Engineering to provide a base map. Exhibit 1 here
is the base map prepared by that engineering firm.
I indicated to them that we needed to have a nase
with some of the property - property outlines of
the description and we let Q. Let me - excuse me, let me interrupt you
here. When you say the property outline
descriptions, you1 re talking about private property
parcels?
A. Private property parcels. Thatfs correct.
Q. So they wou be identified on your base
map for purposes
discussion?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay. Go on.
A. We then went through a process of
determining the current uses of land on the
properties. We determined what were proposed uses

EL0f^
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by discussion with the subject property owners, and
we c .ermined what we would like to see future land
uses to occur over a 20-year time horizon.
Q. All right. When you say what we would
like to see over a 20-year time period, can you be
more specific? Who is the we in that statement?
A. The planning commission and town council
of Toquerville Town.
Q. So then part of the overall master plan
process is to look down the road in advanced
1
planning as far as 20 years; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And with regard to that, as a result of
that feedback and work with the planning commission,
can you describe to the Court how your proposal
began to take shape with regard specifically to the
Anderson Junction area?
A. Yes. We did have a series of meetings and
invited the Anderson Junction property owners to
come to the meetings and discuss future uses of land
and their intents for uses of land at the Anderson
Junction area. We discussed the capability of
J
providing services, including culinary water, sewer,
utility, other utilities, such as electricity.
We talked about the intents of the
1
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property owners, and it was very clear that the
owners of The Property Shoppe that were referred to
earlier, Floyd and Mary Helm, were very interested
in some commercial development at the intersection
itself.
We talked about some future development
across the freeway and talked specifically about the
existing well that could be developed to provide the
culinary water.
THE COURT: Mr. Sizemore, when you use the
phrase "across the freeway," you mean on the west
side or the east side of the freeway?
THE WITNESS: That would be the west side
of the freeway.
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Go ahead,
counsel.
MR.RONNOW: We cut you off. Were you
finished with your description.
THE COURT. Talking about the well is when
I jumped on your testimony, sir.
THE WITNESS: We had a very substantial
discussion over, I believe, a series of three
meetings talking about the potential uses of the
property there.
We also talked about the fact that a

1
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substantial amount of that property is in government
ownership, both federal and state lands, and that we
would have to include their planning processes into
the future uses of that land.
The process ended out with a draft general
plan and zoning map. The draft zoning map is the
exhibit here today.
MR. RONNOW: All right.
Q. We're going to come back to that in just a
minute. I want to focus on some of those
discussions. With regard to water development,
water service in that area, you said you discussed
the well and how you would provide.
Could you give us a little more detail as
to the proposed solutions or possible solutions to
the water — the culinary water issue that you
discussed during the master plan process?
A. My recollection is that we relied heavily
on studies that were underway sponsored by the
Washington County Water Conservancy District. We
talked about some potentials for collecting water
out of some of the streams coming off of the Pine
Valley Mountains and the fact that there was a well
in the area that could be improved and that might be
able to provide substantial amounts of culinary^
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water.
'
Q. As part of those discussions with regard
to water, did you discuss the insulation and
location of possible water tanks, reservoirs for
storage as part of the water system?
A. Those items were addressed, however, not
very specifically, and I personally did not get
involved with specific locations or designs of water
tanks. I left that area of discussion up to their
town engineer.
Q. Without holding you to any specifics, do
you recall general discussions that were possible
locations where a water tank might be fbund?
A. Yes, the high ground on the west side of
1-15.
Q. And can you generally locate where that when you say "high ground on the west side of 1-15,"
our Exhibit 1 does not have topography. Can you
approach Exhibit 1 and just generally direct the
Court's attention to where that would be?
A. I don't know if I can specifically
pinpoint the location. My recollection is it would
be somewhere in this location.
Q. All right. Are you familiar with the
property in the bump on the north end of the annexed
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property?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Is that high ground above the Anderson
Junction area generally?
A. It is.
Q. All right. Thank you. You may return.
Well, while you're there, I'm going to ask you just
to specifically closely identify Exhibit 1. Is that
the - a copy of the - well, is that a copy of the
proposed zoning map that you worked on?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And at what point in the process of master
planning and zoning did you reach that configuration
that is shown on Exhibit 1?
A. This map was prepared in late 1993 after
revising a series of draft maps that would work with
the planning commission over the months. I would
say this was probably November of 1993 that this map
was prepared.
Q. While I have you there by Exhibit 1, do
you recall the issues withregardto the property
that is located on the extreme north end of the
annexed property that constitutes that rectangular
jog into the county area, do you recall discussions
of that property?
|
>

A. I do.

~

Q. And would you describe to the Court, based
on yourrecollection,why you proposed to include
that property into the master plan proposal?
A. The majorreasonwas the fact that
property owner owned property on both sides of the
section line here and did not want to have this
property divided between incorporated Toquerville
Town and unincorporated Washington County.
Q. And is that true on both sides of the
interstate, both the west side property owner and
the east side property owner?
A. I do not recall the specific configuration
of ownership on the east side of I-15. I do recall
that there were property owners that did have that
same situation, but there are numerous property
owners in that area east of 1-15.
Q. All right. So that when you ultimately
made your proposal for zoning asreflectedin
Exhibit 1, how - would you describe to the Court
your proposal for the specific zoning designations
in the Anderson Junction area?
A. Yes. The darker shaded areas here are
proposed highway commercial zoning districts.
Q. Now, at that time, could you describe what

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (801) 652-9971

Page 65 - Page 68

10-01-96

8
9

22
23
24
25

KUNZ V S . U D O T
Condenselt
g . ^ %,/ Page 69
71
1
Q. Now, then, on that map, just while the
the — as a planner, what the basis of your
recommendation for highway commercial was?
2 Court has taken broad judicial notice, in order to
3 make the record, isn't there a geological formation,
A. We looked at the existing zoning of
4
a hill, a ridge that separates generally that
Washington County prior to the annexation. We
5 annexed area from the older traditional Toquerville
looked at the fact that there is an interchange
6 Town?
there, which would generate substantial commercial
7
A. That is correct, sir. This hill is in
traffic, and we looked at the owners' desires and
8 this location.
future plans for their property as well as the
9
THE COURT. And where you weie indicating,
potential tax base benefits that commercial
10 sir, is in a region paralleling the 1-15 freeway
development at the interchange would bring to
11 approximately — well, if I can see the section
Toquerville Town.
12 lines correctly — approximately a mile to the
Q. Now, you stated that after you got
13 southeast of the 1-15 freeway. That is the high
involved in the master plan process it expanded
14 ground that separates the Andersonville — or
somewhat so that in part you looked at the whole
15 Anderson Junction area from Toquerville Town, the
planning issue for Toquerville Town; is that
16 traditional town with only the highway connecting
correct?
A. That's correct.
17 the two?
Q. As part of looking at that whole planning
18
THE WITNESS: That is correct.
issue, can you explain to the Court the issues that
19
THE COURT: All right.
were being discussed with regard to the location of
20
MR. RONNOW:
commercial properties or commercial zones in
21
Q. Now, Mr. Sizemore, just to clarify our
Toquerville generally?
22 exhibit, I'm going to ask you to take the — do we
23 have a black pen there. If you would just draw ~
A. Toquerville historically has been somewhat
24 I'm not holding you to any scale or detail. If you
isolated and has been a residentially oriented
25 could just draw an oval in the area which you just
community. Their intent during this discussion was

P.^>C/^Page72
? ^ 2 / P a g e 70
described as that ridge formation that separates
ate locations for
those two portions of Toquerville, and would you
2 future commercial development could occur, and we
label within that rough oval that you've drawn just
3 looked at their desires as a community and
put the word "ridge."
4 determined that the Anderson Junction interchange
So that if I understand your testimony,
5 would be the most appropriate and viable location
then, the — was it the consensus that you heard
6 for commercial activity.
from property owners and community residents that
7
Q. Okay. I'm going to ask you - I'm going
8 intensive commercial development was most
8 to pin you down just a little bit. When you say
9 appropriate at the Anderson Junction area; is that
9 most appropriate and most viable for the community,
correct?
10 can you give us a little detail as to what led you
A. That is correct.
11 to that conclusion?
Q. All right. Mr. Sizemore, you can sit
12
A. The residents of Toquerville were very
13 concerned about retaining the rural atmosphere and
down. Now, you have described a lot of meetings, a
14 the shaded tree fee street that constitutes the
lot of feedback, a lot of discussion here with both
15 existing Toquerville Town site. They did not want
property owners in the master planned area, other
16 to see intensive commercial development occurring in
Toquerville property owners, and the planning
commission.
17 that area.
In the course of all that discussion,
18
As they looked along the corridor of the
19 feedback, were you ever approached by any property
19 state h . way that goes through Toquerville, they
20 owners with specific — with discussions
20 deters ~-d that there were not many locations along
21 specifically regarding outdoor advertising signs in
21 that ccrvidor that would be appropriate for
22
the Anderson Junction area?
22 intensive commercial development. For that reason,
23
A. The fact that there were three outdoor
23 they determined that the interchange was the
24
advertising
structures in the proposed annexation
24 appropriate location for highway commercial highway
25 area was brought up in the discussion. I was
25 services.
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questioned regarding how the town should approach
the issue of outdoor advertising.
We did note that the existing zoning
regulations in effect at the time for Toquerville
Town did not address outdoor advertising, and that
something needed to be included in future zoning
ordinance amendments to address the location and
regulation of outdoor advertising.
Q. Now, you have made reference to reviewing
Toquerville zoning ordinances. Let me ask you a
question I should have asked — (inaudible.) As
part of your master plan process, did you, in fact,
go to existing Toquerville zoning ordinances and
review what they had?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So that you were, at the time of the
master plan process, familiar with the zoning that
they had adopted?
A. That is correct.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, I'm submitting
for marking as Exhibit 2 a document —
THE COURT: And for identification
purposes, counsel, what do you want to call Exhibit
No. 2?
MR. RONNOW: Exhibit No. 2 is the
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Toquerville zoning ordinance. It's called the
Toquerville General Zoning Ordinance.
THE COURT: All right. Of what date,
counsel? Is it dated?
MR. RONNOW: Well, we're going to have to
clear that up on testimony, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Exhibit No. 2 has
been handed to the witness. Go ahead, counsel.
MR. RONNOW: And, Your Honor, for counsel,
if I may just make a proffer, foundation for this
may require two witnesses, but I want to proceed at
this point with Mr. Sizemore.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. RONNOW:
Q. I ask you to review what has been marked
as Exhibit 2 in this matter. Would you take just a
moment and thumb through that, familiarize yourself
with it. Are you familiar with that document?
A. Yes, sir, I am.
Q. Would you just generally describe what
that document is and how you becameJfamiliar with
i t ? ^ _ ~-~~ — ^=^~~^==—
-
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23 ^ A. It appears to be a copy of the zoning
24 OTdinance in effect during 1993 for the Town of
25 Toftueiallle.
_

VANFEIITT^

Q. And in that period of 1992, '93, did you
review such a document in — in Toquerville offices?
A We keep a copy of all of the currently
adopted ordinances for all the communities in the
five county region in my office, so I have a copy of
this ordinance at my office. I did check with the
town to make sure that there hadn't been any
amendments that I was not aware of.
Q. All right. I'm going to draw your
attention to the first page ofJkss^oeeamhT.
fdinanceNo. 1978-1?
the top of the page it state
A. Yes, sir.
_
Q. Now, have you reviewed thaTsufficiently
enough to be able to determine today whether that is
an accurate copy of the zoning — the Toquerville
zoning ordinance that was, insofar as you know, was
the official adopted Toquerville zoning ordinance in
1993?
A. As far as I know, it is.
Q. All right.
MR. FINLAYSON: May I have that section
number again?
MR. RONNOW: On the very top,* 1978-1.
MR. FINLAYSON: oh, the whole thing.
Okay.

Page 76

1
MR. RONNOW:
2
Q. Now, I'm going to draw your attention to
3 the last page of that document, which is page No.
4 41. Do you have that on Exhibit 2?
5
A. I do.
6
Q. And there's a line there that states,
7 Passed by the town councilm^gjpiBvi
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oftheTownofToquenp^f^OftdayofMarch,
is that correct?
A. It appears that that's correct, yesT
Q. All right.
MR. FINLAYSON: I object to this witness
providing a foundation for that. There's no
indication that he made this — the change or that
he signed the document.
THE COURT: Counsel, Mr. Ronnow has
indicated he may require different witnesses in
order to lay foundation. Being that this is
foundational only, I will overrule your objection,
but we may still be a long ways from admission of
this document. Go ahead, Mr. Ronnow.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, to clarify, for
purposes of this witness, I'm trying to establish
the zoning ordinance that he reviewed as part of his
master plan duties and what he relied on in part in
Page 73 - Page 76
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his master plan preparation.
THE COURT: I follow you, counsel. That's
basis of my ruling.
MR. RONNOW: Okay. Thank you.
Q. Now, Mr. Sizemore, I'm going to direct
your attention to page 38 of that zoning document.
Would you read to the Court on page 38 what is that
page entitled?
A. The page is entitled, Highway Commercial
Zoning.
Q. And the designation is?
A. H-C.
Q. Was that the commercial designation that
you incorporated into your master plan with regard
to the Anderson Junction property?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Now, then, are you familiar with this
particular page of the ordinance, this highway
commercial zone?
A. I am.
Q. And was that in existence and part of the
zoning records — zoning ordinance that you reviewed
in preparation of your master plan?
A. It was, yes, sir.
Q. Now, let me clarify. In relationship to
y
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of their major concerns was that the annexation
might provide additional commercial zoning that may
~ might enable the erection of additional outdoor
advertising along the freeway.
They were very concerned and expressed a
desire to control the proliferation of outdoor
advertising along the 1-15 corridor. Other property
owners indicated that one of their intents was to be
able to allow outdoor advertising as part of the
commercial uses of their property in the future, and
they wanted to have that capability.
The discussion came down to the fact that
the current zoning regulations of Toquerville Town
did not address outdoor advertising and amendments
would have to be made to address that issue.
Q. Now, you have stated in your earlier
testimony that you made the recommendation in the
zoning map, which is Exhibit 1, for the highway
commercial designation at Anderson Junction because
it was the most appropriate location for such ~ for
any economic development in Toquerville Town; is
that correct?
A. Any commercial.
Q. Commercial development?
A. Correct.
/
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your specific duties, you worked on the master plan
and you prepared maps that go with the master plan,
but did you prepare any amendments to actual text of
zoning ordinances?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. So that when we talk about H-C in the
master plan and the zoning map, which is Exhibit 1,
we're referring to this corresponding Toquerville
ordinance for highway commercial zoned H-C; is that
correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. All right. Thank you. Now, you also
mentioned that you talked generally about outdoor
advertising. You have been sitting in on these
proceedings. The issue of these signs is no secret
to anybody. Let's cut to the chase.
Tell the judge, insofar as you recall, any
of the co nments or feedback that you had with regard
to outdooi advertising in this Anderson Junction
area or the annexed area pro or con? What kind of
feedback did you receive?
A. There were property owners who attended
the meetings as we prepared these drafts that were
very concerned and opposed to any proliferation of
outdoor advertising along the freeway corridor. One
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Q. Now, then, in making that recommendation
as planner, you assimilate all of this data;
correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That youreceivedinput from property
owners, input from the planning commission, et
cetera, and then this map reflects, to a certain
extent, certain conclusions that you have drawn; is
that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And is it correct to say that your
conclusions or proposals were based on what you felt
was the majority feeling or consensus at the time?
A. As I indicated previously, we went through
a number of innovations of these kinds of draft
maps, and we spent some time over that year's period
of time sketching potential uses of land in the
proposed annexation area. This particular exhibit
is theresultof the planning commission's consensus
as to what potential zoning district shouk be
adopted for the Anderson Junction area.
Q. Now, you said in passing that that process
of developing that feedback and information took how
long?
A. Again, I believe we began in January of
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1993, and this map was produced in November of 1993. 1
2
Q. And during that process 3
A. Monthly.
4
Q. And there was a fairly constant flow of
5
information and discussion?
6
A. Yes, sir.
7
Q. Now, you have made reference to, as part
8
of the process, looking at what the Washington
9
County Commission had zoned that newly annexed
10
property; is that correct?
11
A. That's correct.
12
MR. FINLAYSON: I object to Washington
County information inasmuch as a matter of law. The 13
14
Court of Appeals has already determined that the
15
Washington County zoning was unlawful as for the
16
primary purpose of — (inaudible.)
17
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, may I address
18
that before you rule?
19
THE COURT: I was not aware that the Court
20
of Appeals had ruled on that issue, counsel.
21
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor-22
MR. FINLAYSON: In my brief, I quote them,
23
and they have a specific sentence that says, We find
24
that that is unlawful - let's see, Til find the
25
page number.

which the Court of Appeals specifically suggests
that relevant evidence would include evidence of
actual land use or evidence that the zoning body
merely perpetrated a prior zoning determination.
They have specifically expressed that as fair game.
THE COURT: Perpetuated rather than
perpetrated.
MR. RONNOW: I'm sorry, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That's okay.
MR. RONNOW: I'll get my teeth back in.
THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson, let's focus on
your objection. Your objection is that the ~
MR. FINLAYSON: rm noi sure what - there
was a reference to the Washington County zoning
plan, and I wasn't sure where that was going to go,
but it looks like you are going to rely on the
Washington County zoning plan, and I wanted to point
out at that point that the Court of Appeals has
determined that as a matter of law that Washington
County zoning is unlawful as providing for the — as
being for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising, and when considering other issues, we
can't ignore that the Court made that legal
determination.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, we are not
|
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MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, at page — Your
Honor, are you looking from the Pacific Digest
copy?
THE COURT: Actually, counsel, I have the
Court of Appeals remitter together with their
opinion right here. I also have the memoranda
submitted by both counsel, and I have the — and I
have the Utah advanced report copy.
MR. RONNOW: May I submit to the Court the
Pacific Digest copy because I think the appropriate
citation should be to that — those page numbers.
THE COURT: Let's use it in that fashion.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, if I may just
assist Mr. Finlayson. We have nothing to hide
here. I draw your attention to page 769 is the
first statement, and the second column towards the
bottom is the first statement that I think he's
referring to wherein the Court of Appeals says, Kunz
is, therefore, bound by the prior adjudication that
Washington County zoning of Eveleth's land was for
the primary purpose of outdoor advertising. And we
don't dispute that holding as it would become the
law of this case.
What I am soliciting from Mr. Sizemore,
however, runs to the left-hand column of page 769 in

submitting in any way, shape, or form. I hesitate
at this point, counsel, on his speculation. We're
certainly not submitting Washington County's zoning
authority as authority for anything. The witness
said that they looked at that zoning, and the Court
of Appeals specifically raise the issue of did
Toquerville perpetuate that zone. That's where I'm
headed.
THE COURT: And I understand you,
counsel. Your caution is well taken, Mr.
Finlayson. We will tiptoe carefully along this
path, but at this point, your objection is
overruled. Let's keep it at mind carefully.
Rephrase your question again, Mr. Ronnow. Let's
start back up.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor-MR. FINLAYSON: One final sentence. The
Court in its findings of fact said that Toquerville
—it didn't use the word perpetuated — retained
the Washington County zoning. This Court found, as
a matter of fact, that Toquerville retained the
Washington County zoning category and —
THE COURT: And I understand that,
counsel, but the concern that I have is to determine
whether or not the primary purpose behind
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MR. RONNOW: No further questions at this
Toquerville in retaining this designation as
2 time, Your Honor.
commercial zoning was to allow outdoor advertising.
3
THE COURT: Counsel, I think it's a good
That is the focus the Court of Appeals has
4 time to take our mid-morning recess. Let's stand in
given me, and that's where I'm going. And in
5 recess about 10 minutes. For your housekeeping
viewing all the evidence and facts and probative of
6 concerns, I intend to go in session until 12:30.
that issue, I'm going to overrule your objection.
7 Then we would break and pick up again about a
Mr. Ronnow, again, state your question.
8 quarter to two, if that helps you align witnesses
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
9 and be ready.
MR. RONNOW:
10
MR. RONNOW: That will work, Your Honor.
Q. Mr. Sizemore, you made reference to the
11
THE COURT: All right. Then we'll be in
fact as one part of the great body of information
12 recess about 10 minutes.
that you refer to incorporated in your designs 13
(Recess.)
(inaudible) — with regard to master planning was a
14
THE COURT: We are back in session in Kunz
review of what the Washington County existing
15 versus Department of Transportation. Counsel are
ordinance provided; is that correct?
16 present. The witness is on the witness stand, and
A. That is correct.
17 Mr. Finlayson, you may cross-examine.
Q. My question is this: Did your 11-month
18
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you.
process of reaching this zoning map proposal that is
19
-oOoreflected in Exhibit 1, after 11 months, would you
20
CROSS-EXAMINATION
characterize that as the - let me rephrase that.
21 BY MR. FINLAYSON:
Did you ever, as part of your
22
Q. Mr. Sizemore, you referred to maps and
recommendation, merely seek to rubber stamp what
23 recommendations and also the Toquerville zoning
Washington County had designated that property?
24 ordinance. Do any of them say anything about
A. No, sir.
Q. Now, did you ever incorporate into your
25 whether it's appropriate to have signs?
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1
A. No, sir.
recommendation, as a basis for your recommendation,
2
Q. Did you anticipate that that would be
the notion or proposal that the Anderson Junction
3
addressed
at a future time?
property should be designated H-C for the purpose of
4
A. Yes, sir.
allowing outdoor advertising?
5
Q. Were you aware of the three large
A. No, sir.
6
billboards
on the Eveleth property at the time of
Q. Now, then, Mr. Sizemore, once you had
7 this process of the zoning and annexation?
reached the point of preparing this master plan and
8
A. Yes, sir.
zoning map, you made your recommendation, did you
9
Q. In your discussions with the planning
participate in its final adoption?
10 commission, was there any discussion of those
A. No, sir. After these draft maps were
11 outdoor advertising signs?
prepared, they were submitted to the planning
12
A. Yes, sir, I recall some discussions.
commission to hold the required public hearing that
13
Q. Okay. Were they aware of the natural
the planning commission is to hold according to
14 beauty of the area where the signs were?
state law, and then their recommendation goes to the
15
MR. RONNOW: objection, calls for
city council, the town board in this case.
16
speculation.
I was involved with the planning
17
MR. FINLAYSON:
commission's deliberations but was not involved past
18
Q. Did they express awareness of the nature
that point. I did not attend the city council
19 of that area?
hearing as I recall.
20
A. I don't recall that being part of the
Q. All right. But to clarify, the map we've
21
discussion.
been working from as Exhibit 1 appears to you to be
22
Q. Did anyone on the commission ever express
— or to be a copy of the zoning map that you
23
a
preference
for having signs there?
prepared for presentation to the planning
24
A. My memory doesn't serve me in terms of
commission?
25 whether it was an actual planning commissioner or if
A. That is correct.
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it were — was just an audience participant, but the
discussion of the signs did come up, and the
inappropriateness of outdoor advertising along that
corridor was a topic of discussion.
Q. Did any commissioner ever say, to your
recollection, that he thought that signs were
inappropriate there?
MR. RONNOW. objection, asked and just
answered.
MR. FTNLAYSON: No, it's a different
question.
THE COURT: He focused specifically on a
planning commissioner, counsel. Overruled. Do you
recall any planning commissioner opining on the
appropriateness of the signs?
THE WITNESS: it's been too long. I
cannot recall whether it was a planning commissioner
or a audience participant.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you.
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Q. You have testified to your experience and
background in city planning and zoning. As a zoning
consultant, do you have an opinion as to whether it
is appropriate to place signs and replace these
signs before they were removed?
J
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Q. There isn't any commercial development at
this point right at the junction; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. The ~ there is a water tank presently on
the west side of I-15 that is south of the road that
crosses there at Anderson Junction; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And presently there is no water that is
run up to the area where the signs are?
A I'm not aware of the location of culinary
waterlines on the subject property.
Q. And while you were working on the project,
there was no culinary water that went up there?
A. No, sir.
Q. And there was no sewer that went up there?
A. No, sir.
Q. And so far as you're aware, there is none

today?
A. No, sir.
MR. FINLAYSON: That's all I have on
cross.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ronnow,
anything on redirect before I get back to Mr.
Finlayson's request?
MR. RONNOW: Yes, Your Honor.
f*
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MR. RONNOW: Objection, Your Honor. I
think that is beyond the scope of his testimony on
direct. He's soliciting affirmative expert opinion
from a witness that was ~ didn't present that
specific issue.
THE COURT: On scope of cross-examination,
I'll sustain your objection. It is beyond the
scope. Next question, Mr. Finlayson.
MR. FINLAYSON: I would request the
opportunity of making this witness my own for the
purpose of this question either now or later.
Perhaps for the convenience of witnesses, I could
ask that now. I don't know.
THE COURT: Finish up your cross, counsel,
then we'll do that without running Mr. Sizemore back
and forth. We'll address the issue at that point,
at that juncture.
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you.

Q. When commercial development - let me commercial development would be more naturally
placed first right at the Anderson Junction rather
than further up where the signs were; is that
correct?
A. Yes, sir. That would be a logical
development pattern.
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THE COURT: Go ahead
-oOoREDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RONNOW:
Q. Mr. Sizemore, do you have Exhibit 2, the
zoning ordinance, in front of you there?
A. I do.
Q. Direct your attention to page 29. How is

29 - page 29 titled?
A. Signs.

Q. That is chapter 12 of the ordinance; is
that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And can you tell from that ordinance ~
direct your attention, first of all, to the
left-hand side of the ordinance, there's a column
apparently defining types - or indicating types of
signs; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you see that first category,
advertising; is that correct?
A. Yes.

Q. Now, using that matrix that appears on
page 29 in the ordinance, can you tell whether
advertising signs are permitted use within the
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highway commercial zone?
A. My reading of the page would indicate that
they are conditional use.
Q. All right. And, in fact, if we flip back
over to page 38, all uses in the highway commercial
are designated conditional; isn't that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Based on your experience as a planner,
have you been involved in preparing and assisting
communities in developing zoning ordinances
specifically?
A. Yes, sir.
* Q. So that you're familiar with the
conditional use procedure?
A. I am.
Q. Generally?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And are you familiar with the variance
procedure generally?
A. I am.
Q. So that if under the sign ordinance here
we have advertising as a conditional use under H-C
coupled with all uses being conditional under the
H-C zone, isn't it possible —
MR. FINLAYSON: objection, leading.
y
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THE COURT: That is - that is the
absolute trip wire for a leading question. I see
the reason for Mr. Finlaysonfs objection. It's
probably well taken. Rephrase your question. Don't
use "isn't it possible," counsel.
MR. RONNOW:
Q. Under the conditional use concept, that
designation in the H-C zoning would allow
consideration and review —
MR. FINLAYSON: objection, leading.
THE COURT: Let's let him finish it first,
counsel.
MR. FINLAYSON: He said if it would
allow. It's a statement. It's - nothing that
follows could be anything other than leading.
THE COURT: Well, depends on where he
goes. It may be a long preamble. Go ahead, Mr.
Ronnow.
MR. RONNOW:
Q. Mr. Sizemore, the H-C zone that we've been
discussing, zoning ordinance - in the Toquerville
zoning ordinance at page 38 provides all uses are
subject to conditional use permit; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And as you just testified, under chapter
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12 of that ordinance, it appears that advertising is
a conditional use under the sign ordinance in
highway commercial; correct?
MR. FINLAYSON: I object. This is leading
or argument, one or the other.
THE COURT: Well, counsel, the problem
that Mr. Ronnow has is that he has a document here
that he has not yet been able to enter into
evidence, and he may need to get another witness in
order to establish its admissibility.
However, in terms of convenience of
presenting his case, he has Mr. Sizemore on the
stand who has testified as to his familiarity with
the ordinance, which I cannot refer to now because
it's not in evidence yet.
Mr. Ronnow is indeed technically leading
the witness. He is technically asking questions
that might be argumentative were Exhibit No. 2 in
evidence, but it's not in yet.
MR. FINLAYSON: I'm not objecting to
foundation. I'm even assuming, for purpose of
argument, that there's no foundational problem. It
still has those effects.
THE COURT: Well, I understand, counsel,
but the Court has discretion under Rule 611 to
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conduct the presentation of evidence in a reasonable
fashion and see that it is conducted in a reasonable
fashion, and I am going to overrule your objection
finding that it's a lot easier to work with Mr.
Sizemore while he's here rather than run him back
and forth. Mr. Ronnow, start up again.
MR. RONNOW:
Q. Based on the H-C ordinance, the highway
commercial ordinance we've been discussing and
provisions therein, and the chapter 12 sign
ordinance, Toquerville's zoning ordinance that we're
now discussing, can an applicant seek a conditional
use permit in highway commercial for an advertising
sign?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you have testified that you're
generally familiar with the variance law and
procedures. Let me focus that. Are you familiar
with the state law found in the Utah Code with
regard to general variance procedure?
A. I am.
Q. And can an applicant landowner seek a
variance from a town, a variance to any provision in
the zoning ordinance?
A. My understanding of the state law is that
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variances are very strictly regulated into three
specific areas and that variance of a use is not
allowed according to case law.
Q. Right, but we have a conditional use
established here; isn't that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So the applicant may seek a variance as to
parameters of that use under state law; isn't that
correct?
MR. FINLAYSON: objection, leading.
MR. RONNOW:
Q. May an applicant landowner, under the Utah
state variance procedure, file an application
seeking a variance as to the limitations of a use
that is permitted in his zone?
A. Yes.
Q. And if he meets all those criteria that
are outlined in the code in case law, could he
receive — or could he expand the limitations if
appropriate?
A. I'm not sure I understand the question.
Q. Well, he may seek a variance under the
strict application of the statute to a permitted
use; correct?
A. I don't interpret the state code that
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way. I'm sorry.
Q. All right. Let me back up again. We have
a permitted use?
A. Yes.
Q. Sign, has to go through a conditional use
procedure. As a planner, based on your experience
in understanding of the Utah Code, I'm not asking
you to comment except generally, may a property
owner, by the process of variance procedure, seek to
acquire a variance, a special treatment, so to
speak, generally, to a permitted use in a given
zone?
A. I am not aware of that process being used
to expand or alter a permitted use.
Q. Well, for example, if I have - if I have
a ordinance that allows me a driveway that's part
and parcel of my permitted use on that property, but
it limits my location of that driveway, may I seek a
variance to - to allow a special treatment to
locate that driveway in a place other than would
normally be required?
A. Certainly an application for a variance
can be made.
Q. That's all I'm asking.
A. Yes.
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Q. All right. So that I may, under the
ordinance, seek to change the strict application of
that use in relationship to location?
A. Certainly.
Q. As long as it's a permitted use, and I can
meet the other criteria of a variance, I may make
application for a variance that would change,
modify, expand, abate certain restrictions to my
permitted use; is that correct?
A. Certainly the application can be made.
Q. All right. That's all we're asking about
because anything else would ask you to speculate.
All right.
MR. RONNOW: No further questions, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. We now have
established this witness' expertise, I think, for
your needs, Mr. Finlayson. I'll go along at this
point and allow you to ask your questions, as though
he were your own witness, to opine on those issues
that you previously approached. Do you want to do
that now, counsel, or do you want to cany up with
some other things?
MR. FINLAYSON: I would like to ask one
question more before proceeding.
y
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THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
-OOORECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. That question is regardless of what may be
in the Toquerville ordinance, was it still your
intention to have further zoning specifications for
signs or not to have signs in the newly annexed
area?
A. Yes, it was the intent of the planning
commission to continue revisions of the ordinance to
address outdoor advertising.
Q. But those were never done?
A. They were never done.
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you,
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, counsel,
as though Mr. Sizemore were your witness.
-oOoDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. As a zoning consultant, and the expertise
has been established, do you have an opinion whether
it is appropriate or desirable to have outdoor
advertising signs up in the area where those signs
were before removed?
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MR. RONNOW: objection, ambiguous as to
the term "appropriate and desirable."
MR. FINLAYSON: On direct he used the term
"appropriate" in describing what was done, and it's
only fair to use the same terminology on the cross.
THE COURT: All right. Your objection is
overruled, Mr. Ronnow. Do you have an answer, sir?
THE WITNESS: My recollection of the
discussion of this issue, at the time we went
through this process, was that we had a fairly long
discussion about the pros and cons of outdoor
advertising and the fact that there is a state
statute that directs some of the location of signs
along freeways.
I did indicate to the planning commission
that we needed to look at the State Highway
Beautification Act and determine what they could, as
a municipality, impose that might be more
restrictive than what the state code allows.
We talked about the fact that outdoor
advertising along the 1-15 corridor might impede
some of the other economic development efforts that
were going on at the time in terms of tourism
development and that we wanted to retain a more
natural looking corridor entering into the St.
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George basin.
'
We talked about the fact that three signs
were already erected and that we might have to live
with the decisions that allowed those signs to be
erected in the first place as prior non-conforming
uses prior to the annexation of the property. Those
all were talked about in general terms, but, again,
that was not followed up on and no proposed
ordinance amendments were developed or recommended.
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MR. FINLAYSON: Okay.

Q. I would like to refocus the question a
little. Assume this is ~ I'm asking your own
opinion as an expert. Assume there is no state law
one way or the other as to whether signs are lawful
or unlawful in this location. As a matter of
planning, and you, as a zoner, is this an
appropriate area for outdoor advertising?
MR. RONNOW: objection,relevance,Your
Honor. The strict issue before the Court is the
purpose of the zoning authorities in Toquerville
Town in designating this H-C designation.
We are now going far field, creating
experts, talking about appropriateness which may
embrace a whole spectrum of issues outside of
purpose of the zoning authority. Mr. Sizemore is
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THE COURT: Mr. MR. FINLAYSON: I have -

THE COURT: - Finlayson, how is his
opinion on this specific issue probative to what is
before the Court in this matter?
MR. FINLAYSON: Yes. The Court of Appeals
first cited and quoted the policy of the Utah act,
which is to preserve the beauty of the area and
protect it for traveling public. It is a very
critical — and our first point to emphasize the
policy of the act, and this goes to whether this
violates that policy and impairs the beauty of the
area and the enjoyment to the public. This is a
very critical and central point to our case. We
haven ft presented it yet.
THE COURT: Counsel, you have won that
issue before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals has construed the statute contrary to this
Court's construction of the statute in order to
narrowly review the one remaining fact issue that
was not before the Court of Appeals, and that is to
determine the primary purpose issue of this
particular zoning.
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Now, if that is all that's before this
Court, and I believe it is, why are we talking about
the overall statute? I thought I had a very narrow
finding that I needed to focus on and make for the
Court of Appeals' opinion on remand.
MR. FINLAYSON: Right at the beginning,
when you stated the issue and asked Mr. Ronnow if
that was correct, I did not have a chance to say
what I believed, and I believe that's part of what
this Court must consider, but that there is another
crucial part and that is that that specific
27-12-136.3 in parens (3) must be read in light of
the policy of the act and it would be error to
consider that specific statutory provision without
giving important credence to the policy of the act
to present beauty, and I believe the Court stated
that in its opinion.
THE COURT: But, counsel, I am looking
very specifically.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, it's page 6 769, first column with the headnote 5 and 6.
THE COURT: Well, I've got 771 where it
says conclusion. It says —
MR. RONNOW: It's restated there as well.
THE COURT: The trial court erred in
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concluding that the subject section that was
referred to by Mr. Finlayson applies only the areas
outside appropriate cities and towns. Outdoor
advertising is prohibited in any location zoned for
the, quote, "primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising," close quote.
Because Kunz and UDOT have presented
conflicting evidence providing Toquerville's primary
purpose behind its zoning of Eveleth's land, we
reversed a grant of summary judgment and remand for
a trial on that issue.
MR. FINLAYSON: I believe that issue
cannot be addressed without the effect on it of the
purpose of the act, and I would like to read a
passage in the opinion unless the Court —
THE COURT: Go ahead, counsel. Tell me
what you're talking about. If I'm missing
something, now is the time to correct it.
MR. FINLAYSON: Yes. I have t h e -
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(inaudible) — report. I don't know where it is
there, but it's the one, two, three, four - it's
about the seventh paragraph down from the beginning
of the analysis. It's a paragraph that begins, In
enacting section 27-12-136.3.
THE COURT: All right. Let me get to you,
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then. I have it right here. It's on page 769.
MR. RONNOW: That's correct.
MR. FINLAYSON: So the Court begins with a
reference to 27-12-136.3, and then says what's
relevant to that section. In enacting this section,
the legislature must have contemplated that local
zoning bodies might attempt to generate immediate
revenue from lands adjacent to highways by rezoning
such lands to allow outdoor advertising, however —
now it links this purpose to this section ~
however, allowing outdoor advertising in areas
without other businesses or highway services in the
vicinity would violate essential purposes of the
Outdoor Advertising Act enacted in part to promote
the convenience and enjoyment of public travel, to
protect the public investment in such highways, to
preserve natural scenic beauty of land bordering on
such highways, and to ensure that information in the
specific interest of the traveling public is
presented safely and effectively.
The Court took as a starting point for its
consideration of 27-12-136.3 in parens (3) the
policy of the act, and that specific section cannot
be properly understood apart from the policy of the
act, and that is a essential part to our case in
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chief and our argument as a whole, and I submit that
it's relevant here.
THE COURT: All right, counsel. I
overruled — or I am going to sustain the objection
on relevance. I basically disagree with your
underlying focus, Mr. Finlayson, and the record
should reflect why so that you have it reserved if
necessary.
I have no idea where this lawsuit is
eventually going to end up. The Court of Appeals in
their opinion has indicated substantial issues of
administrative law and administrative procedure
which have not yet been addressed by these parties
to litigation that I have no idea where it's going
to finish.
What I do know, what I do have an absolute
certainty of is the remand for the determination of
the single issue for trial, which has been set forth
for the Court in the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals, and that is Toquerville's primary purpose
behind its zoning of the subject property, Mr.
Eveleth's land where these signs are, and that is
what my focus is on.
Where that goes once the Court makes the
factual finding that is mandated by the Court of
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Appeals is probably beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court if I read the Court of Appeals appropriately,
but that's not what's before me here today. I'm
sustaining the objection. Any further questions of
Mr. Sizemore, Mr. Finlayson?
MR. FINLAYSON: No, thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Ronnow, anything more of
this witness?
MR. RONNOW: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Sizemore. You
have endured a great deal. You may step down, sir.
Your next witness, counsel.
MR. RONNOW: The plaintiff calls Glade
Peterson.
THE COURT: Mr. Peterson, will you come
forward, raise your hand, and be sworn.
MR. FINLAYSON: Would it be appropriate
for me to get a proffer on what he would say on that
question?
THE COURT: Yes, counsel. If you want to
preserve your record, do that with Mr. Sizemore at
some later point in the litigation, and we'll go
forward with Mr. Peterson right now.
///
///

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (801) 652-9971

Page 105 - Page 108

10-01-96
I

Condenselt™
(2. ^ K ^ V ^

Pa

Whereupon,
GLADE PETERSON,
having been first duly sworn to testify to the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
was examined and testified as follows:
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Please have a
seat here on the witness stand.
-oOoDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RONNOW:
Q. Would you state your full name, please.
A. Glade Lynn Peterson.
Q. Where do you reside, Mr. Peterson?
A. Toquerville —
Q. Excuse me.
A. Toquerville, Utah.
Q. How are you currently employed?
A. I'm the postmaster.
Q. And did you — did you sit on the plan —
the Toquerville Planning Commission at any point
during the master plan and review of the annexed
property that we've been discussing here this
morning?
A. Yes.
Q. And just generally can you put a time
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frame on that?
A. Approximately most of 1993.
Q. Were you chairman of the planning
commission during your tenure?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And as chairman of the planning
commission, did you participate in the master plan
and zoning map preparation discussions that have
been testified to by Mr. Sizemore here this morning?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, specifically, draw your attention to
that period of time in the general preparation. Did
you meet with Mr. Sizemore as a planning commission?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. Would you briefly describe the scope of
those meetings and discussions?
A. Well, I came on the zoning and planning
after the annexation procedure, and Ken Sizemore was
contacted. He either contacted me or I contacted
him, I don't remember which, and we set a time
within our regular scheduled zoning planning
meetings that he could come and help us do the
zoning for Anderson Junction.
And, subsequently, we determined to cover
all of Toquerville, so we made sure that all of the
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details, all of the I s were dotted and T's were
crossed as far as zoning was concerned.
Q. And could you describe what your
understanding at that time frame - as planning
commission chairman, your understanding of what the
planning commission's overall duties were in the
adoption process of the master plan and zone map?
A. Basically to — we had the zoning
ordinance that existed within the town that we
worked with. That's all that we had to work with
that I was aware of, and to get the property owners
of Anderson Junction involved and see what their
needs and desires were was, of course, a part of
it. And to have public input at our meetings from
them and anyone else who wished to make input, and
then finally to have our public hearings on what we
determined out of all of this process.
Q. Would you briefly describe how you — how
the planning commission went about soliciting or
gathering the feedback from Anderson Junction
property owners and other residents in Toquerville?
A. I was not involved in giving out the
information by phone or letter to those peoplejbut
I know that that was done, and also we advertised
our public meetings. And, again, those people were
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invited, we had those advertisements, and letters,
et cetera to come to our public hearing.
J
Q. So on the ongoing basis, as you were in
the discussion stage of this master plan process,
did you have multiple meetings?
A. Yes. We basically had them once a month.
Q. And those were all open meetings?
1
A. Those were all open meetings.
1
Q. And did the public attend to some degree
or another?
A. Yes. Some of them were quite heavily
J
attended.
1
Q. And in those open meetings, did you allow
or solicit comments and feedback from the public?
A. Definitely.
Q. So that as you came to this — first, let
me stop, a foundation question. Let me draw your
attention to the map that appears on the easel here
in the courtroom, which has been marked as Exhibit
1. Are you familiar with that map?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. And is that — I'm going to ask you to
approach the easel if you would for just a moment so
you can get a close look at that. Are you also
familiar with the zoning map that was ultimately
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adopted by the town council as a result of the
planning commission's work in this master plan in
process?
A. Yes, I ~ yes.
Q. Is it the same map that's being used today
insofar as you know?
A. As far as I know, yes.
Q. And have you seen it anywhere in the town
hall or town records?
A. Yes.
Q. I now draw your attention to Exhibit No.
1. Does Exhibit No. 1 appear to be a copy of that
official zoning map?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. And does Exhibit 1 appear to be an
accurate copy of the map that was ultimately
submitted by the Toquerville Planning Commission to
the town council with a recommendation that they
adopt it as the amended zoning map?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. You can take your seat now.
Thank you. Now, then, with regard to all this
feedback from the public in your public meetings,
and, I assume — well, did the planning commission
members also discuss and debate openly the master
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A. As near as I can recall, the landowners on
both sides, we did have some input from landowners
on the west side as well as the east side, wanted
that all to be commercial.
Q. Do you recall generally that at some point
in this whole process you received information or
had specific discussions with each of the property
owners on the four corners of that Anderson Junction
interchange?
A. I can't specifically say how many
landowners commented, but we did have quite a few
landowners comment.
Q. And with regard to the residential
designation that is just west of the Anderson
Junction interchange, was it your recollection that
there was a consensus among the property owners that
that be zoned residential?
A. On the west side?
Q. Excuse me. East side of the Anderson
Junction.
A. On the east side, away from the
interchange, they wanted residential.
Q. Now, then, with regard to your planning
commissioners, when you made arecommendation—
well, let me ask you this: Does Exhibit 1
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accurately reflect the recommendation that you, as a
planning commission, made to the town council as to
the designation of zoning districts in the Anderson
Junction area?
A. I believe that's an accurate recollection.
Q. Do you recall, was there a consensus on
the planning commission that the property at
Anderson junction be zoned commercial?
A. Definitely a consensus, yes.
Q. And in the course of that, were there any
other issues with regard to that commercial zoning
proposal that you recall being discussed at the
planning commission?
A. Well, of course, the infrastructure was
all discussed, water, sewer, existing water, et
cetera.
Q. And did - was the planning commission
aware that there was no existing sewer and water
services there at the time?
A. Yes, we were.
Q. And so what was the — were there
proposals discussed by the planning commission as to
providing those services?
A. There was no specific proposals. There
were general proposals.
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plan process and recommendation?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. And was Mr. Sizemore, the planner that had
been retained, involved in many of those meetings?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. Did he openly provide feedback to the
planning commission as planner?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Do you recall from all of that feedback
discussion, meetings, et cetera what the primary
issues were that the planning commission considered
with regard to zoning property at Anderson Junction?
A. The issues that I am aware of and that I
can recall was first we wanted to have a commercial
development around the interchange, Exit 27, for
purposes of helping tax revenue of the Town of
Toquerville. Secondly, we did have input from some
other landowners, specifically to the east, that
wanted a residential zoning.
Q. All right. With regard, first, to the
proposed commercial zoning, based on these many
meetings of the planning commission, did the — was
there a consensus among the property owners that
that property should be zoned highway commercial at
the Anderson Junction interchange?

10-01-96
£ - ^ * 4 ^ Page 115

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (801) 652-9971

Page 116

Page 113-Page 116

10-01-96

y

Condenselt™

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
p5

^
^52? T7
Page 117
Q ^ right. Was there general discussion
1
— that's my next question. Was there general
2
discussion of the need to provide those services in
3
connection with the —
4
A. There definitely was a discussion as to
5
the need for services there most definitely.
6
Q. Now, then, could you articulate ~ you
7
said — let me ask this question: Were there any
8
other bases which you considered in recommending the J 9
H-C zoning designation for the Anderson Junction
10
properties?
11
A. Well, like I said, we wanted some
12
commercial development, perhaps a truck stop,
13
motel. There was some mention of those specific
14
things that some developers were interested in doing
15
on around the interchange.
16
Q. Prior to making the recommendation that
17
the property be zoned highway commercial, did the
18
planning commission examine and discuss other areas
19
in the Town of Toquerville that might be zoned
20
commercial?
21
A. Only one other spot.
22
Q. And where was that?
23
A. Would you like me to show you.
24
THE COURT: Yes, sir. If you'll go down
25
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to the map, Exhibit 1, and indicate where it was
that you were considering. All right. And you are
indicating on the southern end of the town limits
right next to the — I'll — (inaudible) — the term
notch, in the town boundary.
THE WITNESS: Almost to the La Verkin town
boundary.
THE COURT: All right, sir.
THE WITNESS: And the reason being is
because that had been zoned commercial by future
zoning commission.
THE COURT: Future or past.
THE WITNESS: Past, excuse me.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS: Past zoning planning
commission, but it had never been followed up on,
which we did follow-up on.
MR.RONNOW:
Q. How did you follow-up on it? What action
did you take?
A. The landowner came in and said, look, I
know ~ (inaudible) - the zoning planning has said
this is all right to be commercial. The town
council has approved us to be commercial, but it was
never formally done and recorded. (Inaudible.) So
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we followed up on that.
Q. And what official action did you take?
A We had ~ (inaudible) - and zoned that
commercial also.
Q So as a result, at the stage you made a
recommendation to the town council, that small dark
zone at the south end of the map on Exhibit 1 and
the Anderson Junction were the only two areas in the
town that were — that you proposed to be
commercial?
A. That's correct.
Q. All right. As part of your discussions in
the planning commission, did you receive feedback
from individuals regarding the location of any
commercial property along the traditional downtown
Main Street area of Toquerville?
A. No. In fact, the - it seemed to be the
town would not ~ residents did not want any
commercial development - (inaudible.)
Q. All right. So that by the time you
reached ~ you reached your ~ the recommendation to
the town council, was there a consensus in the
planning commission that the Anderson Junction be
designated highway commercial?
A. Yes, because we thought that was the ideal
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situation. It was right in the town proper. It was
around the interchange. We felt - (inaudible) ~
ideal situation.
Q. And in the course of those discussions,
was there any general discussion with regard to the
kind of unique commercial opportunities that may be
presented in connection to an interstate
interchange?
A. Yes, because there's nothing between Cedar
City and Washington along the interchange there.
It's — (inaudible) ~ Highway 17 to go to Zion
National Park, and there were some property owners
that owned - I don't know if they owned specific or
had options, but they wanted some growth there.
Q. All right. You can take your seat now.
Mr. Peterson, you heard discussion regarding signs,
and I want you to describe for the Court, based on
your own recollection of that whole deliberative
process in developing a master plan and zoning map,
what is your recollection as to discussion of any
outdoor advertising signs in the Anderson Junction
area?
A. Well, I've heard all Mr. Sizemore said,
and T ve read a copy of the minutes that mentions

25 that was discussed just one sentence in there. I
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1
process
leading
up
to
the
recommendation
to the town
1 can't recall specifically having much of a
2 council; is that correct?
2 discussion on the signs. I can't recall it being a
3
A That's correct.
3 issue with m e at all.
4
Q
And your testimony is that Exhibit 2
4
Q All right. Do you recall ever having ~
5 appears to be that zoning ordinance?
5 ever in your discussions with the planning
6
A Yes.
6 commission issues of signage reaching a level that
7
Q
Did you have any understanding with regard
7 it was a primary or important consideration to the
8 to when that was adopted?
8 planning commission?
9
A M y understanding was, and all I had to go
9
A I ' d have to say, no, it wasn't. In m y
10
by
was the date on the front, 1978, and,
10 opinion, m y memory and what I thought, it was not a
11 subsequently, I did go back and find an entry in the
II —it was not an issue.
12 minutes that indicated that was when it was adopted.
12
Q Now, you heard the planner, Mr. Sizemore,
13
Q Originally? Now, drawing your attention
13 talk about the large scope of the process he
14 to the last page of Exhibit 2. It has ~
14 followed including a review of what the preexisting
15
A Last page?
15 zoning designation in Washington County was. A s a
16
Q Last page.
16 planning commission, do you recall ever discussing
17
A Okay.
17 the prior Washington County zoning designation?
18
Q It has date of adoption showing March 10,
18
A I can't really recall even knowing what
19 1982. D o you have any recollection of any
19 the prior county designation was. It didn't have
20 understanding as to the discrepancy between those
20 any bearing on what w e were doing as far as our
21 two dates o f ' 8 2 or f 78?
21 zoning that I can recall.
22
A. Yes, and I believe that's w h y I went back
22
Q N o w , then, as planning commission
23 to the minutes. I believe that they were — that's
23 chairman, when you started this project, did you
24 when it was compiled, and it w a s n ' t really adopted
24 have any direction from town officials directing you
125
until 1982.
25 how you should specifically zone any of those
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private properties in the newly annexed area?
A. Y o u ' r e speaking of the town council?
Q Town council, yes.
A Very little input from them. They were
just leaving us to do our planning.
Q. So as far as you were concerned, as the
planning commissioner working with the planner, were
you starting with a clean slate on the master plan?
A Yes. There — there really hadn't been
anything done on the master plan. There had been
zoning in place, but really nothing on the master
plan up until this point.
Q D o you recall any discussions ~ strike
that. Did you — I ' m going to draw your attention
to ask you to take a look at Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
MR RONNOW Bailiff, thank you.
THE WITNESS without going through every
page, this appears to be the zoning ordinances that
w e were using, yes.
MR RONNOW.
Q So, then, as planning commission chairman,
you familiarized yourself with the zoning ordinance
that was in place during your tenure as chairman?
A That is correct.
Q A n d m place during this master plan in

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
!14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

P - , *???/
Page 124
Q. All right. So when you say 19 — that w a s
when it was compiled, you mean the 1978?
A Right.
Q. The initial work that went into drafting
it?
A Yes.
Q A n d so basis of your recollection during
your tenure as planning commission chairman, this
ordinance is dated 1982 was the operative zoning
order in Toquerville?
A. That is correct.
Q. A n d had been apparently since 1982. Is
that your understanding?
A . Yes.
Q A n d have you reviewed that zoning
ordinance as part of the official record of
Toquerville Town?
A. Yes.
MR. RONNOW. Your Honor, w e would m o v e for
the admission of Exhibit 2 .
THE COURT. Any objection to N o . 2 , Mr.
Finlayson?
MR F I N L A Y S O N No, Your Honor.
THE COURT All right. 2 is received.
///
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l aware of their existence?
1
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's Exhibit
2
2 was receive i into evidence.)
2
A. Just generally. That was about it.
3
MR. RONNOW.
3
Q. Did you assume that since they were there
4
Q. Finally, Mr. Peterson, in your
4 so far as you knew they were legal?
5 deliberations, did you -- in your recommendation to
5
A. Yes.
6 the town council of this zoning map, which is
Q. That was your assumption?
J
6
7 Exhibit 1, was it ever the designation of the
7
A. That was our assumption.
8 highway commercial zone at Anderson Junction, was
Q. You never were concerned about any details
8
9 that ever prompted or motivated by a desire on your
9 or differences between the Washington County zoning
10 part to merely accommodate outdoor advertising?
10 as highway commercial and the ToquerviUe zoning as
11
A. No.
11 highway commercial, you never concerned yourself
12
Q. Was that ever a factor in your
12 with any differences in details there might be;
13 recommendation to the council?
13 isn't that correct?
14
A. No.
14
A. That's correct. I personally really
15
MR. RONNOW: Thank you. No further
15 wasn't aware of what Washington County had zoned
16 questions.
16 that.
17
THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson, you may cross.
17
Q. And so when you adopted the highway
J
18
MR. FINLAYSON: Yes. Thank you.
18 commercial category for ToquerviUe and Washington
19 County was the same highway commercial, you didn't
19
^
^SOo1
"X
20
/
CROSS-EXAMINATION^^
20 change that zoning category, did you?
21
A. No, I said we really weren't aware of what
21 B Y y ^ : ¥ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ : : : : : r — ^ ^ y "
22
Q. You referred to a truck stop and motel as
22 Washington County had. We zoned what I had as
23 possible commercial development; is that correct?
23 Exhibit 2 and zoned it highway commercial.
24
A. Yes, sir.
24
MR. FINLAYSON: That's all I have, Your
25
Q. Would they more naturally go right down at
25 Honor.
y
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the Anderson Junction or up further where the signs
are?
MR. RONNOW: object, that calls for
speculation and is ambiguous with regard to more
naturally.
THE COURT: Rephrase your question.
Sustained on the form of the question.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. You were a member of the zoning
commission?
A. Yes.
Q. And you considered possible uses of land?
A. Yes.
Q. What was likely and not likely in terms of
development of various types; isn't that correct?
A. That's correct
Q. Would it be more likely that this truck
stop and motel would go right near the intersection
or up where the signs are?
A. More likely, yes, would be more likely to
be at the interchange.
Q. Yet there is nothing even at the
interchange; isn't that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. There were three signs there, and you were
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THE COURT: Anything more, Mr. Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Peterson. You
may step down, and you may be excused, sir. Your
next witness, counsel.
MR. RONNOW. Your Honor, plaintiffs call
Charles Wahlquist.
THE COURT: Mr. Wahlquist, will you come
forward and be sworn.
Whereupon,
CHARLES WAHLQUIST,
having been first duly sworn to testify to the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
was examined and testified as follows:
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Please have a
seat here on the witness stand.
-oOoDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RONNOW:
Q. Would you state your name — full name,
please.
A. Charles Pack Wahlquist.
Q. And where do you reside?
A. In ToquerviUe.
Q. And Mr. Wahlquist, are you retired now?
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A. Yes.
*~~
Q. And during the time frame that we've been
discussing here this morning, generally through from
1992 through 1993, were you the mayor of ToquerviUe
Town when the annexation and master plan in process
took place?
A. Yes, I was mayor from 1990 to 1995.
Q. So, then, you ~ did you participate in
the discussions and town meetings that had to do
with the master plan — excuse me — first, with the
annexation of the property out near Anderson
Junction?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you participate in discussions
with the planner?
A. No. I went there first. Actually, 1 went
to city engineer who we retained for and talked to
him about annexation. Our original plan is somewhat
different than what the Exhibit No. 1, but after his
work, why then that's what we ended up with.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, may I approach
the clerk with an exhibit.
THE COURT: Certainly, counsel. You'll
have to do the leg work until she gets back.
MR. RONNOW: That's all right as long as J
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receive Exhibit No. 3. There's no reason to make
the mayor read them to me, counsel. I can read them
myself.
MR. RONNOW: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Exhibit 3 is
received.
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's Exhibit
3 was received into evidence.)
MR. RONNOW:
Q. Now, then, the meeting on October 14,
1992, in which the town council adopted the
annexation ordinance, is Exhibit 1, a map that
accurately reflects the annexation as marked in
green that was adopted on that date?
A. Yes. That's the final — final map.
Q. All right. Now, then, moving on to the
annexation, did you participate in the master plan
process and procedure?
A. No. We turned that over to the planning
and zoning. I did not attend their meetings.
Q. Why is that?
A. Well, I didn't want to feel that they were
intimidated.
Q. All right. Did you participate generally
in the community in discussions on the street^yith
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regard to a master planning and zoning?
A. Well, we had some discussion in our
meetings unofficially. We had discussions, like you
said, on the street with one of the councilman a
time or two.
Q. While you didn't participate directly in
planning commission meetings, were you generally
aware as mayor as this proposed master plan and
zoning map began to evolve?
A. I knew what it was. They kept me posted.
Q. And were you aware of the issues that the
planning commission was discussing with regard to
zoning designations near Anderson Junction?
A. Yes. It may not have been what I was
hoping to get, but I was aware of what they were
doing.
Q. All right. Then did - based on your own
experience during this time frame, did you receive
feedback from property owners or residents of
ToquerviUe with regard to the proposed zoning?
A. Well, yes. You always receive a lot of
phone calls and personal visits from various people
pro and con. My first - the reason we even
considered annexation is because of phone calls from
people who are interested in developing some

c
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no one shoots me while I approach the witness.
Q. Mr. Wahlquist, I show you what's been
marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. Would you review
that for a moment, please. Have you had a chance to
review that?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you familiar with that?
A. Yes, I wrote the agenda.
Q. Now, this is a — would you describe what
that is to the Court, please?
A. This is an agenda of our October —
October 14, 1992 meeting.
Q. When you say "agenda," is — are these the
minutes that are recorded at that meeting?
A. This is the minutes as a result of the
agenda I had prepared.
Q. All right. Drawing your attention to the,
oh, just below midway down that first page, the
topTHE COURT: Counsel, let me ask if Mr.
Finlayson — Mr. Finlayson, do you have any
objection to the Court receiving this exhibit as a
copy of the town minutes?
MR. FINLAYSON: No, I do not, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Then let's just
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J Z ^ ^ * ' /""Page 131 1
/

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (801) 652-9971

Page 132

Page 129 - Page 132

|

10-01-96

^L

Condenselt 1

A. Just north of the city up aoove the little
notch there and on up on the other side, there's an
old oil well up there that was built back 40 years
ago, and I had been given a copy of the drilling
log. And they hit a very good stream of water.
It's deep water, and it was good water. And it was
tested. And I took Lynn Naegle, and we hiked up to
that site.
Q. Who is Lynn Naegle, sir?
A. He had some property up there just north
of town. His mother had a little farm up there when
he was a boy, and he took up us up and showed us
where this well — showed me where this well was.
It was in January right after I was taken office,
and so I Q. That's January of 1990?
A. 1990. And we hiked up there, a little
snow on the ground, and it was a long hike, but —
and I filed for well rights on that site with the
State. Working with Kim Wallace as our engineer, we
filed on three sites inside the city limits along
the fall line.
Q. When you say "we filed," you're talking
about on behalf of the town?
A. On behalf of the town.

property in that area. It's one of the nicest on
and off ramps between Salt Lake and Las Vegas, and
it's right on Highway 17 going to Grand ~ or to
Grand Canyon, then on down to Zion Park.
So we were interested in commercial area.
We didn't have any commercial area. We had a store
at one time years ago, a store and service station
and a garage. It was all kind of closed up, but I
felt that we needed to get some additional
financing, additional money coming into the town.
Q. And so could you describe, based on your
feedback and discussions with members of the public,
what the issues were with regard to that proposed
commercial zoning in the Anderson Junction area?
A. Most of them that were in favor of it.
Q. And why were they in favor of it?
A. Well, they put it out of town, put the —
(inaudible) — out next to the freeway.
Q. Can you see this area from downtown
Toquerville?
A. No.
Q. Did you receive some objections?
A. Oh, there's always people who are
negative, yes. There f s a few objections.
Q. All right. What were the — what were the
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other issues, apart from the commercial,
non-commercial debate, what were other issues that
you f re aware of with regard to the proposed
annexation and master plan?
A. Well, all of the cities in southern Utah
are beginning to grow and expand, just explode, and
I felt that that would eventually happen in
Toquerville and that we ought to have a handle on
some of that growth. And so we were expecting to
annex more property in order to kind of control what
went on.
Q. So you in attempting to get a handle on
growth, as you characterize it, does that mean you
were prepared to annex that property first and solve
utility and water issues later?
A. Well, that's the only way it could
happen. We couldn't install utilities outside the
city limits, period. State law.
Q. And as mayor, were you involved in the
ongoing discussion of water issues in that area?
A. Oh, yes. I've always been involved in
water issues.
Q. And during that whole process, would you
describe to the Court what the situation was snd the
discussion was with regard to water services?
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Q. All
right.
~
A. We filed for well rights on three sites
along the fall line because apparently we also hired
Bryce Montgomery from Salt Lake to do a geological
survey of the feasibility of that well and paid him
a pretty good fee for that. And his fee then went
with our application to the State to that well right
and we have not acted on it.
Q. They have not acted on it to date, you
mean?
A. No. We hoped that they would, but they
haven't. We still have the filing in the office.
Q. All right.
A. (Inaudible) — wants to build a tank up
there, which would have been higher than we are, and
come on down through Anderson Junction and on down
through Toquerville for additional water source for
Toquerville.
Q. You talked about building the tank. Where
was the tank located - to be located?
A. Up on the side. We even went to the BLM
because it was just a hundred feet off of Naegle's
property on BLM property to get right-of-way to do
that and submitted application to them.
Q. With - as the application in cooperation
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develop the water in Anderson Junction.
Q. And how did you respond to that request?
A. Their well was not properly drilled for
commercial or for municipal use, so I went to the
conservancy district, which Ron Thompson is their
general manager —
Q. The conservancy district, you mean the
Washington County Conservancy District?
A. Washington County Conservancy District.
They said, well, let us do it, we can move water
rights. We have water rights. Our big problem was
we did not have any well water rights in the town.
Q. So you had a source there, but no paper
right?
A. Right. We had a source but no paper
rights and Cottam's rights were too small to justify
us buying that well. They would not do us any good,
but the conservancy district said that there - they
had some rights that they could move to that well,
and they would drill the well and sell us the water.
Q. And did the conservancy district pursue
that option?
A. Yes. They have drilled a big well, and I
talked with Alvin on one occasion about putting the
water tank up on his property up near where those
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of the State of Utah boggeddown, were there other
discussions of other options that you pursued A. Yes, we started talking with water
conservancy district on springs, these other
springs, this little reservoir that has been
mentioned. Actually, that was the upper site.
There was two other lower sites, better sites than
that one.
As they did their surveys, they said those
cannot be used because improper foundation for dams
or lakes be moved up to that one and determined that
was the same situation in that one. It was not
feasible. So those three sites were dropped by the
water conservancy district.
Q. All right. Still within - directing your
attention to water issues, jumping down the road to
even after the annexation and master plan, were
there other options that Toquerville pursued to
develop water out in that area?
A. Yes. Over on the little tiny three
cornered piece on - zoned by the Cottam family and
they had water right for — a small water right.
They drilled a small well, six-inch well, hit a very
good aquifer, and they came to me and asked if the
city would buy that well from them and use that to
Pa
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signs are up in the highest point on his property.
Verbally he gave me that permission, but it never
developed after I left office. Conservancy district
couldn't pursue that. They said he reneged on that
agreement, so they put the tank down where the well
is.
Q. So based on the best knowledge you have
today, is there a adequate municipal standard well
in that annexed area now?
A. Yes. They have drilled a 21-inch well.
It's got a lot of water in it. They have told me
that it's the best aquifer in Washington County.
Q. Now, at the time of the master planning
and zoning discussions, did the town council discuss
any options as to how they were going to get
services out there in addition to actually the
source of water, how they were going to pay for and
actually develop A. That would have to be done by SID. we
thought we could pump water for more present source
up over the hill and down into Anderson Junction.
We figured we'd have to put a small tank, we have
another tank we can just — that we had stopped
using that we might use that 100,000 gallon tank and
move it up on the hill somewhere.

f2^73^ P a g e l 4 °
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Q. And so the financing of that at that time
was generally discussed in the context of the
special improvement district?
A. Well, that was a discussion that we were
having in city council meeting.
Q. Were there other options available that
you were aware of?
A. No. The little well that was up there
that's mentioned several times is a private well.
Nearly every home up there is on that little well.
It's inadequate. They're out of water most of the
time or part of the time, and so they were very
anxious to have some city water up there.
Q. So apart from the actual water source and
having water to deliver, were there other financing
options that were available to municipalities at the
time to do these kinds of infrastructure?
A. Well, if I had told these people who
called about motels and truck stops that they would
have to participate heavily enough up front to
install water - (inaudible.)
Q. You made reference just in passing the
people that have called. Will you explain in detail
what you mean? People that have called about what?
A. Commercial properties, such as motels,
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truck stop, RV parks. Eveii Eveleth at one point
asked for a permit to put an RV park up on his
property
Q And that was in connection or in the
general location of the Anderson Junction property?
A There was — right off the interchange
there's a high nipple there It's on the BLM land.
We approached them about putting a tank up there,
but they were so restrictive now they made it almost
mhibitive, so we gave that up.
Q When you talked to these individuals who
were inquiring regarding possible development, you
stated that you talked to them about up front
participation. Is that m the nature of an impact
fee?
A Yes.
Q And what was their response to those
discussions?
A They weren't very favorable. They wanted
us to do it for them, and I said, no, you've got to
do it for us.
Q All right. Now, then, prior to the
planning commission — or prior to the town
council's actual adoption of that zoning map, do you
recall any discussions about the sign issues in

1^ 9 ^ T / W 142
Anderson Junction, outdoor advertising signs?
A It was never brought up that I recall in
the city council meeting. I knew they were there.
Part of the time they were. Part of the time they
weren't. They were — they had a auxiliary
generator up there on a propane tank, and I had been
told that it was sabotaged, and it could no longer
light them signs.
Q Now, then, I'm going to direct your — ask
the bailiff if we could have this marked as an
exhibit.
THE COURT- We're up to 4, counsel. What
will 4 be?
MR RONNOW The town council minutes of
December 14,1993.
THE COURT Any objection to the Court
17 receiving Exhibit No. 4, Mr. Finlayson?
MR FINLAYSON No, Your Honor.
THE COURT No. 4, then, is received as
identified town council meetings.
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's Exhibit
4 was received into evidence.)
MR RONNOW
Q Nov^ * en, is it your recollection, mayor,
25 that it was o December 14,1993 that you adopted
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commission
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with
the recommendation of the planning
regard to the master plan and zoning map?
A Yes, we adopted it.
Q Now, you have been referring to — in
looking at Exhibit 1 that we have out there on the
easel, is — is that an accurate depiction and copy
of the zoning map that was adopted on December 14,
1993?
A That's the one we were looking at when we
adopted it.
Q And is that the zoning map that, insofar
as you know, is still being used by Toquerville Town
today?
A Yes.
Q Okay. When you adopted the
recommendations of the planning commission and the
map which appears as Exhibit 1, did you ever
consider, as a reason for adopting that, as a
purpose for adopting that, to adopt zoning simply to
allow outdoor advertising?
A I don't recall that outdoor advertising
was ever mentioned.
Q All right. You have heard discussion with
regard to the commercial issues. Was — did the
town council discuss, in their deliberations,
duijng
s, dupr
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ra to commercial
this process, issues with regard
zoning in the older Main Street area of Toquerville?
A Only down on the south end where it was,
that one little corner down there by the three-acre
piece had been zoned. We did adopt that as
recommended to us by the planning zone.
Q Based on — during your time as mayor and
your — the information available to you,
discussions with individuals, et cetera, what was
the general feeling about commercial development in
the center of Toquerville Town?
A Well, nobody wanted — I shouldn't say
nobody. Most people didn't want commercial right in
town. Some people did. I had a few people — some
of the old widows said, why don't we have a
convenient store right here in town. I said, there
isn't any provision for such in our planning.
Q Was there anybody that ever discussed in
the meeting that you attended as the town council
the outdoor advertising signs and presented them as
a basis justifying the zoning?
A No.
Q All right. I see in reference to Exhibit
4 it appears that all members of the council present
voted in the affirmative to adopt this zoning map.
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Is that your recollection?
A. Yes. We had held a special meeting prior
to that, but we discussed it.
MR. RONNOW: No further questions, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Finlayson, you
may cross-examine Mr. Wahlquist.
MR. FINLAYSON: I have a preliminary
matter with regard to the most recent exhibit. My
copy is not clear.
THE COURT: The last page of the Court's
copy, counsel, does have a problem. Mr. Ronnow, can
you get us one that doesn't have a blank -MR. FINLAYSON: I have a copy of that.
MaylTHE COURT: Can we simply substitute a
second page? If yours is clearer, let's use that.
I'm going to get a better copy for the second page
of the town council meetings, Exhibit No. 4. All
right, counsel, that's done.
-oOoCROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Mr. Wahlquist, how long have you lived in
Toquerville?
¥ ~ ? 7 ?
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commercial development in that area cannot
reasonably be done; isn't that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. You referred to a new waterline and a new
tank. Is there a new water tank?
A. There is. It's built. It is not finished
yet. The line is not installed, but will be
probably by the first of the year.
Q. Okay. Is that tank south ~ that tank is
south of —
A. Can I show you on the map where it is?
Q. I first want to get -- it's south of the
road that crosses 1-15 at Anderson Junction?
A. Yes.
Q. That new line that's proposed, it will
cross under the freeway; isn't that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. It will go east toward Toquerville?
A. Yes.
Q. And it will serve Toquerville, La Verkin,
Virgin and Leeds?
A. Yes.
Q. But it will not run water up to the area
of the signs?
A. No. Toquerville will have to do that on
/ 2 ^ 0 /
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A. About 12 years.
Q. Have you lived in southern Utah for a
longer period of time than that?
A. I lived 10 years in Hurricane prior to
that and about 10 years in St. George prior to
that. When we first moved here, we came to St.
George.
Q. So that's more than 30 years?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have occasion to go by this area
called Anderson Junction frequently?
A. All the time. Almost every day.
Q. Have you ever seen any commercial activity
in the anea right where the signs are other than the
signs?
A. No.
Q. Has there ever been any culinary water
service run up to the area where the signs are?
A. No, not to my knowledge.
Q. Has there ever been any sewer service run
to that area where the signs are?
A. No. There's no sewage up there at all.
We had talked with the sewer district to get some,
but there isn't any present.
Q. Without culinary water or sewage,
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their own.
Q. Okay.
MR. FINLAYSON: I would like to have
presented to the witness the most recent exhibit.
THE COURT: Exhibit 4 we'll hand to Mr.
Wahlquist.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. I refer you to the second page (inaudible.) There's a paragraph toward the middle
that says, Council and George Hunter, I just
identified the location that I want to address.
Council and George Hunter made the motion with the
second action by councilman Chris Lundell that we
accept the interim — I'm in the wrong line.
Okay, the line above that, the paragraph
above that. An ordinance in the town of Toquerville
establishing the temporary moratorium from the
division of land and adopting an interim zoning
path. What is meant by interim?
A. Well, until we get an official - get the
map that Mr. Kenmone and the city council or
planning and zoning people were working on.
Q. Okay. This just represents an interim and
not the final?
A. Right.
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Q Thank you.
*^
MR FTNLAYSON That's all I have.
THE COURT Anything else, Mr. Ronnow?
-oOoREDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR RONNOW
Q Mr. Wahlquist, picking up on counsel's
discussion of interim zoning map, has there ever
been a zoning map adopted since December, 1992 that
amends or changes or alters this zoning map?
THE COURT Counsel, I think your date was
wrong. It's'93, isn't it? Check your first page
on Exhibit 4.
MR RONNOW Excuse me, I'm looking at
Exhibit 3. Yes, Your Honor, '93.
THE WITNESS Not that I'm aware of.
MR RONNOW
Q So your tenure as mayor, while there may
have been a general objective to continue working on
this map, m fact, the map that is reflected on
Exhibit 1 was adopted and is being used as
Toquerville's only zoning map at this time; is that
correct?
A Unless they changed it after I left as
mayor.
>

(2. ^

Q So that on December 13, 1993 until you
left as mayor, Exhibit 1 represents a copy of the
zoning map that was the operative zoning map in
Toquerville Town?
A Yes.
Q Is that correct? And let me ask you, I
want to go back just briefly to clarify. I draw
your attention to what should be in front of you as
Exhibit 2, the zoning ordinance.
THE COURT I have it, counsel.
MR RONNOW I'm sorry, Your Honor.
THE COURT Mr. Wahlquist will have it
shortly.
MR RONNOW
Q Can you explain to the Court why there are
two dates on that zoning ordinance, 1978 on the
front and 1982 as the adopting date on the last
page?
A Well, they did this, when, 1982? We
weren't sure that they had done it to be honest. We
didn't have - at that time we hadn't found the
minutes, and so we adopted it again just to make
sure it was there.
Q All right. And does that represent the
zoning ordinance that was -

Page 149 - Page 152

^

/

Page 1511

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

A We didn't make any changes from what's m
here.
Q Right.
A We adopted it as it is written. Only did
that as housekeeping, shall we say.
Q And that's the official zoning — that
ordinance that you have in your hand as Exhibit 2
was the official zoning ordinance m effect at the
time of the master plan and adoption of this map; is
that correct?
A Uh-huh.
Q You have to answer audibly, sir.
A Yes.
Q Thank you.
MR RONNOW No further questions, Your
Honor.
THE COURT Mr. Fmlayson.
-oOoRECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR FINLAYSON
Q Following up this question, do you recall
writing affidavits earlier in this action, things
that you signed about the facts in this case?
MR FINLAYSON There's a - I have -- if
I could have this presented to the witness and asj^
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him if he — if this is his signature. It's - it's
an affidavit — (inaudible.)
1
THE COURT Is that your signature, Mr.
J
Wahlquist?
THE WITNESS Yes.
THE COURT All right. Go ahead, Mr.
Finlayson.
MR FINLAYSON May I have the document.
Q I'm going to read what is in this document
and ask you if it's correct. The annexation of the
property by the Town of Toquerville and the town's
zoning of the property as commercial made no change
in the zoning status of the property inasmuch as the
property was zoned highway commercial both before
and after Toquerville zoning. Toquerville left the
zoning of the Eveleth land the signs are on just as
it was when the land was only in the county. Is
that correct?
A At that time, yes. See, that was part —
what's the date on that?
Q Oh, it's August 10, 1994. Okay. Also a
paragraph 8 is stated, To my knowledge, there is no
specific planning of any commercial developer to
construct any commercial activity on the property
other than the signs. Was that correct as of that
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time?
'
A. As of that time. There could be no
commercial property as long as there's no water or
services up there.
Q. Okay. Also, Toquerville does not
presently provide, nor has it provided in the past,
any services to the property such as power, water,
or sewer, nor are such services provided to the area
by anyone else. Is that correct?
MR. RONNOW: objection, Your Honor. That
has all been asked and answered even on his cross.
THE COURT: Sustained, counsel. That's
repetitive. We've covered that ground.
MR. FINLAYSON: I don't think I ever asked
about power.
THE COURT: Is there any power up there,
sir, to your knowledge?
THE WITNESS: Not on that side of the
freeway.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Toquerville, itself, does not, itself Toquerville does not, itself, intend to construct
commercial development on the property.
MR. RONNOW: objection, asked and
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answered.
MR. FINLAYSON: I haven't asked this
witness.
THE COURT: Not this witness, counsel.
Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Read that again.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Toquerville does not, itself, intend to
construct commercial development on the property.
A. No, we are not going to do it.
MR. FINLAYSON: That's all I have, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Anything more, Mr.
Ronnow?
-oOoFURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RONNOW:
Q. Do you have a copy of that affidavit that
he's reviewing?
A. NO.
Q. Do you recall when that affidavit was
prepared, Mr. Wahlquist?
A. Yes, I remember seeing it.
Q. Was that prepared by Mr. Finlayson THE COURT: if you know, sir.
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MR. RONNOW:

"

Q. — the attorney for Utah State in this
matter?
A. Probably.
Q. All right. Now, then, you testified
earlier that you were mayor during the whole time of
the master plan in process and procedure; is that
right?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall roughly how long the
planning commission worked on development of the
master plan and zoning map?
A. It was over a period of about a month. 1
don't recall exactly.
Q. Do you have any reason to dispute earlier
testimony that basically from January of 1993 until
November of 1993 the planning commission was working
on the master plan and zoning map?
A. It was at least that long. I'd thought it
was longer than that.
Q. All right.
MR. RONNOW: Thank you. No further
questions.
THE COURT: Anything more, Mr. Finlayson?
///
/
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FURTHER RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. As the town council, it's the town council
who makes the final decisions on annexation and
zoning; isn't that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And not the earlier advisors?
A. No. They just submitted their
recommendation to us.
Q. And it's — it's you who makes the final
decision?
A. Yes.
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you.
THE COURT: Anything more, Mr. Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: Yes.
-oOoFURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RONNOW:
Q. Mr. Wahlquist, you had, in this process, a
planner retained by the town, Mr. Sizemore, from
Five County Association of Governments; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And as a town council, you approved
retaining Mr. Sizemore; is that correct?
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A. Well, him or the Five Counties. I don't
remember just how we had that arranged, but he was
working with us, yes.
Q. And as a town council, did you rely o'* his
consulting and work with the planning commission in
developing this master plan and zoning map?
A. Well, he knew more about that than we did,
so we had to.
Q. And did you rely on the planning
commission for that very same purpose, to advise you
in the preparation of the master plan and zoning
map?
A. Yes. They did all the leg work, and they
did all the research.
Q. And as a town council, have you relied on
- had you relied on that planning commission for
advice and recommendations to the town council prior
to that?
A. Yes.
Q. And as mayor, do you recall that - was it
the council's practice and procedure to listen to
the recommendations of the planning commission?
A. Well, we always listened. We didn't
always agree.
Q. Exactly. And did you discuss the
/
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recommendations of the planning commission with
regard to this zoning master plan and map that they
prepared?
A. Yes.
Q. And was there ongoing — you testified
that there was ongoing discussion in town council —
town council meetings during the process as the map
and plan evolved; isn't that correct?
MR. FINLAYSON: It's either argumentative
or leading.
THE COURT: Well, he is leading, counsel,
but it's foundational. Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. RONNOW:
Q. And did the - did you feel, at the time
that you adopted this zoning map that appears as
Exhibit 1, that the council had carefully reviewed
the recommendations and proposals and all the issues
that were part of them?
A. Well, we spent the -- we got the
recommendation in November and spent the next month
going over that. In fact, we had one special
meeting in between i study that proposal. Then in
November or December we did accept it.
Q. All right.
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MR. RONNOW: No further questions, Your
Honor.
THE COURT. Mr. Finlayson, any more?
MR. FINLAYSON: No, thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr.
Wahlquist. You may step down, sir. You can just
leave those —
THE WITNESS: Right here?
THE COURT: - right there on the edge of
that witness stand. We'll collect them from there.
Counsel, I think it's time for our noon recess.
Let's go ahead and take our recess, come back into
session at 1:45.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: We are back in session in Kunz
versus the State of Utah. The counsel for the
respective parties are present. And, Mr. Ronnow, do
you intend to call any further witnesses?
MR. RONNOW: No further witnesses, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. The plaintiff
having rested, Mr. Finlayson, we'll turn to your
side of the courtroom.

1

MR. FINLAYSON: I wish to make a

25 statement, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: All right, counsel.

^

MR. FINLAYSON: This case is about a
beautiful and scenic area of Utah where billboards
are inappropriate and unlawful, but where plaintiff
seeks to place billboards. There are several
controlling elements of law, and, therefore, several
corresponding clusters of fact that show violation
of those elements of law.
The billboards would violate express
1
purpose of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act
including its purpose to promote the enjoyment of
public travel and to preserve the natural scenic
beauty of the lands bordering on the highway quoting
from the statute.
The evidence will show that the signs
violate this policy which the Court of Appeals cited
and quoted in connection with its construction of
section 27-12-136.3 in parentheses (3), which
provides, Commercial or industrial zone does not
mean area zoned for the primary purpose of allowing
outdoor advertising.
On page 30 of the brief we submitted to
the Court of Appeals, we both cited and quoted the
Utah Federal Agreement, and we cited the Federal Act
23 U.S.C., Section 131 A, that also have policies
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that are very similar to the Utah act to preserve
natural beauty adjacent to the freeways. The
evidence will show the signs violate this policy.
Second, we will show circumstances that
demonstrate violation of Utah Code Annotated
27-12-136.3, which I've already quoted. That
statutory provision is clarified by a Utah rule, and
I leave it to the Court how to treat that Utah
rule. It does exist. We are addressing whether
signs may go there in the future.
The Court ruled that these signs were
unlawful, they are not there, they have no vested
rights. If the signs go back up again, they have to
comply with all statutory and rule provisions. And
there is also a rule in existence that provides area
zoned for the primary purpose of outdoor advertising
includes areas in which the, quote, primary activity
is outdoor advertising.
We will show that there is no other
activity in this area other than the signs of a
commercial nature. We will also show the pristine
nature of the area, and that under the policy of the
act, it is inappropriate for signs to be here.
The signs have been in existence for nine
years, and there has been no commercial development
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except these signs. I think that is just about as
conclusively proven as we can possibly get. Mr.
Ronnow, is there any question about that at this
stage in the record?
MR. RONNOW. That the signs are the only,
quote, "development"?
THE COURT: That's correct, counsel.
MR. RONNOW: No, Your Honor. There's no
evidence. I think there was some evidence of an old
stock reservoir at one point in all of our
discussions, but as of today, those signs and
fences, and that's it.
THE COURT: Well, the fence is the State's
right-of-way fence that I'm aware of, counsel, and
so I don't think we need to show any proof on that
one. Go ahead.
MR. FINLAYSON: okay. Thank you, Your
Honor. I will, therefore, elicit no testimony on
those issues. However, for the record, I would like
to submit photos which document it for the record.
THE COURT: I think we should have photos
if you have them available, counsel. They will
assist anyone reviewing the records that this Court
sees because maybe not all the judges in the Court
of Appeals have been by it as carefully as I have/
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to support them. For seven years since they were
first zoned commercial by Washington County, there
has been no commercial development there. The — we
will show facts supporting that. If ~
THE COURT: Counsel, I don!t mean to cut
you short MR. FINLAYSON: Yes.
THE COURT: - but it doesn't seem to be
necessary on the state of this record to establish
any point of proof at this point that the signs are
the sole evidence of humanity on the subject
property. There is testimony that there is no
water, no sewer.
The only electrical there at all that I've
heard from is Mayor Wahlquist who indicated that
there had been a generator that at one time or
another may have been sabotaged, but a generator is
a closed system, not connected to anything else, and
there's no evidence before the Court that there's
any power.
I cannot help but note my own observations
of the site having driven by it, even having slowed
as I drove by it to examine it, that there is no
other presence on this triangular shaped piece of
property, west of the freeway, shown on Exhibit 1,
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MR. FINLAYSON: Yes. Thank you, Your
Honor. The Court of Appeals directed attention to
several features of 27-12-136.3 in parens (3), the
first of which was actual land use. It said, Do not
consider just stated purposes, but consider actual
land use.
MR. RONNOW. Your Honor, I f m going to
object. I've gone along this far, but this does not
sound like opening statement as much as closing
argument. Thus far Mr. - counsel is just arguing
the law, and I think that's more appropriate for
closing.
THE COURT: oh, I think not, counsel. I
think Mr. Finlayson is telling me what his proof is
going to show in terms of what the land use is, that
we have just established that the only use of the
land is the signs. If that's an objection, it's
overruled. Go ahead, counsel.
MR. FINLAYSON: And we will submit photo
evidence to document it, Your Honor. The
perpetuation of a prior zoning was also mentioned to
the Court. That is really more of a legal issue,
and I believe I will address that in closing, not at
this time.
Do not, therefore, concentrate on
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objective facts rather than subjective statements of
intent, which in this coniext we submit are less
relevant. I have asked Mr. Sizemore to come back
for a proffer on the question, which I asked earlier
about his opinion.
THE COURT: All right, counsel. Mr.
Sizemore, I want you to listen carefully to the
proffer that's going to be offered to the Court by
Mr. Finlayson. If he states it accurately, and if
that would, in fact, be your testimony if called
upon to so testify, I will put that on the record.
Again, the Court has ruled that the
opinion of Mr. Sizemore irrelevant and immaterial to
the issues before this matter, but we want to make
sure that the record is clear as to what your
opinion would be so that if I was in error in my
evidentiary ruling it will be preserved for the
Court of Appeals. Before we do that, Mr. Ronnow,
anything further?
MR. RONNOW: Yes, Your Honor. I object to
the proffer on the basis the Court has already ruled
it's irrelevant. The problem is with a bench trial
this Court is the trier of fact. To let in a
proffer creates an element of prejudice with regard
to evidence the Court has already ruled is
/
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immaterial.
*
•
/
THE COURT: All right, counsel. The Court
of Appeals has always given trial courts at least
the deference and the understanding that we can
separate the weak from the chaff, and if I don't
allow Mr. Finlayson to put his proffer on the
record, the Court of Appeals will never know what
Mr. Sizemore's opinion would have been. So I'm
going to allow him to secure therecordin that
fashion. Mr. Finlayson, what is your proffer?
MR. FINLAYSON: I proffer that Mr.
Sizemore, as a person qualified by the plaintiff as
a - an expert in zoning would testify that based on
the standards of zoners taking into account the
nature of the pristine area with its beauty where
the signs are that it would not — that he would not
recommend that outdoor advertising signs be placed
there, that he wouldrecommendthat they not be
placed there.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Sizemore, is
that a fairrenditionof what your opinion would be,
sir?
MR. SIZEMORE: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr.
Sizemore. That proffer is on the record over your
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objection. Mr. Ronnow, do you wish to cross-examine
Mr. Sizemore on those issues to preserve a record at
this juncture even though live Court is not
J
considering it as part of the facts that will go
J
into the final decision in this case?
J
MR. RONNOW: Weflljust clarify for the
record. Based on proffer, we continue our objection
that it's irrelevant and immaterial to the specific
issue remanded to the Court for a review.
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel, and that
ruling stands. Next, Mr. Finlayson.
MR. FINLAYSON: I have a series of
exhibits I will submit through my first witness, Mr.
Snow. I could either present them to the Court and
have them marked or take them one at a time.
1
THE COURT: Counsel, it usually saves us
J
some time if I just give you a chance to get up to
the clerk, get them all marked with Mr. Ronnow over
your shoulder, and you gentlemen can go through
them, especially the photographs. Why donft I just
take a brief recess while you get that done. Then
we'll come back and take the testimony from your
witness.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: All right. We are back in
|
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1 session in Kunz versus UDOT, and the counsel for the
2 parties are present. We have marked some exhibits.
3 Counsel, do we have a stipulation as to the entry of
4 any of these exhibits without the necessity of
5 anything more than just foundational identification
6 on the record?
7
MR. RONNOW: Yes, Your Honor. I'm going
8 to object and seek the Court's clarification, and
9 just by way of clarification, we had a series of
10 photographs that show the use of the property
11 currently, the sign posts and no signs, and then
12 photos of preexisting sign faces and a photo of the
13 for sale sign. And I would object to their
14 relevance in total with regard to the issue before
15 the Court.
16
Now, insofar as this Court has made
17 certain — taken certain notice as a condition of
18 the property and the Court of Appeals has mentioned
19 current use, we have a — (inaudible) — of evidence
20 of what the existing use is and isn't. I think
21 three of these photos that show the sign posts
22 indicating that there's nothing else on the property
23 is certainly sufficient, and the rest are not
24 relevant to the issue regarding purpose —
25 (inaudible.)
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THE COURT: All right. Which exhibits do
you have no objection to in view of the Court's
previous ruling that photographs would be of
assistance to the record?
MR. RONNOW: Well, I think, Your Honor,
there are three photographs numbered 8, 9, and 10
that show the three sign posts and apparently show
them essentially looking south, looking pretty much
due west, and looking substantially north of west
which provides a very broad view of the surrounding
property.
One of the pictures, Exhibit 8, shows all
three signs in a view south from the freeway, and I
think that clearly describes, together with all the
verbal — or the sworn testimony and the Court's
judicial notice the situation of the property with
regard to the Court of Appeals' suggestion that
present use might be relevant to the Court's
inquiry.
THE COURT: All right, counsel. I note
that those don't seem to have exhibit numbers on
them. They have not been marked yet?
MR. RONNOW: These are my copies.
THE COURT: oh, those are your copies.
MR. RONNOW: And I have them on the ba^k.
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showing the three empty sign posts in a view west
southwest from the median of interstate 15 — no —
from the right-of-way fence on interstate 15 across
the frontage road.
MR. SNOW. This was taken actually from
the median. The black strip is the southbound ~
THE COURT: oh, that's southbound. Okay.
So from the median —
MR. SNOW: (Inaudible.)
THE COURT: From the median of interstate
15 looking west southwest shows all three of the
sign posts in question and taken by Mr. Snow, and
that's correct, sir?
MR. SNOW: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. That's record for
No. 8, It's received. No 9 is a photograph of one
of the sign posts.
MR. SNOW: This will be the most southerly
one, I think.
THE COURT: That's what I was going to
estimate from the other terrain features. Again —
MR. SNOW: I took this one probably on the
southbound shoulder directly across from the sign
just slightly to the THE COURT: Looking across to the sign, ^
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1 The Court's copies have a little sticker on the
2 front.
3
THE COURT: So you have no objection to 8,
4 9, and 10?
5
MR. RONNOW: 8, 9, 10 - (inaudible) 6 first we should have a proffer on the record as to
7 just foundation. Off the record I was told that Mr.
8 Snow took these photographs so that even by
9 stipulation I would like a brief record as to the
10 direction these photographs represent.
11
THE COURT: Well, counsel, Mr. Finlayson
12 — Mr. Bailiff, will you hand me photographs 8, 9.,
13 and 10. Are they the large ones, counsel?
14
MR. FINLAYSON: I would urge admission of
15 all of them. Each shows a different thing.
16
THE COURT: Well, we'll deal with each
17 one, and I'll put on the record the foundational
18 requirements that Mr. Ronnow is urging because,
19 again, they should be carefully identified on the
20 record as to their view and the objects depicted in
21 them. All right.
22
MR. RONNOW: Mr. Snow, if you want to look
23 at these, you can tell us which direction we're
24 looking. This is 8, 9.
[25
THE COURT: Exhibit No. 8 is a photograph
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across the frontage road, and, again, more west than
southwest, but a little bit south of west. All
right. That is Exhibit No. 1 0 - 9 . Exhibit No. 10
is a photograph of the northern most sign post. Is
that correct, Mr. Snow?
MR. SNOW: uh-huh. Yes, it is.
THE COURT: All right. That's the way I
identified it from my recollection. Exhibit No. 10
is taken from an area west of the freeway.
MR. SNOW: This is sitting on the same the southbound shoulder of the freeway again.
THE COURT: All right. And looking very
close to northwest MR. SNOW: Right
THE COURT: - towards the sign post as
well as the eastern face of the Pine Valley
Mountains, which shows in the background. And
approximately when were these photographs taken, Mr.
Snow?
MR. SNOW: June or July. Just after the
heads were removed.
THE COURT: okay. June or July, 1996,
showing the present use of the property, as we have
it today, at that distance and showing those vistas.
MR. FINLAYSON: if I may add, I supplied
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these three in that each was taken from a slightly
different location from the freeway, and it's
relevant where they are taken from because that's
the view of the traveling public. So the first one
is in the median, the next one is on the, I think,
road side on the west side, and the next one is a
little closer to the signs.
THE COURT: And it will show - at least
Exhibit No. 8 taken from the median would show a
relatively reasonable view of the traveling public
in the northbound lanes of the interstate. 9 and 10
would show more representative of the view of the
traveling public from the southbound lanes of 1-15
heading southbound.
Those are received in conjunction as
illustrative of the Court's previous findings of
judicial notice as to the character of the area in
which the signs are located. Let's just go ahead
with the rest of them then. I'm not going to
require any more stipulations. You may call your
witness, Mr. Finlayson.
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibits 8
through 10 were received into evidence.)
MR. FINLAYSON: Mr. Snow.

THE COURT: Mr. Snow, if you will come y
forward and be sworn.
/
Whereupon,
SCOTT SNOW,
having been first duly sworn to testify to the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,
was examined and testified as follows:
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Please have a
seat on the witness stand.
-oOoDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Mr. Snow, for the record, would you please
state your name and spell it?
A. My name is Scott Joseph Snow, S-K-0-T-T,
J-0-S-E-P-H, S-N-O-W.
Q. By whom are you employed?
A. Utah Department of Transportation.
Q. How long have you been employed by them?
A. I've been employed there approximately 13
years.
Q. What is your present title?
A. I am the Cedar City District Encroachment
Permits Officer.
Q. How long have you had that position?
A. Six years the first of September.
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Q. So that first year would have been whefn?
A. September of 1990 I started.
MR. FINLAYSON: I would like to have the
first three photos presented to the witness.
THE COURT: That should be 5, b and 7.
MR. FINLAYSON: Yes.
MR. RONNOW: There are no duplicates of
those three; is that correct?
MR. FINLAYSON: I think I may have some
somewhere.
MR. RONNOW: Those indicate - those are
your numbers in sequence.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. You have three photos. As a group what do
they — well, let's see, I'll take them one at a
time. The first one, No. 5, what does it represent?
A. This is a picture of the southbound sign
with its little square sign there in front of it.
The permit officer at that time took it. It says
the permit number, the sign number, the milepost,
county, and date it was taken.
Q. It shows the date the picture was taken?
A. It shows the date the picture was taken..
Q. What is that date?
A. This is 7/1 of f 87.
y
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Q. So is it fair to say that the signs were
of record as of that date?
A. Yes.
MR. RONNOW: objection, foundation.
MR. FINLAYSON: Sure.
Q. Who took these pictures?
A. I think the permit officer at that time
was Cliff Reece. I'm not sure — for sure who took
the picture, but I would assume that it was Cliff
Reece, the permits officer.
Q. Are they — do you have a file in your
office that has outdoor advertising documentation in
it?
A. Yes.
THE COURT: Are photographs of this nature
kept in the regular course of business as part of
the regular record keeping of the Utah Department of
Transportation — (inaudible) ~ sir?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Are these three photos in that file that
is kept in the regular course of business?
A. Yes.
Q. Who is the custodian of that file?
A. I am.
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Q. Why are you and not someone else?
A. That's my job as the encroachment permits
officer, to keep track of the signs and other
encroachments along the road.
MR. FINLAYSON: All right. I submit No. 1
in evidence.
THE COURT: Exhibit No. 5?
MR. FINLAYSON: No. 5 and ask it be
presented to the Court.
THE COURT: Your objections, Mr. Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: Objections to 5, 6, and 7,
same objection, they're irrelevant to the issues
before the Court. These particular photos, as
distinguished from the others, are close-up photos
of not just the sign, but right in the middle of the
small frame is still another photo providing
information as to — that Mr. Snow just testified
to.
As to the purpose of the legislative body,
they show nothing. As to the use of the land, they
show nothing because theyfre filled with sign. They
only show the sign, and pursuant to our discussion
earlier this morning, those issues with regard to
purpose and violation of purposes of the act,
particularly as it runs through aesthetics, have y

l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

tZslOl/
/ P a g e 178
already been resolved by the Court of Appeals, and
it's not relevant or material to our issues.
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. You may
not argue further, Mr. Finlayson, 5, 6, and 7, as
identified ~ first of all just No. 5, as identified
by Mr. Snow, is received. The Court is receiving it
as relevant and probative evidence of use of the
land and historic use of the land, the date of the
photograph being shown in the photograph 1987. 5 is
received. No. 6 let's get into next.
(Whereupon, Defendantf s Exhibit
5 was received into evidence.)
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Mr. Snow, what is No. 6?
A. No. 6 is a pictures of the middle sign
with its - with the interior sign showing the
permit number, the sign number, milepost, and the
date the sign was taken.
THE COURT: SameTHE WITNESS: SameTHE COURT: - type of photograph as No.
5?
THE WITNESS: Exactly.
THE COURT: All right. Same objection,
Mr. Ronnow?

19-01-96

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. RONNOW: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Same ruling. No.
6 is received.
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit
6 was received into evidence.)
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. And it's also in your file the same as the
first?
A. Yes.
Q. The next in order, No. 7?
A. It is the picture of the north sign with
the picture on the inside of the sign — on the
inside showing the same permit number.
THE COURT: All right. Your record is
preserved, Mr. Ronnow. You have a continuing
objection, but No. 7 is received.
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit
7 was received into evidence.)
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. This is also part of your file the same as
the first two?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.
MR. FINLAYSON: I simply submit these in
evidence as evidence of the date as when the sigps
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were there and what the signs look like when they
are up and the nature of the area.
THE COURT: And they are received,
counsel, for that foundational purpose.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Do these photos reflect the circumstances
as of today?
A. No.
Q. In what respect are today's circumstances
different?
A. What is there now is the posts without the
advertising heads on them.
MR. FINLAYSON: I'm going to ask that this
large photo, which is out of order, No. 17, be put
up on the board, and I wonder if it would be more
easily viewed if brought somewhat closer.
THE COURT: Oh, I think I can see it
pretty well from here, counsel. No. 17 is — turn
it another 90 degrees. Yeah, that's it. No. 17
appears to be an aerial photograph of the Anderson
Junction interchange, Exit No. 27. Any objection to
No. 17, Mr. Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: Mine isn't big enough. Yes,
Your Honor, foundation objection. This photo was
not taken by the witness, and I'd object as to

!
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foundation.
THE COURT: All right. Let's lay a little
foundation, then, Mr. Finlayson.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Mr. Snow, have you been —
THE COURT: Bailiff.
Q. - down this area —
THE COURT: How about large clips?
MR. RONNOW: Not large enough, Your
Honor. We tried that size.
MR. FINLAYSON: A little tape might do it.
MR. RONNOW: You need a - (inaudible) clip.
THE COURT: industrial strength might do
it. I think we're fine, counsel. It seems to be
staying with us as long as no one walks by it
quickly. Go ahead, counsel.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. How long have you lived in the Cedar City,
St. George area?
A. 41 years.
Q. Have you had occasion to drive up 1-15
between St. George and Cedar City past where the
signs are? Have you had occasion to do that?
A. Many, many, many times.
y
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Q. Since you were - became a permits
officer, about how frequently do you drive past that
area?
A. I usually get to the St. George area at
least once a week and often times more often than
that.
Q. Have you on foot gone through this area
and examined where the signs are and various
indications of the ground?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you, from your own experience,
compared this map to your personal experiences as
you have both driven by and walked the area to
determine whether this aerial map represents the
area near Anderson Junction where the signs are?
THE COURT: Counsel, by this area map, you
are referring to Exhibit No. 17, which is, in fact,
an aerial photograph?
MR. FINLAYSON: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. And your answer,
sir.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. And as of today, I mean, I don't mean this
moment, when did you - when did you last walk
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through this area and looked for indications of the
topography?
A. Within the last 10 days. Last week
sometime I was down there.
Q. Does that accurately reflect your
observations?
A. Pretty much. The interchange - our
freeway interchange has been changed a little bit.
This picture was taken in '79. We've extended the
on ramp — northbound on ramp somewhat to better
make it a better, safe intersection, but other than
that, it's pretty much exactly the same.
MR. FINLAYSON: I submit this document in
evidence.
THE COURT: All right. Your objection it
is a photograph, you don't know who took it, you
don't know when it was taken?
MR. FINLAYSON: There's a mark on the
back, but —
MR. RONNOW: I have a further objection,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Relevance as well, counsel,
based upon your prior objections. What else?
MR. RONNOW: Well, it's not relevant in
that Mr. Snow has just testified that the actual/
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present circumstances of the freeway configuration
at the intersection are different today than when
that photograph was taken. This is also an aerial
photograph, not a photograph at the level Mr. Snow
is accustomed to walking the property. May I voir
dire briefly?
THE COURT: Ifm not going to let it in,
counsel. A 1979 photograph is not particularly
useful when the signs weren't built until 1987, and
what I'm going to do is order that Exhibit No. 17 be
filed with the clerk of the Court to see that if I
am in error it will be part of the record that can
be corrected, and with that in mind, now, counsel,
you may voir dire to cover any other issues that you
may.
-oOoVOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. RONNOW:
Q. Mr. Snow, are you a pilot?
A. No.
Q. Have you ~ in the time frame of 1979,
have you flown over the area immediately above
Anderson Junction that is purportedly depicted in
the aerial photograph on Exhibit 17?
A. Numerous times.
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Q. And -^
A. Skywest Airlines. I fly - I fly down
here, I imagine, once a month right through the
pass.
Q. All right. So do I. Rarely do they go
over Anderson Junction.
THE COURT: occasionally, they do,
counsel. (Inaudible.)
THE WITNESS: Occasionally they do.
MR. RONNOW: We would object on the basis
that it is not probative of the condition of the
land or accurate as to the condition of the land or
the intersection during the relevant time frame of
this lawsuit.
THE COURT: And your objection is
sustained, however, 17 is filed with the clerk in
order to preserve the record. Next question, Mr.
Finlayson.
MR. FINLAYSON: if I may just state a
reason in argument with regard to this photo. It
shows the nature of the whole area, and the witness
has testified that he has observed, except for the
exact configuration of the freeway entrance, that
the photo represents present facts, and that would
be my argument for its admission.
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THE COURT: All right. Thank you,
counsel. Your record is made. Let's go on.
MR. FINLAYSON: I was also prepared to
have the witness show where on the map exactly where
these signs are, but if it's not in evidence, I
can't do that.
THE COURT: It's not in evidence, counsel,
but I'll give you that opportunity to preserve the
proffer if you wish to do so. You're objecting
still, Mr. Ronnow, based upon the age of the photo,
the perhaps differences in the landmarks between
1979 and 1987, though doesn't that go to weight
rather than admissibility?
MR. RONNOW: We would — we would continue
that objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, counsel. Go ahead,
Mr. Snow, will you go down, and as best you can, on
the Exhibit No. 17 with a pen, mark the location of
the three sign posts that are there today if we were
to drive to that locale.
MR. RONNOW: I'm going to object to that,
Your Honor, and the basis is that is not Mr.
Finlayson's question. We don't have any foundation
laid as to his ability at this point to locate signs
as opposed to just being familiar with the general

(2. lOlcA*&
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area.
THE COURT: All right, counsel.
MR. RONNOW: We do have - again, Your
Honor, we have an affidavit by an engineer in the
record that has located those signs by metes and
bounds if you will.
THE COURT: And, counsel, you have that in
your record, and the Court of Appeals has already
seen it, but I'm going to allow this witness, for
the purpose of this proffer, it doesn't go into the
record for this decision on today's matter, but I'm
going to allow Mr. Snow to locate them to the best
of his ability without any further foundation for
the purpose of preserving the record. Go ahead, Mr.
Snow.
MR. FINLAYSON: I can elicit from the
witness how he determined those were the proper
locations.
THE COURT: Let him mark it first, and
then you can do that once he's back on the stand,
counsel.
-oOoDIRECT EXAMINATION (RESUMED)
BY MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. And where is — well, I'll ask him
y
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questions.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Snow, you can have
a seat.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, may I — may I
just approach the exhibit and see exactly where that
is.
THE COURT: Go ahead, counsel.
THE WITNESS: We need a bigger marker.
THE COURT: It's lost to the color blind
judge anyway, so it's not to worry about. And I'm
not looking at it because it's not part of the
record.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Mr. Snow, would you also mark where the
road goes across 1-15.
THE COURT: oh, counsel, that's visible on
the photograph. Anybody can see where it goes
across.
MR. FINLAYSON: okay. That's fine.
Q. Can you tell me how you determined just
where to put the first marker, the one closest to
the Anderson Junction intersection?
A. Can I go back down there?
THE COURT: if you need to, go ahead.
THE WITNESS: okay. 1 just - it's easier
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to kind of show you. The scale on this map is 120
to — 120 feet to one inch.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. How do you know that?
A. There is a stamp on the back that came
from the aerial photographic company that says one
inch on this is a scale of 120.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead and show
me how you did that.
THE WITNESS: Right here is a ditch. This
ditch, this drainage comes down so this ditch is
still present as of today. Okay. The first sign is
right here. I found this ditch, okay, so I - and I
know where this is because I can find it on the
ground.
I measured ~ I have a distance meter in
my pickup that measures accurately as you drive
along. Here I measured to that point where the sign
is, took the scale ~ I knew the exact distance,
took the scale and measured it to there, found that
distance.
From this point the distance measured —
(inaudible) - the next sign, scaled it from a point
that I now knew to that point, to this point.
THE COURT: All right, sir. We f ve got it
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in the most logical fashion.
A. From the first - from the most southerly
sign, to the center of the interchange or to the
center of where the ~ where old 91 goes underneath,
the structure is approximately 2,000 feet.
Q. By approximately, within how many feet?
A. A couple of feet.
MR. RONNOW: which sign? I'm sorry,
counsel.
THE WITNESS: The most southerly one. The
one that's closest to the interchange.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. How many feet?
MR. RONNOW: Approximately 2,000.
THE WITNESS: 2,000.
THE COURT: Give or take two.
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MR. FINLAYSON: I'm Still going to ask him

several questions.
THE COURT: if we're still working on it
as part of the proffer, counsel, we'll keep it up
until Mr. Finlayson is done.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Did you measure distances from one sign to
another and from the sign closest to the junction,
from there to the junction?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what the distances are?
MR. RONNOW: objection, relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled. This is not on the
record for the purposes of this trial, counsel.
This continues to be Mr. Finlayson's proffer with
respect to Exhibit 17. Am I correct, counsel?
MR. FINLAYSON: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Overruled. Go
ahead.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. What are those distances? Just state them
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THE WITNESS: A couple feet.

18
MR. FINLAYSON:
19
Q. From that sign to the middle sign, what is
20 the distance?
21
A. 490 feet.
22
Q. Is there a rule regarding how far —
23
MR. RONNOW: objection, Your Honor,
24 relevance. This is not - this is not part of the
25 proffer with regard to this exhibit. Mr. Finlayson

^iOT/T/
1 covered.
2
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, we would request
3 that the exhibit be removed now.
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is trying to bootstrap to evidence regarding a whole
entirely different section of the Outdoor
Advertising Act.
THE COURT: And, counsel, I'm going to
sustain you there with respect to this question
about the rule. Let's find the distance. What's
the distance to the most northerly sign, sir?
THE WITNESS: From the second sign to the
most northerly sign is 520 feet.
THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

1
J

1

MR. FINLAYSON:

Q. Were there any differences between your
measurements and the affidavit of Mr. Whitehead that
you - did you review his —
A. Yes, I had - I had Mr. Whitehead's
information with me, and I found that - the
distance that he had between the structure — I
wasn't sure exactly. I just went from what he
said.
He said he started in the center of it, so
I started from the center of it. I found the first
structure was actually 200 feet farther away from
the st. acture, farther to the north than what he
said there was.
///

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING, INC. (801) 652-9971

KUNZ VS. UDOT

I
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
|25

tyOl^/

Condenselt

Page 193

MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. And in other respects were the A. Everything else was running by the — he
had 490, that's what I found is 490. He had 520,
and that's what I had, 520.
THE COURT: Just the beginning point was
200 feet different?
THE WITNESS: Right.
MR. FINLAYSON: That's all I have on this
exhibit.
THE COURT: All right. Then Mr. Bailiff
if you will take the exhibit down, give it to the
clerk as offered but not received, filed with the
clerk for the purpose of the record.
MR. FINLAYSON: I would ask that the next
six photos be presented to the witness.
THE COURT: That should be 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, and 16.
MR. RONNOW: Excuse me, counsel. I don't
have 14 and 15 as photos. I think there are only
four more photos. 14 and 15 are documents. There1 s
three large photos, and one small photo left.
MR. FINLAYSON: okay. Numbers - the
first three in this series were perhaps given to the
judge. They were 8, 9, and 10.
/
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THE COURT: Does it fairly and accurately
depict the image as you saw it at the time you took
the photograph?
THE COURT: Same as it was this morning
when I drove by.
THE COURT: All right. And what direction
were you facing at the time you took the
photograph?
THE WITNESS: I was standing right on the
frontage road looking pretty well straight west.
THE COURT: All right, sir. Do you offer
Exhibit No. 11, counsel?
MR. FINLAYSON: I do, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any objections, Mr. Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, we would object
It's absolutely redundant of Exhibit 9. It's just
closer, and as such, it's a little bit misleading.
It doesn't add anything to what is going on or not
going on on the property.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you,
counsel. I overrule your objection. No. 11 is
received. I find that 11 does depict the generating
apparatus that was testified to by one* of the
plaintiff's witnesses, and Exhibit No. 9 does not
show that. 11 is received. Next question, y
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THE COURT: I have 8, 9, and 10. They're
already received, and they're on the bench.
MR. FINLAYSON: They're received in
evidence?
THE COURT: They are, counsel.
MR. FINLAYSON: okay. Yes. Would it be
appropriate for me to ask him what they represent or
do you consider on THE COURT: We Ve already got the record
on, and Mr. Snow assisted in that process. And
they're identified and on the record.
MR. FINLAYSON: Then these are 14,15, and
16.
MR. RONNOW: They're 11, 12, and 13.
THE BAILIFF: 11, 12, and 13.
THE COURT: All right. What does
photograph No. 11 depict, Mr. Snow?
THE WITNESS: No. 11 is the picture of the
center sign post with the generating apparatus box
- (inaudible) - signs.
THE COURT: All right. Taken when, sir?
THE WITNESS: This was taken same as the
others. I think June or July of this year.
THE COURT: YOU took it?
THE WITNESS: I took it.
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counsel.
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit
11 was received into evidence.)
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. I would ask you about No. 12 and ask you
what it represents?
A. Okay. No. 12 is a picture, this is the
most southerly sign post. This is looking probably
more a little toward the north because I'm getting a
lot of the Pine Valley Mountain in that.
Q. Did you take that at the same time?
A. Same time, yeah.
Q. This is a different picture from the
immediately prior one — I mean a different sign?
A. Different sign post. This is the one —
the most southerly one.
MR. FINLAYSON: I urge this in evidence.
THE COURT: Same objection, Mr. Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Duplication?
MR. RONNOW: Yes.
THE COURT: Overruled. The size of the
sign post shown in the photograph is somewhat more
useful to show the immediate area. 12 is received.
///
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(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit
12 was received into evidence)
MR FINLAYSON
Q No 13,1 ask you what that photo depicts9
A This is of the most northerly sign post
This is, again, looking - this is looking pretty
well just straight west
Q That's a different sign post from the
prior two 9
A Different sign post from the prior two
Q And you took this at the same time you
took-A Same time, uh-huh
MR FINLAYSON I submit this in evidence
MR RONNOW Same objections, Your Honor.
THE COURT Same objection? Same order
No 13 is received
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit
13 was received into evidence.)
MR FINLAYSON
Q Do those three exhibits reflect the
circumstances presently on the property?
A Yes
Q Does your file include a lease from the
landowner to a sign owner for signs on this /
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MR FINLAYSON Wait a minute

23
MR RONNOW Your Honor, if I may, this
24 lease is not even between — has nothing to do with
25 the parties m this case
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THE COURT is it the Lundgren lease,
counsel 9
1
MR RONNOW Yes
MR FINLAYSON Eveleth is the landowner
then under the lease and presently, so it is
relevant
1
THE COURT Well, and that's one of the
problems we run into with the Court of Appeals'
decision They have indicated that Lundgrens having
been the predecessor and interest to Kunz that they
are m the chain of title, and you're just basically
saying, why bother, Mr Ronnow, it's really not
before the Court today?
MR RONNOW There are two predecessors in
interest, Your Honor, two back.
MR FINLAYSON (Inaudible) - landowner,
not the sign owner, and I will show how that's
relevant
THE COURT But, counsel, there is no
issue that Mr. Eveleth is the landowner. Is that
correct, Mr. Ronnow?
MR RONNOW That is correct, and that is
not relevant under the issue before the Court.
THE COURT Then why is it that the lease,
Mr Fmlayson, is relevant? If there's no ISSU^/
|
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property?
•
A Yes.
MR RONNOW objection, relevance.
THE COURT As it goes to use, counsel,
and use is one of the factors that the Court of
Appeals did point out, a lease establishing that a
lease between the property owner and the sign owner,
you f re sure it f s irrelevant9
MR RONNOW Your Honor, this is not even
a lease between the current sign owner and the
property owner. This is a lease that goes back
years, and there is no dispute but that the signs
are there pursuant to a lease. The issue of use is
that it's a sign on the property under lease. This
document, itself, is irrelevant.
MR FINLAYSON I would like to respond.
THE COURT I don't think you need to,
counsel. I can see its relevance. However, what is
the exhibit number of said lease?
MR FINLAYSON No 14.
THE COURT All right
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1 that Eveleth is the landowner, plaintiff stipulates
2 that that's the fact ~
3
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MR FINLAYSON Mr. Eveleth'S

participation we will submit is relevant to the
zoning change, and he as a landowner is relevant to
that line of inquiry.
THE COURT Well, counsel, m the
plaintiff's case in chief, unrebutted testimony came
in that Mr. Eveleth was involved in the annexation
process and in the —
MR RONNOW Master planning.
THE COURT - master planning at least to
the extent that his interests were solicited by
Toquerville Town and that his requests were
accommodated by extending the annexation, and,
thereafter, the zoning map up to encompass all of
Mr. Eveleth's property on the west side of the
freeway, on the northern edge of the town limits.
Now, that's not an issue as I see it. I
don't think you need to offer any proof on that
because everyone agrees that Mr. Eveleth, as a
landowner, was part and parcel to the process of
annexing, and, thereafter, zoning What else do you
want to get into with Mr Eveleth 9
MR FINLAYSON I'm willing to accept that

I
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if we stipulate that Mr. Eveleth was the landowner
at the time the signs were first put up, and that he
has continued to be the landowner.
THE COURT: And there's no question about
that, to your knowledge, Mr. Ronnow? You have no
factual issue about that whatsoever?
MR. RONNOW: Except that it's not
relevant, Your Honor. I have no ~ our
understanding in the underlying — in the case prior
to appeal was that he was and is, has been landowner
at all times relevant to this issue.
THE COURT: All right. Then, counsel, it
is conclusively proven that Mr. Eveleth is the owner
of the fee title interest, the underlying real
estate upon which these signs, which are the subject
matter of this litigation, are located.
MR. FINLAYSON: I'm willing to withdraw
submission of this.
THE COURT: All right. Then we don't need
to worry about Exhibit No. 14.
MR. FINLAYSON: Actually, I think I miss
named i t The lease might be 15.
MR. RONNOW: 15, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. 15, then, we don't
need to worry about. You can take Exhibit 15 back
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to Mr. Finlayson.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. No. 14 I would have presented to the
witness and ask him what it is.
THE COURT: Do you have a copy, Mr.
Ronnow?
MR. RONNOW: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: okay. Go ahead, Mr. Scott,
(sic) take a look at No. 14.
MR. FINLAYSON:
Q. Mr. Snow, what is the title on the top of
this document?
A. It is Agreement Utah.
Q. Is this — do you have — is this part of
your file?
A. Yes.
Q. And on the back page, what does it show?
MR. RONNOW: objection, Your Honor. Until
it's admitted, I f m going to object to the witness
reviewing or reading from the exhibit, and we are
going to object on relevance. If he wants to
identify exactly what it is, we can proceed from
there.
THE COURT: when it says, Agreement Utah,
what is this agreement, sir?
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THE WITNESS: This is the agreement this is the Utah Federal Agreement for the outdoor
advertising sign.
THE COURT: An agreement entered into
between the State of Utah Department of
Transportation of the United States of America
Department of Transportation regarding to the regarding the outdoor advertising issues and
agreements between those two entities?
THE WITNESS: Right.
THE COURT: All right. Your objection as
to relevance, Mr. Ronnow.
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, again, it
couldn't be clearer as to the narrow confines of the
issue on remand here, that is, the purpose of the
Toquerville legislative body enacting their
ordinance. The federal agreements between the State
of Utah and the federal government with regard to
outdoor advertising are simply not relevant to this
procedure or that issue.
Insofar as it may have been relevant to
issues have already gone up on appeal, the Court of
Appeals has dealt with that. Insofar as it may have
~ may be relevant in - somewhere down the road in
that administrative procedure that the Court allyded
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to this morning, we're at pure speculation at this
point as to whether it's relevant or not. In
relationship to the primary purpose of adopting a
zone depicted under Exhibit 1 by the Toquerville
Town Council, it simply is not relevant.
THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson, why is the
agreement between the State of Utah and the United
States relevant and probative in the issues before
the Court today?
MR. FINLAYSON: The Federal State
Agreement purpose was quoted in our brief to the
federal court and it states a policy.
THE COURT: Federal court or appellate
court?
MR. FINLAYSON: Excuse me, appellate
court.
THE COURT: okay. We f ve got one too many
judges involved in this mess already, counsel.
MR. FINLAYSON: It was once before the
federal court.
THE COURT: That's what I was afraid of.
MR. FINLAYSON: No, before the - before
the Court of Appeals, sir. We quoted that it's a
policy statement regardless of what explicitly the
Court of Appeals stated, it is the law that Utah
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must comply with that federal standard.
If we were to have a ruling here in
violation of that law, the federal government could
take action, and in any event, regardless of what
action they take, if it is the law, I'm sure the
Court of Appeals would incorporate it. I mean, they
can't envision every conceivable idea that may be
presented. If it's the law, I'm sure they would
countenance this Court's recognizing it.
THE COURT: But, counsel, my concern is,
first and foremost, I'm a state trial court judge.
I don't have federal issues over me, and I don't
have - in front of me, and I don't have federal
jurisdiction over me except in the broadest sense of
the federal constitution.
I have no authority to interpret, nor
enforce an agreement to which the United States
government, is a party unless they come in and
consent to give me that authority, and I can't
imagine a federal agency doing so. That would have
to be before the federal court in Salt Lake.
The fact that it was in your appellate
brief, counsel, may indeed be of use to the
appellate court in determining what the applicable
law of the case might be between vis-a-vis Utahyand
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the United States, but in the issues that are before
this Court today, as to the primary purpose of
Toquerville Town in enacting their annexation master
planning and zoning of this property, I just still
am puzzled as to why it is that this Court need to
review and/or opine on the Federal State Agreement.
MR. FINLAYSON: The section 27-12-136.2 of
the Utah Act specifically incorporates this Federal
State Agreement.
THE COURT: And if it does, counsel, if it
incorporates the Federal State Agreement, then it
does just as a matter of law, but do I need this in
evidence t o MR. FINLAYSON: It's more a matter of law
than evidence really.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. FINLAYSON: I would submit it in that
way if it's incorporated here, but I thought perhaps
I would ensure its consideration if I submitted it
in evidence.
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Ronnow, do you think
there is any need for me to look at the Federal
State Agreement in order to find the facts necessary
in this hearing?
MR. RONNOW: No, Your Honor, and I would
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like to just clarify the record because we're not —
we're going to get into this again as soon as
closing argument begins. Mr. Finlayson read from
the section of the Court of Appeals case this
morning that he's referring to on page 769 of the
Pacific Reporter, that's 913 P.2d, 765 at 769 in
that left-hand column beginning with the paragraph
in enacting section 27-12-136.3, and the Court of
Appeals went through that broad policy statement and
suggested there that there had to be consistency
with that policy.
But the counsel for the State stopped
short of the only relevance of that statement when
in the last sentence the Court of Appeals says,
Accordingly, if a zoning body designates specific
land as commercial for the primary purpose of
allowing outdoor advertising on that land, then
section 27-12-136.3 (3) prohibits the use of the
billboards on a land regardless of whether or not
the zoning body also intends to reserve the land for
other commercial use, or, in other words, because of
the policy that they articulated out of the Federal
Act 136.3 (3) was promulgated, and if we run. afoul
of that, then we also run afoul of the act.
But the issue before the Court is whether
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— if primary purpose of the zoning was to
accommodate signage. This Court is not — in this
proceeding here today, is it necessary at all for
this Court to get into the federal act with that
language? The Court of Appeals has tied it up all
very neatly.
THE COURT: Well, that's the way I see it,
counsel, but in order to preserve this record, what
I'm going to do is I'm going to receive the
agreement, not as an exhibit, but simply filed by
the State to show the details of the Federal State
Agreement, but I agree with you, Mr. Ronnow, I don't
think I need look at it. But it will go into the
file so that anybody else who has a concern over it,
for what possible reason I can't imagine, but it
will be there.
MR. RONNOW: All right. Your Honor and if
I may just add one thing to the record. You know,
it's virtually impossible for us to prepare to deal
with this kind of collateral issue MR. FINLAYSON: I object to this type of
response I don't THE COURT: All right. Your objection is
on the record. Go ahead, Mr. Ronnow.
MR. RONNOW. -- with this kind of issue
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that is so far afield of what the Court of Appeals
directed this Court, but with the Court's ruling, we
understand
THE COURT All right Then Exhibit No.
14 is ordered filed m the Court's file, submitted
as authority under the statute, prepared by counsel
for the defense to show the Court what the law is
insofar as it is impacted by the Federal State
Agreement.
MR RONNOW Then, Your Honor, is my
objection sustained?
THE COURT Your objection is sustained as
to its reception in evidence.
MR RONNOW Okay.
THE COURT All right. Go ahead, Mr.
Fmlayson.
MR FTNLAYSON Thank you, Your Honor.
The next exhibit is No. 16, which I would ask be
presented to the witness and first shown to counsel
if he does not have a copy.
MR RONNOW Maybe not. Okay.
MR FINLAYSON
Q Mr. Snow, who took this picture?
A I did.
Q When did you take it?
age 210
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A I think I took this about last Thursday.
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Q Does it accurately reflect the
circumstances as of the last time you were on the
property?
A Yes.
Q When was that?
A Last time I was actually on the property
was Thursday. I drove by this morning and the sign
was still there.
Q Today you saw that sign?
A Yes.
Q Okay. What does the sign say?
MR RONNOW. objection. We will object to
the exhibit, but if it is received, it's the best
evidence of what is in it.
THE COURT All right. Any objection,
then, to this photograph, counsel?
MR RONNOW Yes, Your Honor, again
irrelevant objection.
THE COURT Overruled. It shows the
property as it exists last Thursday and today. No.
16 is received.
(Whereupon, Defendant's Exhibit
16 was received into evidence.)
MR FINLAYSON with the stipulation that
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Eveleth is still the owner, I will refrain from
further questioning
THE COURT All right, counsel.
MR FINLAYSON This is my testimony, Your
Honor, and Mr. Snow is finished with direct.
THE COURT All right. You may
cross-examine, counsel, if you need to.
MR RONNOW No questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT All right. Thank you, Mr.
Snow. You may step down. If you will hand those
photographs to the bailiff, that will take care of
it. The State having rested, then, counsel, do you
want a few minutes to go through your notes, examine
the record, and prepare for closing arguments?
MR RONNOW That will be helpful, Your
Honor.
THE COURT All right. Mr. Fmlayson,
let's give you the same chance since Mr. Ronnow
wants it. Let's stand in recess until 3:15, and
then we'll come back and hear your closing
arguments.
(Recess.)
THE COURT We are back in session in Kunz
versus Department of Transportation. Mr. Ronnow,
Mr. Finlayson, and Mr. Scott — Mr. Scott
Snow
t -—spc
&\Otfc/
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are present and, Mr. Ronnow, you may proceed with
your closing argument.
MR RONNOW: Your Honor, we have been
doing closing argument all day long to a certain
extent, but as the Court pointed out, there's
clearly a lot left m this lawsuit even after
today. So I want to take a little time with this.
Let me start by stating that we are not
here today to litigate the appropriateness of these
signs from any kind of a setting standpoint. While
there may be a time and place for that, that isn't
today.
We are not here today to construe
compliance with federal acts, agreements between the
state and federal government, or even state or UDOT
agency administrative procedure. What we are here
to determine, and the only thing that we are here to
determine today is primary purpose for the
Toquerville zoning decision zoning the Eveleth
property at Anderson Junction as highway
commercial.
Clearly, as the Court has already pointed
out, at 769 and at 771 of the Kunz versus State
case, that's 913 Pacific 2.d 765, clearly in two
places the Court of Appeals limit it to just that.
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1 The Court stated, We, therefore, reverse and remand
2 for trial to allow the fact finder to determine the
3 primary purpose for the zoning decision.
4
Now, the Court of Appeals, as it is
5 sometimes want to do, generously supplied us with a
6 lot of direction about what we might consider, and,
7 in fact, I submit to you today, Your Honor, that the
8 Court of Appeals has already ruled on defendant's
9 Motion in Limine.
10
The Court of Appeals stated at 769 of the
11 Kunz case that the Court, the fact finder, can and
12 should consider all relevant evidence. All relevant
13 evidence. Now, it's important to understand there
14 that the Court has ruled on that Motion in Limine
15 because the inquiry at this stage is not the
16 construction of any statute. That's already been
17 accomplished in appeal.
18
It isn't the construction of any statute.
19 It isn't even the validity of the actual zoning
20 ordinance or map or master plan or annexation that
21 Toquerville undertook. We're not here to consider
22 whether or not their action is valid under express
23 and limited direction of the Court of Appeals. We
24 are here only to look at the purpose in designating
25 that property as highway commercial.
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Now, since the Court of Appeals suggested
that it would be appropriate and relevant for the
Court to look at actual land use, that's why we
looked at all those photographs, and the Court of
Appeals also said that it would be appropriate for
the Court to consider whether Toquerville merely
perpetrated county zoning, that under that express
direction the whole Toquerville process of
annexation, master plan, and zoning map adoption are
relevant to this issue.
If we are to consider whether Toquerville
merely perpetrated an earlier zoning THE COURT: Perpetuated.
MR. RONNOW: Perpetuated. Excuse me, Your
Honor. — perpetuated an earlier zoning designation
then we can't - we can't understand that issue
without looking at what they did.
It's important also to note here, Your
Honor, that the policy behind 136.3 (3), and that is
Utah Code Annotated 27-12-136.3 paren (3) for the
record, the policy behind that is really to
preclude, as the Court of Appeals directs us there,
to preclude the ha tened, unreasoned exercise zoning
authority merely t accommodate a outdoor
advertising. All right.
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Clearly this Court of Appeals held that
the — in recognizing and affirmed this Court with
the Court's conclusion that a legitimate town zoning
body may prospectively designate commercial and
industrial zonings as part of their long-range
planning, and in that situation, signage, outdoor
advertising complies with the act.
It is only under the circumstance that
that zoning activity was perpetrated, motivated for
the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising
that we run afoul of 136.6.
Now, then, the State would have this Court
believe that after the fact result is the only
evidence - is the only probative evidence of what
the intent and purpose of the zoning authority was
in adopting that ordinance, and that simply isn't
true. That would tip the zoning process on its head
completely.
That would run so foul of all the purpose
and policy and objective in the cities and towns
Land Planning Enabling Act as well as the county
Land Planning Enabling Act encouraging these towns
and cities to reach out, and as Mayor Wahlquist
said, try to get ahead of the zoning curve.
Certainly, there is no better and
mu vivid
viviu v
[O^f/
fa
illustration of that problem than Washington
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County. Reactive zoning is the problem. Proactive
zoning is the solution. Proactive zoning is what
the Utah Land Enabling Act is all about.
So the Court of Appeals correctly but
quietly affirmed this trial court in saying that the
trial court construed the use of the term "reserved"
to mean that the property does not actually need to
have commercial development on it, but that it
merely be zoned for that purpose.
Then the Court goes on and quietly
affirms, the trial court, while we agree that an
area zoned for commercial or industrial use in a
city or town need not actually have commercial
development on it to satisfy the definition, we
conclude that such property may still be excluded
from the use of outdoor advertising if the zoning
violates 136.3.
So the fact that there is no commercial
development out there is not evidence that the
designation violated 136.3 (3). It's only evidence
that there is no commercial development out on the
property.
We heard from Kim Wallace, the engineer,
with regard to the annexation that technically v, nat
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prompted the annexation were the property owners out
there responding to several issues. One was the
opportunity that perhaps this reservoir on the
planning — on the drawing board represented in
terms of commercial.
Generically, with or without the
reservoir, there was interest in zoning that
property commercial both by property owners and
throughout the town, but Mr. Wallace stated that
there were three primary issues or concerns driving,
if you will, that annexation.
Once the petition was received and the
town reviewed the petition, the issues were how do
we pay for services, how do we get them out there,
and a lot of discussions about SIDs and other
things. How do we actually handle the logistic of
providing services? A lot of talk about the water
and solutions and what may or may not happen that
way.
And then most importantly a lot of talk
about the property owners and they're to have
commercialrightnear the Anderson Junction
interchange itself, and north, on the east side of
Anderson junction, the residential side.
He said — Mr. Wallace said clearly that
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11 -month time frame in developing this master plan
and zoning map, working on monthly public meetings
with the planning commission, in which the public
was involved and encouraged to participate.
This is not a kind of zoning procedure
that is - that is, you know, a snap judgment to
accommodate signage. He was very frightened that
the signs were an issue out there, and there was ~
if there was any evidence or motivation with regard
to the signs, I think it can be safely construed —
the evidence can be safely - conservatively
construed to say that a lot of people were in
objection to those signs, didn't want to see them,
but the issues, as Mr. Sizemore stated, that drove
the master plan and zoning map were first,
primarily, commercial area.
Toquerville has a need. As the mayor
testified, we're on a curve. It's growing. It's
developing. We need to get ahead of that
development. Part of that is the opportunity for a
commercial development, and what that brings to a
growing viable community.
Toquerville also has a long history and
unique character of being a very quaint,
agricultural small town. They had a problem, and
Pa
-10^5/
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those were the issues that were driving the
consideration and review of this annexation. It was
clear that the amended configuration of the
annexation was to accommodate arequestnot just by
Mr. Eveleth, but by the property owners on both
sides of the freeway to the effect that — all of
our property owners, and that's certainly a
reasonablerequestand part of the ongoing process
in annexation.
And I submit to the Court it is exactly
why the state code requires that the first step is
for the town to adopt a statement of policy, a
policy statement, publish it, get it out on the
table so that those kinds of issues can be raised as
they move from the policy statement in an annexation
to the final adoption of the annexation.
And the fact that Mr. Eveleth's property
happened to be one of those parcels that was divided
down the middle so that half would be county and
half would be city, again, is not evidence that the
annexation was to accommodate his sign leases.
Mr. Sizemore, the planner, his testimony
isremarkablein the context of 136.3 (3) because he
clearly illustrated how deliberate, how careful
every effort was made to involve the public,

igr01-96
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all of the witnesses testified that that problem and
issue was what drove the discussion, where do we put
commercial.
And all the witnesses testified that
designation of the Anderson Junction location
provided a perfect fit. It was the best opportunity
for a commercial enterprise in connection with an
1-15 cloverleaf interchange. It wasremovedfrom
the old, quaint area of Toquerville Town, would not
impinge, interfere, or disrupt that area, and the
property owners all wanted it out there.
That's what drove this signing, this
decision. Wahlquist testified withregardto the
water issues that there were problems with water
issues but what is important, from Mr. Wahlquist's
testimony, is therecognitionas the mayor and
chairman of the town council that they had a need,
they had a growing community.
They had to get ahead of that growth curve
to plan for that growth curve, and, clearly, all the
discussion of the water and how they would
accommodate the water, even the continued work with
the water conservancy district to solve those
problems, is a clear indication the evidence is that
the primary purpose of adopting that commercial zone
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Mr. Wahlquist, a witness for the
plaintiff, further testified that in this state of
things, commercial activity in the area of the signs
is not even feasible. Further, he said that a new
waterline that's going in in that area goes across
the freeway and does not go up to the area of the
signs.
I would like to say something about Mr.
Eveleth. Since the focus is the land use, Mr.
Eveleth is really more pertinent to this inquiry
than the sign owners. It was Mr. Eveleth who owned
the land and had the first lease with the first
landowner, and he has been the continuing landowner
from that time to this.
It is Mr. Eveleth that constantly said, I
am going to develop this area commercially and put
commercial materials on it. He made six appearances
to Washington County, which is in a certified copy
of the Washington County MR. RONNOW: objection, Your Honor.
Counsel is arguing facts that are not in evidence
before the Court for this proceeding.
THE COURT: All right, counsel. Your
objection is noted for the record. Go ahead, Mr.
Finlayson.
Pa e224

1
throughout was to accommodate the growth of
2
Toquerville, provide a logical and appropriate place
3
to develop hopefully commercial enterprises.
4
The fact that it hasn't happened yet, and
5
I underscore yet, Your Honor, is not evidence that
6
this zoning was adopted merely to accommodate or
7
allow for outdoor advertising.
8
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Mr.
9
Finlayson, it's your turn.
10
MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you, Your Honor, and
11
counsel. The Court of Appeals directed focus to,
12
quote, "actual land use." The nature of the
13
property for the signs would be the most objective,
14
most significant evidence that can be presented in
15
this case. It shows the purpose served by the
16
zoning.
17
The Court of Appeals recognized that
18
statements of intent don't matter to whether signs
19
actually violate the purpose of the Outdoor
20
Advertising Act and someone could state a purpose.
21
We state that we are doing this only for commerce
22
and not for signs, and then they could zone it that
23
way and signs forever be the only activity on the
24
property.
25
And Mr. Ronnow's argument would have it
Page 222
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that those signs were always legal from now until
1
MR. FINLAYSON: I wish to show the record
eternity. That cannot be the standard. You have to
2 of Mr. Eveleth with regard to this property.
look at the actual land uses or Section 27-12-136.3
3 Without Mr. Eveleth1 s involvement, the bump on the
in parens (3) is read out of existence, and that was
4 west side of the property that belongs to Eveleth,
precisely the point that the Court of Appeals was
5 that's where all three signs are located, that
concerned about.
6 portion on the west side of the property would never
The fuzziness of the memories of these
7 have been included in the annexation by the city.
people about this long past annexation and zoning
8
Their first proposal excluded that area,
shows that the objective facts should be the focus
9 and it's reasonable why it did. It's too far away
of the decision.
10 from the intersection. Perhaps it was reasonable to
Further, the Court of Appeals began its
11 consider that commercial development would occur
inquiry of section 27-12-136.3 in parens (3) by
12 right at the intersection, and witnesses testified
quoting the purpose of the Utah Outdoor Advertising
13 that if there was going to be commercial development
Act. I won't repeat it. I've stated it earlier.
14 that is where it would occur first.
The testimony of all of the witnesses
15
There is no commercial development even
showed there was no commercial activity ever on this
16 there at this time, but way up where the signs are,
property. Mr. Wahlquist has been in this area for
17 2,000 feet away, is not a feasible place for a
30 years, and he says ~ he stated on his own
18 commercial development.
observation there has never been any commercial
19
We should not be surprised that Mr.
activity there.
20 Eveleth, the landowner who is receiving income from
Further, specifically addressing other
21 the sign leases, is the one who urged inclusion of
features of the land use, he testified that there is
22 his property in this annexation. The city didn't
no water service, no sewer, no power except for a
23 include it because it was too far away. Only after
24 generator on a closed system that's now defunct, no
24 Mr. Eveleth interceded did they include his
25 commercial activity at all.
25 property.
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1 law that statements of intent of a legislative body
These signs have been there for more than
2 that are not part of the legislative record are not
nine years. That's the only thing that is there.
3 admissible, and that would include almost all of the
If there is any case where 27-12-136.3 would have
4 evidence submitted by Mr. Ronnow.
relevance, it must have relevance here, otherwise a
5
This rule does not say that you can get no
person could state an intent to do something
6 evidence of legislative intent. It is a rule that
commercially, put signs there in a pristine,
7 limits legislative intent to the official record,
beautiful area, and I submit the pristineness and
8 and again the fuzziness of the memories shows why
the beauty of this area is relevant to consideration
9 that rule became law.
here.
10
We submit that the nature of the area, the
A person could put signs in that area and
11
use
there,
the passage of time, the signs have been
leave them there forever and violate the policy of
12 there, and the area has been zoned commercial
the state act and the federal act and the Federal
13 without any commercial development, require, in this
State Agreement, but certainly just limiting it to
14 instance, a ruling that it's a - an area that is
the Utah act as the Court of Appeals referred to
15 unlawful for signs, that area, which is proposed by
that would make 27-12-136.3 in parens (3) entirely
16 plaintiff. We submit they have not borne their
useless.
17
burden of proof. Thank you.
Seven years have passed since Toquerville
18
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Mr.
zoned it commercial and still there's no commercial
19 Ronnow, any rebuttal?
development there. We donft object to the county
20
MR. RONNOW: Yes, Your Honor. The only
zoning an area commercial and seeking to develop it
21 evidence submitted by the State, evidence —
commercially. There is no objection on the part of
the State at all about that.
22 affirmative evidence of the primary purpose of
Our objection is that if it's an area that
23 Toquerville Town zoning authorities in zoning this
serves the primary purpose of allowing outdoor
24 property was to allow outdoor advertising, the only
advertising, then it doesn't qualify the area for
25 evidence whatsoever is that outdoor advertising is
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signs. This doesn't stop them from doing other
commercial development, and, in fact, if they did
other commercial development there and it was bona
fide and it was in the area of the signs, the State
would not object to the signs.
The incongruity is that you have signs
there and only signs in a pristine area without it
even being feasible for a commercial development and
in justifying the signs for the policy of the act is
to preserve the beauty of the pristine area. It is
starkly incongruous. In 27-12-136.3 in parens (3)
renders these signs unlawful.
Just — I guess I have stated something
about intent. The fuzziness of the memories about
what was said, counsel, we urge, focus on the
objective criteria. Mr. Ronnow made several
comments that I would like to respond to.
He said that we should consider all
relevant evidence. Now, did the Court of Appeals
mean by that that you accept all evidence that is
relevant regardless of whether it's inadmissible for
any other reason? Of course, it didn't. It meant
accept relevant evidence that also meets other
criteria of admissibility.
I submit that it is crystal clear in the
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the only use.
It ignores the fact that outdoor
advertising was there before they zoned it, but the
State can only point to and continues to be that
force, that use, and the State would have the Court
believe that use is the only evidence to consider,
and that simply isn't the case.
In connection to this brief in Motion in
Limine the case is cited there in — are all cited
for the same proposition which is totally irrelevant
to our issue today. That is, in construing a
statute, the Court's refused to consider testimony
about intent.
We're not here to construe 136.3 (3).
That job has been done. There isn't any dispute as
to what that statute says and how that statute
applies now in light of the Court of Appeals'
direction in law of the case.
We are here to determine a factual issue.
Did they create that zone district for the primary
purpose of allowing outdoor advertising? I submit
to the Court that there is no evidence before this
Court at all that there was any purpose, any
motivation at all to create this zone to allow
signage.
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The only evidence with regard to signage
is some rather nebulous recognition that there were
those who were opposed to signage out there and are
still opposed to signage out there. There is no
evidence in this record today presented to this
Court showing any primary purpose to accommodate
signage. The State just merely repeatedly refers to
the fact that nothing has been done out there.
That isn't even completely accurate. When
the State says that the actual land use shows the
purpose served by the zoning, that's only half the
case when you're talking about planning.
The State has no response and no evidence
to the substantial body of evidence that Toquerville
has no viable option for commercial other than out
in that area, that for Toquerville that location in
and around the Anderson Junction, along both the
1-15 interchange and the state road going in to
Toquerville, north of the ridge on Exhibit 1, is not
just an appropriate place for commercial, it makes
the most sense for Toquerville. No evidence to
contradict that whatsoever.
All parties involved in the process,
annexation, the engineer, master planning from the
planner, consultant, the planning commission ^
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be. And it is now there available, ready for
development as is the power. All those homes up in
that area have power. UP&L is up there with those
power poles. You can see them. There is power that
1
can be put in.
J
The issue is when does growth in economic
circumstances motivate development in a growth
J
area? If the city waits until the growth is already
1
on them, they lose their opportunity to control and
1
develop appropriately, reasonably.
1
I submit to the Court that there is not a
bit of evidence showing that this zoning designation
was adopted for any purpose to allow or accommodate
or otherwise deal with those signs at all except by
1
virtue of the fact that they were already there and
J
mat the primary purpose was to solve that
J
commercial zoning problem and accommodate commercial
zoning in the most logical place.
1
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. These are
I
the Court's factual findings: First of all, the
1
property in question, the Eveleth property located
J
west of interstate 15 and consisting of the northern
1
most limits of the Town of Toquerville, was annexed
by the town in 1992.
MR. FINLAYSON: what year?
( Z / 4 £ > 5 V yPage 23211
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THE COURT: 1992, counsel, annexed by the
town. Beginning in January of 1993, Toquerville
Town undertook a process of master planning their
entire community enlisting the Association of Five
County Association of Governments and the expertise
offered by that agency using the efforts of the town
engineer and enlisting the input of all property
owners.
J
The Court finds that the signs in question
had been on the subject property since 1987. The
Court finds from Exhibit No. 1 and the testimony
elicited with regard to Exhibit No. 1 that the Town
of Toquerville, within its corporate limits, is
separated into two distinct areas, one south of the
high ridge that blocks view of Anderson Junction
from the town - the traditional town and one north
and west of the high ridge, which constitutes the
annexed area.
It is unrebutted and the testimony stands
unobjected to before this Court that it was the
purpose of the town in establishing its master plan
and zoning ordinance and zoning designations upon
its zoning map that commercial zoning be limited to
two distinct areas. One of them a tiny parcel
located at the south end of the town in the, as I've

230

chairman, and the mayor all agreed on one thing, the
community wanted commercial development and didn't
want it in downtown Toquerville, and the State has
no explanation to the clear and overwhelming
evidence that their purpose was to locate a
commercial zone that made sense both in terms
location and in terms of opportunity.
There is no better opportunity for
commercial benefit for Toquerville Town than that
area that they zoned. In relationship to the
argument that the fact there are no services
currently out there, that's not completely accurate
either.
The testimony is that the city has worked
- the town has worked on developing water and
solving the water problem. The testimony is that
they now have that water source problem solved, that
they will be able to pump water out of this
wonderful aquifer under the direction — under the
auspices of the water conservancy district and serve
those areas.
The state misconstrued the testimony. The
mayor said that there is not a plan currently to
pipe water across to the Eveleth property or the
west side, but there isn't anyreasonwhy it can't
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described it, notch up against the existing highway
17 that leads towards La Verkin, and the other
portion immediately surrounding the Anderson
Junction,
The Court finds from Exhibit No. 2 that it
was the intent of Toquerville Town, because they
incorporated their planning and zoning to match up
8 with their existing zoning ordinance, that any
9 signage, of the type which is in question in this
litigation, be permissible only by conditional use
permit.
The town ordinance so provides, and it is
the clear intention of the town in this annexation
to substantially limit outdoor advertising signs by
that process.
While the Court has heard evidence and
testimony of the intent of the town from the former
mayor, the chairman of the planning commission at
the time that these actions were undertaking, the
former town engineer, and while that has had some
assistance in the Court's determination of these
facts, the most telling intent of the town, with
respect to outdoor advertising signs, is the town's
ordinance, itself.
And due to the fact that the placement of
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outdoor advertising signs within the Eveleth
property after Toquerville annexed and zoned the
property could only be done by conditional use
permit, the Court cannot find that the primary
purpose of the zoning was to allow outdoor signage.
Accordingly, as a conclusion of law, and
because this matter was remanded of the Court on the
conflicting evidence regarding Toquerville's primary
purpose behind its zoning, the Court finds that the
primary purpose of the zoning was something other
than allowing outdoor advertising.
Ho wever, the Court further finds that the
singfe and sok use of this property and the cmly
evidence before this Court of the use of this
property since 1987 has bomforoutdoor signage.
Thwe is no evidence of tt« Court-befwre the
Court of the availability of any utilities, water,
power, gas, sanitary sewer, or other utilities and
vrere it incumbent u{Km the Q ^
uses this property had been put to - a n d Vm endog
a sentence wfth a pieittsitta
not
|23
But if it were left to the Court to
24 detetniiiietowhich use ift^
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come to on the basis of this record is that the only
use that this property has ever had during the times
pertinent 1987 to date has been for the maintenance
of outdoor advertising.
I observe parenthetically that the
legislative use within 27-12-136.3 sub 3 of the
phrase primary purpose of allowing outdoor
advertising probably does not accomplish the intent
— the announced intent of the act or give any kind
of reasonable framework within which courts may
determine issues of these kinds.
I would suspect that it would be a rare
case if the Court could find evidence that the
primary purpose was to build billboards. The
evidence here is the primary purpose is to get
development away from the old traditional Town of
Toquerville out against the freeway, isolate the old
traditional town from that commercial purpose, and
increase the tax base of the town by having a
commercial base, but not in their backyard
Mr. Ronnow, do you need any further
findings from the Court at this stage?
MR. RONNOW: if I mayjust clarify, the
Court started into a discussion of 27-12-133.3 (sic)
using the phrase parenthetically and thenimovefli
moved on
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1 to a statement that the Court was finding primary
2 purpose to locale commercial activity outside of the
3 old town. Is it the Court's intent that the second
4 statement, primary purpose was to locale cnmincaeial
5 activity outside of downtown, if you will,
6 Toquerville, is it the Court's intent that be
7 included as a finding of fact?
8
THE COURT: Tint is a findiqg of fact,
9 counsel
10
MR. RONNOW: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That was their primary propose
11
12 on the basis of the record that I have before HCL
MR. RONNOW: I think that covers Ac
13
14 issues on remand, Your Honor.
THE COURT:/JlrighL Mr. Rnhtyson,
15
anything
else I can determine as far as afindingof
16
17 fact in your side of the litigation?
MR. FINLAYSON: I can't think of any at
18
19 the moment, Your Honor.
THE COURT: AD right Thank yon,
20
21 counsel IfyouwfflpiqparetheapiHopriale-22 (inaiKW>fe)-Mr.Rom
23 Rnlaysonfar his response, the Court will sign the
24 final order.
25
MIL RONNOW: I will, Your
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2
THEC; rRT. Thank you, gentlemen. The
3 Court will st:md in recess in this matter.
4
(Ther ~>on, the hearing
5
was concluded.)
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STATE OFUTAH

)
) SS
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON)
I, J. Elizabeth Van Fleet, a duly
commissioned Notary Public, Washington County, State
of Utah, do hereby certify:
That I reported stenographically the
foregoing videotape at the time and place
hereinbefore set forth.
That thereafter said shorthand notes were
transcribed into typewriting and that the
typewritten transcript of said videotape is a
complete, true and accurate transcription of my said
shorthand notes taken down at said time, to the best
of my ability.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand and affixed my official seal of office in the
County of Washington, State of Utah, this day of
,1997.

J. Elizabeth Van Fleet, RPR, CSR
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